email page print pageAll Topic Reviews
A Theory of Feelings Anger and Forgiveness"My Madness Saved Me"10 Good Questions about Life and Death12 Modern Philosophers50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a GodA Cabinet of Philosophical CuriositiesA Case for IronyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to Buddhist PhilosophyA Companion to FoucaultA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to HumeA Companion to KantA Companion to Phenomenology and ExistentialismA Companion to PragmatismA Companion to the Philosophy of ActionA Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyA Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Critical Overview of Biological FunctionsA Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of MindA Cursing Brain?A Delicate BalanceA Farewell to AlmsA Frightening LoveA Future for PresentismA Guide to the Good LifeA History of PsychiatryA History of the MindA Life Worth LivingA Manual of Experimental PhilosophyA Map of the MindA Metaphysics of PsychopathologyA Mind So RareA Natural History of Human MoralityA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Natural History of VisionA Parliament of MindsA Philosopher Looks at The Sense of HumorA Philosophical DiseaseA Philosophy of BoredomA Philosophy of Cinematic ArtA Philosophy of CultureA Philosophy of EmptinessA Philosophy of FearA Philosophy of PainA Physicalist ManifestoA Place for ConsciousnessA Question of TrustA Research Agenda for DSM-VA Revolution of the MindA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Stroll With William JamesA Tear is an Intellectual ThingA Theory of FreedomA Thousand MachinesA Universe of ConsciousnessA Very Bad WizardA Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the CurtainA Virtue EpistemologyA World Full of GodsA World Without ValuesAbout FaceAbout the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the SelfAction and ResponsibilityAction in ContextAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionAction, Contemplation, and HappinessAction, Emotion and WillAdam SmithAdaptive DynamicsAddictionAddictionAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction Is a ChoiceAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAftermathAfterwarAgainst AdaptationAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HappinessAgainst HealthAgency and ActionAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and EmbodimentAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAl-JununAlain BadiouAlain BadiouAlasdair MacIntyreAlien Landscapes?Altered EgosAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Ethics for TodayAn Intellectual History of CannibalismAn Interpretation of DesireAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy An Introduction to Philosophy of EducationAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyAn Introductory Philosophy of MedicineAn Odd Kind of FameAnalytic FreudAnalytic Philosophy in AmericaAncient AngerAncient Models of MindAncient Philosophy of the SelfAngerAnimal LessonsAnimal MindsAnimals Like UsAnnihilationAnother PlanetAnswers for AristotleAnti-ExternalismAnti-Individualism and KnowledgeAntigone’s ClaimAntipsychiatryAre We Hardwired?Are Women Human?Arguing about DisabilityArguing About Human NatureAristotle and the Philosophy of FriendshipAristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's ChildrenAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAristotle, Emotions, and EducationArt & MoralityArt After Conceptual ArtArt in Three DimensionsArt, Self and KnowledgeArtificial ConsciousnessArtificial HappinessAspects of PsychologismAsylum to ActionAtonement and ForgivenessAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutobiography as PhilosophyAutonomyAutonomy and Mental DisorderAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismBabies by DesignBackslidingBadiouBadiou's DeleuzeBadiou, Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking EmancipationBare Facts And Naked TruthsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBattlestar Galactica and PhilosophyBe Like the FoxBeautyBecoming a SubjectBecoming HumanBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing AmoralBeing HumanBeing Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory Being No OneBeing Realistic about ReasonsBeing ReducedBeing YourselfBelief's Own EthicsBending Over BackwardsBerlin Childhood around 1900Bernard WilliamsBertrand RussellBetter than BothBetter Than WellBetween Two WorldsBeyond HealthBeyond Hegel and NietzscheBeyond KuhnBeyond LossBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond PostmodernismBeyond ReductionBeyond SchizophreniaBeyond the DSM StoryBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics in the ClinicBiological Complexity and Integrative PluralismBiology Is TechnologyBiosBipolar ExpeditionsBlackwell Companion to the Philosophy of EducationBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlues - Philosophy for EveryoneBlushBob Dylan and PhilosophyBody ConsciousnessBody Image And Body SchemaBody ImagesBody LanguageBody MattersBody WorkBody-Subjects and Disordered MindsBoundBoundaries of the MindBoyleBrain Evolution and CognitionBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-WiseBrainchildrenBrains, Buddhas, and BelievingBrainstormingBrave New WorldsBreakdown of WillBrief Child Therapy Homework PlannerBrief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and FaithBrief Therapy Homework PlannerBritain on the CouchBritish Idealism and the Concept of the SelfBrute RationalityBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyBut Is It Art?Camus and SartreCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCarving Nature at Its JointsCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsCassandra's DaughterCato's TearsCausation and CounterfactualsCauses, Laws, and Free WillChanging Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-ModernityChanging the SubjectChaosophyCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionCharles DarwinCherishmentChildhood and the Philosophy of EducationChildrenChildren, Families, and Health Care Decision MakingChoices and ConflictChoosing Not to ChooseChristmas - Philosophy for EveryoneCinema, Philosophy, BergmanCinematic MythmakingCity and Soul in Plato's RepublicClassifying MadnessClear and Queer ThinkingClinical EthicsClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyCodependent ForevermoreCoffee - Philosophy for EveryoneCognition and the BrainCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, ReflectionCognitive BiologyCognitive FictionsCognitive Neuroscience of EmotionCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Cognitive Theories of Mental IllnessCoherence in Thought and ActionCollected Papers, Volume 1Collected Papers, Volume 2College SexComedy IncarnateCommitmentCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentConcealment And ExposureConceptual Analysis and Philosophical NaturalismConceptual Art and PaintingConceptual Issues in Evolutionary BiologyConfessionsConfucianismConnected, or What It Means to Live in the Network SocietyConquest of AbundanceConscience and ConvenienceConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the SelfConsciousness EmergingConsciousness EvolvingConsciousness ExplainedConsciousness in ActionConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsole and ClassifyConstructing the WorldConstructive AnalysisContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Philosophy of BiologyContemporary Debates in Philosophy of MindContemporary Debates in Political PhilosophyContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Natural LawContested Knowledge: Social Theory TodayContesting PsychiatryContext and the AttitudesContinental Philosophy of ScienceControlControlling Our DestiniesConversations About Psychology and Sexual OrientationCopernicus, Darwin and FreudCrazy for YouCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCreating ConsilienceCreating HysteriaCreating Mental IllnessCreating Scientific ConceptsCreating the American JunkieCreation, Rationality and AutonomyCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCrimes of ReasonCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychiatryCritical PsychologyCritical ResistanceCritical Thinking About PsychologyCritical VisionsCross and KhoraCruel CompassionCTRL [SPACE]Cultural Psychology of the SelfCultural Theory: An IntroductionCulture and Psychiatric DiagnosisCulture and Subjective Well-BeingCulture of DeathCultures of NeurastheniaCurious EmotionsCurrent Controversies in Experimental PhilosophyCustom and Reason in HumeCustomers and Patrons of the Mad-TradeCutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together AgainCylons in AmericaDamaged IdentitiesDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous EmotionsDaniel DennettDaniel DennettDark AgesDarwin and DesignDarwin's Dangerous IdeaDarwin's LegacyDarwin, God and the Meaning of LifeDarwinian PsychiatryDarwinian ReductionismDarwinizing CultureDating: Philosophy for EveryoneDeathDeathDeath and CharacterDeath and CompassionDeath and the AfterlifeDebating DesignDebating HumanismDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecomposing the WillDeconstructing PsychotherapyDeconstruction and DemocracyDeeper Than DarwinDeeper than ReasonDefending Science - within ReasonDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDegrees of BeliefDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDelusions and the Madness of the MassesDementiaDemons, Dreamers, and MadmenDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDennett’s PhilosophyDepression Is a ChoiceDepression, Emotion and the SelfDepthDerrida, Deleuze, PsychoanalysisDescartesDescartes and the Passionate MindDescartes' CogitoDescartes's Changing MindDescartes's Concept of MindDescribing Inner Experience?Descriptions and PrescriptionsDesembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Desire and AffectDesire, Love, and IdentityDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDeveloping the VirtuesDiagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDialectics of the SelfDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital SoulDimensional Models of Personality DisordersDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisjunctivismDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDispatches from the Freud WarsDisrupted LivesDistractionDisturbed ConsciousnessDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Do We Still Need Doctors?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Does the Woman Exist?Doing without ConceptsDon't Believe Everything You ThinkDonald DavidsonDonald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the MentalDoubting Darwin?Dreaming and Other Involuntary MentationDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV-TR CasebookDworkin and His CriticsDying to KnowDynamics in ActionDysthymia and the Spectrum of Chronic DepressionsEccentricsEducational MetamorphosesEffective IntentionsElbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth WantingEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbodied RhetoricsEmbodied Selves and Divided MindsEmbryos under the MicroscopeEmergencies in Mental Health PracticeEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotionEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion and PsycheEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotional ReasonEmotional ReasonEmotional TruthEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions, Value, and AgencyEmpathyEmpathy and AgencyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpathy in the Context of PhilosophyEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEnchanted LoomsEngaging BuddhismEngineering the Human GermlineEnjoymentEnvyEpicureanismEpistemic LuckEpistemologyEpistemology and EmotionsEpistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentEros and the GoodErotic MoralityEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssays in the Metaphysics of Mind Essays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEssays on Nonconceptual ContentEssays on Philosophical CounselingEssays on Reference, Language, and MindEssays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern PhilosophyEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEsssential Philosophy of PsychiatryEternal Sunshine of the Spotless MindEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in Human CloningEthical TheoryEthicsEthicsEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics and Values in PsychotherapyEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics in Plain EnglishEthics in PracticeEthics in Psychiatric ResearchEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEuropean Review of Philosophy. Vol. 5Everyday IrrationalityEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolutionEvolution and the Human MindEvolution's RainbowEvolutionary Origins of MoralityEvolutionary PsychologyExamined LifeExamined LivesExistential AmericaExistentialismExistentialism and Romantic LoveExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and NaturalismExperiments in EthicsExplaining ConsciousnessExplaining the BrainExplaining the Computational MindExplanatory PluralismExploding the Gene MythExploring HappinessExploring the SelfExpression and the InnerExpressions of JudgmentFaces of IntentionFact and ValueFact and Value in EmotionFacts, Values, and NormsFads and Fallacies in the Social SciencesFaith and Wisdom in ScienceFatherhoodFear of KnowledgeFearless SpeechFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFeelings of BeingFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminism and Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Interpretations of Rene DescartesFeminist TheoryField Notes from ElsewhereFinding Consciousness in the BrainFingerprints of GodFlesh in the Age of ReasonFolk Psychological NarrativesFolk Psychology Re-AssessedForces of HabitForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and RetributionFoucault 2.0Foucault and PhilosophyFoucault NowFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Ethical Practice, Research, and Teaching in PsychologyFour Views on Free WillFrank Ramsey (1903-1930)Free WillFree WillFree WillFree WillFree Will and Action ExplanationFree Will and LuckFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free WillFreedomFreedom and DeterminismFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom and ResponsibiltyFreedom and ValueFreedom EvolvesFreedom RegainedFreedom vs. InterventionFreedom, Fame, Lying, and BetrayalFreudFreud and the Question of PseudoscienceFreud As PhilosopherFreud's AnswerFreud, the Reluctant PhilosopherFriedrich NietzscheFrom Chance to ChoiceFrom Clinic to ClassroomFrom Complexity to LifeFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the HumanitiesFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrontiers of ConsciousnessFrontiers of JusticeFurnishing the MindGalileo in PittsburghGenderGender and Mental HealthGender in the MirrorGender TroubleGenesGenes, Women, EqualityGenetic Nature/CultureGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetic SecretsGenocide's AftermathGenomes and What to Make of ThemGerman Idealism and the JewGerman PhilosophyGetting HookedGilles DeleuzeGlobal PhilosophyGluttonyGod and Phenomenal ConsciousnessGoffman's LegacyGoing Amiss in Experimental ResearchGoodness & AdviceGrassroots SpiritualityGrave MattersGrave MattersGreedGreek Models of Mind and SelfGut ReactionsHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHabits of MindHallucinationHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of EmotionsHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness and EducationHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHappiness, Death, and the Remainder of LifeHard LuckHarmful ThoughtsHaving the World in ViewHealing PsychiatryHealing the Soul in the Age of the BrainHealth, Illness and DiseaseHealth, Science, and Ordinary LanguageHegelHeidegger and a Metaphysics of FeelingHeidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of BeingHermann von Helmholtz's MechanismHermeneutics As PoliticsHeterophobiaHeterosyncraciesHeuristics and BiasesHeuristics and the LawHidden ResourcesHidden SelvesHiding from HumanityHigh Art LiteHistorical OntologyHistory of Psychiatry and Medical PsychologyHistory, Historicity And ScienceHobbesHomosexualitiesHope and Dread in PsychoanalysisHot ThoughtHow Can I Be Trusted?How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Children Learn the Meanings of WordsHow Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?How Do We Know Who We Are?How Emotions WorkHow Emotions WorkHow History Made the MindHow Images ThinkHow is Nature Possible?How Propaganda WorksHow Science WorksHow Scientific Practices MatterHow Scientists Explain DiseaseHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Make Opportunity EqualHow to Solve the Mind-Body Problemhow to stop timeHow to Think More About SexHow We HopeHow We ReasonHuman CloningHuman Development, Language and the Future of MankindHuman EnhancementHuman Evolution, Reproduction, and MoralityHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman NatureHuman NatureHuman Nature and the Limits of ScienceHuman-Built WorldHumanismHumanism, What's That?HumanityHumans, Animals, MachinesHumeHumeHume on Motivation and VirtueHusserlHystoriesI of the VortexI Was WrongIdeas that MatterIdentifying the MindIdentity and Agency in Cultural WorldsIgnorance and ImaginationIllnessImagination and Its PathologiesImagination and the Meaningful BrainImagining NumbersImmortal RemainsImproving Nature?In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of HealthIn Defense of SentimentalityIn Love With LifeIn Praise of Athletic BeautyIn Praise of the WhipIn Pursuit of HappinessIn Search of HappinessIn the Name of GodIn the Name of IdentityIn the Space of ReasonsIn Two MindsIncompatibilism's AllureIndividual Differences in Conscious ExperienceInfinity and PerspectiveInformation ArtsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchIngmar Bergman, Cinematic PhilosopherInhuman ThoughtsInner PresenceInsanityIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntelligent VirtueIntentionIntentionality, Deliberation and AutonomyIntentions and IntentionalityIntentions and IntentionalityInterpreting MindsInterpreting NietzscheIntroducing Greek PhilosophyIntrospection and ConsciousnessIntrospection VindicatedIntuition, Imagination, and Philosophical MethodologyIntuitionismInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIrrationalityIs Academic Feminism Dead?Is It Me or My Meds?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is Oedipus Online?Is Science Neurotic?Is Science Value Free?Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Is There a Duty to Die?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJacques LacanJacques RancièreJacques RanciereJean-Paul SartreJohn McDowellJohn SearleJohn Searle's Ideas About Social RealityJohn Stuart MillJohn Stuart Mill and the Writing of CharacterJoint AttentionJokesJonathan EdwardsJudging and UnderstandingJustice for ChildrenJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeKantKant and MiltonKant and the Fate of AutonomyKant and the Limits of AutonomyKant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral ActionKant on Freedom, Law, and HappinessKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Anatomy of EvilKant's Anatomy of the Intelligent MindKant's Theory of VirtueKarl JaspersKarl PopperKey Concepts in PhilosophyKierkegaardKierkegaard as PhenomenologistKierkegaard's Concept of DespairKierkegaard's MuseKinds of MindsKinds, Things, and StuffKnowing, Knowledge and BeliefsKnowledge MonopoliesKnowledge, Belief, and CharacterKnowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessLacanLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLanguageLanguage in ContextLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Culture, and MindLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw and the BrainLaw, Liberty, and PsychiatryLaws, Mind, and Free WillLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberatory PsychiatryLife and ActionLife at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum, 1857-1997Life Is Not a Game of PerfectLife of the MindLife's FormLife, Death, & MeaningLife, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of UtilityLife, Sex, and IdeasLight in the Dark RoomLike a Splinter in Your MindLiving and Dying WellLiving NarrativeLiving Outside Mental IllnessLiving with DarwinLiving With One’s PastLockeLocke LockeLogic and the Art of Memory Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and LiteratureLooking for SpinozaLooking for The StrangerLost SoulsLOT 2LoveLoveLove's ConfusionsLove's VisionLove, Friendship, and the SelfLove, Sex & TragedyLuckyLudwig WittgensteinLustLyingMachine ConsciousnessMad for FoucaultMad TravelersMade with WordsMadness And Death In PhilosophyMadness and DemocracyMadness at HomeMadness Is CivilizationMaking Natural KnowledgeMaking Sense of EvolutionMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMaking the DSM-5Making the Social WorldMaking TruthMale Female EmailMan, Beast, and ZombieMandated Reporting of Suspected Child AbuseManiaManic Depression and CreativityMapping the Edges and the In-betweenMapping the Future of BiologyMarcus AureliusMaster PassionsMatters of the MindMe++Meaning and Moral OrderMeaning and Value in a Secular AgeMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMeaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and MindMeasuring HappinessMeasuring PsychopathologyMedia MadnessMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedicine and Philosophy in Classical AntiquityMedicine of the PersonMedicine, Mental Health, Religion, Science and Well-BeingMelancholy And the Care of the SoulMelancholy and the Otherness of GodMementoMemory and NarrativeMental ActionsMental CausationMental Causation and OntologyMental HealthMental Health At The CrossroadsMental Health Policy in BritainMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMerleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of PhilosophyMetacognition and Theory of MindMetacreationMetaethical SubjectivismMetaethicsMetal and FleshMetaphors of MemoryMetapoliticsMethods in MindMichel FoucaultMill's UtilitarianismMindMindMind and ConsciousnessMind and CosmosMind and MechanismMind GamesMind in a Physical WorldMind in Everyday Life and Cognitive ScienceMind in LifeMind TimeMind's LandscapeMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMind, Brain, and Free WillMind, Reason and ImaginationMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds and PersonsMinds, Brains, and LawMinds, Ethics, and ConditionalsMindshapingMindsightMindworldsMirror, MirrorMixed FeelingsMockingbird YearsModels of the SelfModern Social ImaginariesModern Theories of JusticeModernity and SubjectivityModernity and TechnologyMoody Minds DistemperedMoral BrainsMoral DimensionsMoral FailureMoral ImaginationMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral ParticularismMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology and Human AgencyMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Moral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMotherhoodMotive and RightnessMoving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New PsychiatryMultiple Analogies in Science and PhilosophyMultiple Identities & False MemoriesMusic, Madness, and the Unworking of LanguageMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Double UnveiledMy WayNarrativeNarrative and IdentityNarrative MedicineNarrative PsychiatryNarrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesNatural Ethical FactsNatural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeNatural MindsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveNaturalism and the Human ConditionNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalized BioethicsNaturalizing the MindNatureNature and NarrativeNear Death ExperienceNeither Bad nor MadNeither Victim nor SurvivorNeuro-Philosophy and the Healthy MindNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neurophilosophy at WorkNeurophilosophy of Free WillNeuropoliticsNeuropsychoanalysis in PracticeNeuroscience and PhilosophyNew Essays on the Explanation of ActionNew Philosophy for a New MediaNew Versions of VictimsNew Waves in Philosophy of ActionNietzscheNietzsche and Buddhist PhilosophyNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNietzsche's TherapyNietzsche, Culture and EducationNietzsche: The Man and His PhilosophyNihil UnboundNoir AnxietyNormative EthicsNormativityNorms of NatureNotebooks 1951-1959Notes Toward a Performative Theory of AssemblyNothing So AbsurdOblivionOn AnxietyOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn Being AuthenticOn BeliefOn BetrayalOn BullshitOn DelusionOn DesireOn EmotionsOn HashishOn Human RightsOn Loving Our EnemiesOn Nature and LanguageOn PersonalityOn ReflectionOn Romantic LoveOn the EmotionsOn the Freud WatchOn the Government of the LivingOn the Human ConditionOn the InternetOn the Meaning of LifeOn the Philosophy of LawOn the Pragmatics of CommunicationOn the Punitive SocietyOn TruthOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne Hundred DaysOnflowOnly a Promise of HappinessOntology of ConsciousnessOpen MindedOpen Your EyesOrgans without BodiesOther MindsOur Last Great IllusionOur Own MindsOur Posthuman FutureOur StoriesOut of Its MindOut of Our HeadsOxford Guide to the MindOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPanic DisorderPanpsychismPanpsychism in the WestPartialityPassionate EnginesPassionate EnginesPathologies of BeliefPathologies of ReasonPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perceiving the WorldPerception & CognitionPerception and Basic BeliefsPerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPerceptual ExperiencePerfecting VirtuePerplexities of ConsciousnessPersistencePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal IdentityPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonal Identity and Fractured SelvesPersonhood and Health CarePersonsPersons and BodiesPersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPersons, Souls and DeathPerspectives on ImitationPerspectives on PragmatismPessimismPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenal ConsciousnessPhenomenal IntentionalityPhenomenology and ExistentialismPhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophersPhilosophers on MusicPhilosophers without GodsPhilosophical CounselingPhilosophical Counselling and the UnconsciousPhilosophical DevicesPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical History and the Problem of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in Psychiatry IIPhilosophical MethodologyPhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophical Myths of the FallPhilosophical Perspectives on DepictionPhilosophical Perspectives on Technology and PsychiatryPhilosophical PracticePhilosophical Reflections on DisabilityPhilosophizing About Sex Philosophizing the EverydayPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy and LivingPhilosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy and PsychotherapyPhilosophy and Science FictionPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CulturePhilosophy and the Moving ImagePhilosophy and the NeurosciencesPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy As FictionPhilosophy BitesPhilosophy Bites BackPhilosophy for Counselling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy for LifePhilosophy in a New CenturyPhilosophy in an Age of SciencePhilosophy in Children's LiteraturePhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BodyPhilosophy of Film and Motion PicturesPhilosophy of LovePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and MarriagePhilosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionPhilosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple PersonalityPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Public HealthPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhilosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophy on TapPhilosophy PracticePhilosophy the Day after TomorrowPhilosophy's Role in Counseling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhilosophy, Politics, DemocracyPhotography and PhilosophyPhysical RealizationPhysicalism and Its DiscontentsPhysicalism and Mental CausationPhysicalism, or Something Near EnoughPhysician-Assisted DyingPillar of SaltPin-up GrrrlsPlatoPlatoPlato, Not Prozac!Platonic Ethics, Old and NewPluralistic CasuistryPolarities of ExperiencesPolitical EmotionsPopper, Objectivity and the Growth of KnowledgePornPorn StudiesPornography, Sex, and FeminismPortrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young ManPostcolonial DisordersPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPower and the SelfPower SplitPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical ConflictsPractical Identity and Narrative AgencyPractical PhilosophyPractical RulesPractical Tortoise RaisingPractically ProfoundPracticing Feminist Ethics in PsychologyPragmatic BioethicsPragmatismPragmatism, Old And NewPraise and BlamePredicative MindsPreferences and Well-BeingPrescriptions for the MindPresocraticsPrimary and Secondary QualitiesPrimates and PhilosophersPrivacyPrivileged AccessProblems in MindProblems of RationalityProzac As a Way of LifeProzac BacklashProzac on the CouchPsyche and SomaPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric Cultures ComparedPsychiatric Diagnosis and ClassificationPsychiatric EthicsPsychiatric HegemonyPsychiatric PowerPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry and Philosophy of SciencePsychiatry and ReligionPsychiatry as a Human SciencePsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry in SocietyPsychiatry in the New MilleniumPsychiatry in the Scientific ImagePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsycho-Physical Dualism TodayPsychoanalysis and Narrative MedicinePsychoanalysis and the Philosophy of SciencePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and PhilosophyPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology, Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of Human RelationshipsPsychotherapy and ConfidentialityPsychotherapy As PraxisPublic PhilosophyPunishmentPure ImmanencePurple HazePursuing MeaningQuality of Life and Human DifferenceQueer PhilosophyQuestions for FreudQuestions for FreudQuine and Davidson on Language, Thought and RealityRaceRace in Contemporary MedicineRadiant CoolRadical AlterityRadical ExternalismRadical HopeRational and Social AgencyRational CausationRational Choice in an Uncertain WorldRationality + Consciousness = Free WillRationality and FreedomRationality and the Reflective MindRationality in ActionRawls, Dewey, and ConstructivismRe-creating MedicineRe-EmergenceRe-Engineering Philosophy for Limited BeingsReading AutobiographyReading Bernard WilliamsReading SartreReadings in the Philosophy of TechnologyReal MaterialismReal Natures and Familiar ObjectsReal ScienceRealism in ActionReason & EmancipationReason in ActionReason in PhilosophyReason's GriefReasonably ViciousReasoning About Rational AgentsReasoning in Biological DiscoveriesReasons from WithinReasons without RationalismReclaiming CognitionReclaiming the SoulReconceiving SchizophreniaReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecreative MindsRediscovering EmotionRediscovering EmpathyReference and ExistenceReference and the Rational MindReflections On How We LiveReframing Disease ContextuallyRefusing CareRegulating SexReinventing the SoulRelativism and Human RightsRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyReliable ReasoningReligion without GodRelying on OthersRemembering HomeResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility from the MarginsRestraining RageRethinking ExpertiseRethinking IntrospectionRethinking Mental Health and DisorderRethinking RapeRethinking the DSMRethinking the Sociology of Mental HealthRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfReturn to ReasonRevolt, She SaidRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard Rorty's New PragmatismRightsRights, Democracy, and Fulfillment in the Era of Identity PoliticsRise And Fall of Soul And SelfRitalin NationRobert NozickRousseauRousseau and the Dilemmas of Modernity Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on DeconstructionRules, Reason, and Self-KnowledgeSaints, Scholars, and Schizophrenics: Mental Illness in Rural IrelandSartreSartreSartreSartre in Search of an EthicsSatisficing and MaximizingSaving GodScandalous KnowledgeSchizophreniaSchizophrenia and the Fate of the SelfSchizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion?SchopenhauerSchopenhauer's TelescopeScienceScience and EthicsScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologyScience and SpiritualityScience and the Pursuit of WisdomScience Fiction and PhilosophyScience Fiction and PhilosophyScience in Civil SocietyScience in DemocracyScience RulesScience WarsScience, Consciousness and Ultimate RealityScience, Policy, and the Value-Free IdealSciences from BelowScientific EvidenceScientific IrrationalismScientific PerspectivismScientific PluralismScientific Realism and the Rationality of ScienceScratching the Surface of BioethicsSecond NatureSecond OpinionsSecond PhilosophySecrets of the MindSecular Philosophy and the Religious TemperamentSecurity, Territory, PopulationSeeing and VisualizingSeeing DoubleSeeing Fictions in FilmSeeing RedSeeing Wittgenstein AnewSeeing, Doing, And KnowingSelfSelf and OtherSelf and SubjectivitySelf, No Self?Self-ConsciousnessSelf-ConstitutionSelf-ExpressionSelf-FulfillmentSelf-Knowledge and ResentmentSelf-Knowledge and Self-DeceptionSelf-Made MadnessSelf-Reference and Self-AwarenessSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessSelvesSentimental RulesSexing the BodySexualized BrainsShades of LonelinessShame and GuiltShame and NecessityShame and PhilosophyShop Class as SoulcraftShynessSigns, Mind, And RealitySimone de BeauvoirSimple MindednessSimulating MindsSimulation and SimilaritySinging in the FireSisyphus's BoulderSituating SemanticsSix Questions of SocratesSkeptical FeminismSkepticismSketch for a Theory of the EmotionsSleeping With Extra-TerrestrialsSlothSocial EpistemologySocial PhenomenologySocializing MetaphysicsSociological Perspectives on the New GeneticsSocratesSocrates CafeSocrates in LoveSocratic Moral PsychologySoft SubversionsSoren KierkegaardSorting Things OutSoul Made FleshSound SentimentsSovereign VirtueSpeaking My MindSpinozaSpinoza and Deep EcologySpinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good LifeSpinoza on MonismSpirits and ClocksSplit DecisionsStich and His CriticsSticks and StonesStiffedStoicismStoicismStoicismStoicism and EmotionStories MatterStranger from AbroadStrong FeelingsStructures of AgencySubjectivity and Being SomebodySubjectivity and OthernessSubjectivity and SelfhoodSubjectivity and SelfhoodSuffering, Death, and IdentitySupersizing the MindSurprise, Uncertainty, and Mental StructuresSurrealist Painters and PoetsSurviving DeathSurviving HitlerSweet DreamsSynaptic SelfSynesthesia : A Union of the SensesSzasz Under FireTaking ActionTaking the Red PillTaking Wittgenstein at His WordTalking Back to PsychiatryTalking Cures and Placebo EffectsTalking to Our SelvesTalking with SartreTaming AngerTeach Yourself PostmodernismTechnology and the Good Life?Teleological RealismTen Years of Viewing from WithinTerrence MalickThe Act of ThinkingThe Activity of BeingThe Aesthetic MindThe Aesthetics of DisappearanceThe Age of GeniusThe Age of InsanityThe Altruism EquationThe Altruistic BrainThe American ParadoxThe Anti-Oedipus PapersThe Antidepressant EraThe Anxieties of AffluenceThe Art of Adolf WolfliThe Art of LivingThe Art of LivingThe Asymmetrical BrainThe Autonomy of MoralityThe Bakhtin CircleThe Beginning of PhilosophyThe Beginnings of Western ScienceThe Belief InstinctThe Beloved SelfThe Bifurcation of the SelfThe Big Book of ConceptsThe Biology and Psychology of Moral AgencyThe Birth of BiopoliticsThe Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of ScienceThe Blank SlateThe Bodhisattva's BrainThe Body ReaderThe Body/Body ProblemThe Bounds of AgencyThe Bounds of CognitionThe Brain and the Meaning of LifeThe Caldron of ConsciousnessThe Cambridge Companion to AdornoThe Cambridge Companion to AtheismThe Cambridge Companion to BerkeleyThe Cambridge Companion to DeweyThe Cambridge Companion to Feminism in PhilosophyThe Cambridge Companion to LacanThe Cambridge Companion to Life and DeathThe Cambridge Companion to Plato's RepublicThe Cambridge Companion to QuineThe Cambridge Companion to Science and ReligionThe Cambridge Companion to Simone de BeauvoirThe Cambridge Companion to SocratesThe Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyThe Cambridge Companion to the StoicsThe Cambridge Introduction to Michel FoucaultThe Cambridge Medical Ethics WorkbookThe Cambridge Textbook of BioethicsThe Case against Assisted SuicideThe Case for HumanismThe Case for Pragmatic PsychologyThe Case of the Female OrgasmThe Certainty of UncertaintyThe Challenge of ThingsThe Character of ConsciousnessThe Clinical and Forensic Assessment of PsychopathyThe Cognitive Basis of ScienceThe Cognitive Neuroscience of ConsciousnessThe Cognitive Science of ScienceThe Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual InvestigationsThe Concept of the Gene in Development and EvolutionThe Concepts of PsychiatryThe Conceptual Evolution of DSM-5The Condition of MadnessThe Conscious BrainThe Conscious MindThe Conscious SelfThe Consolation of PhilosophyThe Consolations of PhilosophyThe Constitution of AgencyThe Constitution of SelvesThe Construction of Human KindsThe Construction of Power and Authority in PsychiatryThe Continuum Companion to Kant The Courage of TruthThe Creation of PsychopharmacologyThe Creation of the Modern WorldThe Crucible of ConsciousnessThe Crucible of ExperienceThe Cultural Context of Health, Illness, and MedicineThe Cultural Origins of Human CognitionThe Culture of Our DiscontentThe Death of PsychotherapyThe Delay of the HeartThe Deleuze ConnectionsThe Disappearance of the Social in American Social PsychologyThe Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New RepublicThe Disordered MindThe Dissolution of MindThe Domain of ReasonsThe Domestication of LanguageThe Dream DrugstoreThe Early Modern SubjectThe Ecstasy of CommunicationThe Ego TunnelThe Emergence of SexualityThe Emotional BrainThe Emotional Construction of MoralsThe EmotionsThe EmotionsThe Empathy GapThe Empire of TraumaThe Empirical StanceThe Engaged IntellectThe Enigma of HealthThe Erotic PhenomenonThe Essential William JamesThe Ethical BrainThe Ethical Dimensions of the Biological and Health SciencesThe Ethical WayThe Ethics of Human CloningThe Ethics of IdentityThe Ethics of PsychoanalysisThe Ethics of SufferingThe Ethics of the Family in SenecaThe Ethics of the LieThe Evolution of Agency and Other EssaysThe Evolution of LanguageThe Evolution of MoralityThe Evolution of the Private Language ArgumentThe Evolved ApprenticeThe ExistentialistsThe Explanation of Social ActionThe Extended MindThe Extinction of DesireThe Fate of KnowledgeThe Feeling BodyThe Feeling of What HappensThe Form of Practical KnowledgeThe Fountain of YouthThe Freud WarsThe Future for PhilosophyThe Future of Human NatureThe God DebatesThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Greeks and the IrrationalThe Healing VirtuesThe Heart & Soul of ChangeThe Heart of William JamesThe History of Human RightsThe Human AnimalThe Hungry SoulThe Hypomanic EdgeThe Idea of the SelfThe Illusion of Conscious WillThe Illusion of Freedom and EqualityThe Imagery DebateThe Importance of Being UnderstoodThe Imprinted BrainThe Improbability of GodThe Inessential IndexicalThe Innate MindThe Innate Mind: Volume 3The Intentional BrainThe Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of FreedomThe Knotted SubjectThe Language of GodThe Language of ThoughtThe Last PhysicianThe Legacy of John RawlsThe Limits and Lies of Human Genetic ResearchThe Limits of Autobiography The Limits of MedicineThe Logic of AffectThe Loss of SadnessThe Lost Art of HappinessThe Madness of Adam and EveThe Madonna of the FutureThe Making of a PhilosopherThe Making of Friedrich NietzscheThe Making of the Modern SelfThe Man Who Wasn't ThereThe Mark of the BeastThe Matrix and PhilosophyThe Matter of the MindThe Matter of the MindThe Meaning of AddictionThe Meaning of DisgustThe Meaning of FriendshipThe Meaning of MindThe Meaning of the BodyThe Meaning of the BodyThe Measure of MadnessThe Measure of MindThe Medicalization of Everyday LifeThe Medicalization of SocietyThe Meme MachineThe Metaphor of Mental IllnessThe Metaphysical ClubThe Metaphysics of CapitalThe Metaphysics of ScienceThe Metaphysics of Scientific RealismThe Mind and its DiscontentsThe Mind Doesn't Work That WayThe Mind Has MountainsThe Mind in NatureThe Mind IncarnateThe Mind's ProvisionsThe Mind, the Body and the WorldThe MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive SciencesThe Moral Challenge of Alzheimer DiseaseThe Moral Demands of MemoryThe Moral Psychology HandbookThe Most Human HumanThe Most Solitary of AfflictionsThe Multiple Realization BookThe Mystery of ExistenceThe Myth of an AfterlifeThe Myth of Digital DemocracyThe Myth of PainThe Nature and Future of PhilosophyThe Nature and Structure of ContentThe Nature of ConsciousnessThe Nature of DignityThe Nature of IntelligenceThe Nature of LifeThe Nature of MelancholyThe Nature of NormativityThe Nature of Sexual DesireThe Nature of the MindThe Nature of the SelfThe Necessity Of MadnessThe New AtheismThe New Disability HistoryThe New Idea of a UniversityThe New IntuitionismThe New PhrenologyThe New PragmatismThe New Rational TherapyThe New Science of the MindThe Nietzschean SelfThe Origin of Consciousness in the Social WorldThe Other Bishop BerkeleyThe Overman in the MarketplaceThe Oxford Companion to the MindThe Oxford Handbook of Free WillThe Oxford Handbook of HumeThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and PsychiatryThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of BiologyThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of DeathThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of EmotionThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of MindThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of PerceptionThe Oxford Handbook of RationalityThe Oxford Handbook of the SelfThe Paradox of Self ConsciousnessThe Parallax ViewThe Paranormal and the Politics of TruthThe Phenomenology ReaderThe Philosopher's "I"The Philosopher's Autobiography The Philosopher's Secret FireThe Philosophical BabyThe Philosophical Breakfast ClubThe Philosophical Foundations of Modern MedicineThe Philosophical IThe Philosophical PractitionerThe Philosophy of Andy WarholThe Philosophy of Animal MindsThe Philosophy of Animal MindsThe Philosophy of CreativityThe Philosophy of DeathThe Philosophy of DeceptionThe Philosophy of Elizabeth AnscombeThe Philosophy of ExpertiseThe Philosophy of Food The Philosophy of Free WillThe Philosophy of HeideggerThe Philosophy of InformationThe Philosophy of LawThe Philosophy of LivingThe Philosophy of Merleau-PontyThe Philosophy of Motion PicturesThe Philosophy of NeedThe Philosophy of PhilosophyThe Philosophy of PsychiatryThe Philosophy of PsychologyThe Philosophy of ReligionThe Philosophy of SartreThe Philosophy of Science and Technology StudiesThe Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary ReadingsThe Philosophy of William JamesThe Philosophy of WineThe Physics of ConsciousnessThe Physiology of TruthThe Pleasure CenterThe Pleasure's All MineThe Plural SelfThe Politics of AgencyThe Politics of HappinessThe Politics of PersonsThe Portfolio and the DiagramThe Postnational SelfThe Poverty of Radical OrthodoxyThe Power of FeelingsThe Practice of Everyday LifeThe Practices of the SelfThe Presence of MindThe Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday LifeThe Primacy of the SubjectiveThe Prism of GrammarThe Private Life of the BrainThe Problem of PunishmentThe Problem of the SoulThe Prosthetic ImpulseThe Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the Conscious BrainThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of HappinessThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe PsychopathThe Pursuit of PerfectionThe Pursuit of UnhappinessThe Race for ConsciousnessThe Rational AnimalThe Rational ImaginationThe Really Hard ProblemThe Reasons of LoveThe Red and the RealThe Relevance of Philosophy to LifeThe Representational and the PresentationalThe Revolt of the PrimitiveThe Right to Refuse Mental Health TreatmentThe Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial ModelThe Rise of the Conservative Legal MovementThe Robot's RebellionThe Roman StoicsThe Routledge Companion to Free WillThe Routledge Companion to PhenomenologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-BeingThe RoutledgeFalmer Reader In The Philosophy Of Education The Rules of InsanityThe Schopenhauer CureThe Science MythThe Science of AddictionThe Science of Self-ControlThe Search for MeaningThe Second-Person StandpointThe SecretThe Secret History of EmotionThe SelfThe Self and Its EmotionsThe Self AwakenedThe Self-Organizing Social MindThe Self?The Selfish Gene PhilosophyThe Shattered SelfThe Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of PhilosophyThe Shortest ShadowThe Significance of ConsciousnessThe Silent World of Doctor and PatientThe Simpsons and PhilosophyThe Situated SelfThe Sleep of ReasonThe Social Construction of What?The Social Nature of Mental IllnessThe Solitary SelfThe Soul at WorkThe Soul Knows No BarsThe Spinoza ProblemThe Stoic Art of LivingThe Stoics On Determinism And CompatibilismThe Structure of ThinkingThe Struggle against DogmatismThe Subject's Point of ViewThe Subjective SelfThe Sublime Object of PsychiatryThe Subtlety of EmotionsThe Talking CureThe Tears of ThingsThe Therapy for the SaneThe Therapy of DesireThe Things We Do and Why We Do ThemThe Toothpaste of ImmortalityThe Transformation of PsychologyThe Transhumanist ReaderThe Trolley Problem MysteriesThe Turing TestThe Uncertain SciencesThe Undiscovered WittgensteinThe Unity of ConsciousnessThe Uses of PessimismThe Varieties of Religious ExperienceThe Vehement PassionsThe View from WithinThe Virtues of FreedomThe Virtues of HappinessThe Volitional BrainThe Wages of SinThe Web of LifeThe Whole ChildThe Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the MonsterThe Wing of MadnessThe Wonder of ConsciousnessThe Work of MourningThe Works of AgencyThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the WorldThe World of PerceptionThe World of PerversionTheoretical Issues in Psychology: An IntroductionTheories of Human NatureTheory and RealityTheory of MindTherapeutic ActionThere is No Such Thing as a Social ScienceThere's Something About Mary Things and PlacesThinking About FeelingThinking and SeeingThinking for CliniciansThinking for CliniciansThinking of AnswersThinking through the BodyThinking TwiceThinking with WhiteheadThis is Madness TooThomas KuhnThomas KuhnThomas Kuhn's ""Linguistic Turn"" and the Legacy of Logical EmpiricismThought in a Hostile WorldThought in ActionThought's FootingThreads of LifeThree Faces of DesireThrough the Looking GlassTime and IdentityTo Have Or To Be?TolerationTortured SubjectsTowards a Science of Consciousness IIITowards Non-BeingTraumaTrauma, Truth and ReconciliationTrue to LifeTrue to Our FeelingsTrusting on the EdgeTrusting the Subject?Truth & PredicationTruth and Truth-MakingTruth and TruthfulnessTruth as One and ManyTuringTwo Great Problems of LearningTwo Regimes of MadnessUgly FeelingsUmbr(a)Unconscious knowing and other essays in psycho-philosophical analysisUnderstanding EmotionsUnderstanding EvilUnderstanding Kant's EthicsUnderstanding LoveUnderstanding MarriageUnderstanding Moral ObligationUnderstanding PeopleUnderstanding Phenomenal Consciousness Undoing GenderUnifying HinduismUniversitiesUnlearning or 'How NOT to Be Governed?'Unnatural SelectionUnprincipled VirtueUnsanctifying Human Life: Essays on EthicsUnto OthersUpheavals of ThoughtUsers and Abusers of PsychiatryValue-Free Science?Values and Psychiatric DiagnosisVarieties of Anomalous ExperienceVarieties of MeaningVarieties of Practical ReasoningViolence Against WomenViolence and the BodyVirtue, Rules, and JusticeVirtue, Vice, and PersonalityVirtues and Their VicesVirtues of ThoughtVision and BrainVision and MindVision's InvisiblesVisual CultureVital NourishmentW. K. Clifford and "The Ethics of Belief"Waking LifeWandering SignificanceWays of KnowingWeakness of Will and Practical IrrationalityWeakness of Will from Plato to the PresentWeakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation ThoughtWelfare and Rational CareWhat Are We?What Art IsWhat Emotions Really AreWhat Good Are the Arts?What If Medicine Disappeared?What Is a Human?What Is an Emotion: Classic and Contemporary ReadingsWhat Is Good and WhyWhat Is Medicine?What is Mental Disorder?What Is Posthumanism?What Is Secular Humanism?What Is the Good Life?What is the Self?What Is This Thing Called Happiness?What Is Thought?What Makes Us Think?What Nietzsche Really SaidWhat Should I Believe?What Should I Do?What We Owe to Each OtherWhat Would Aristotle Do?What's Good on TVWhat's Wrong with Children's RightsWhat's Wrong With Science?When Self-Consciousness BreaksWhere Biology Meets PsychologyWhere the Action IsWhere the Roots Reach for WaterWhispers from the EastWho Rules in ScienceWho Was Jacques Derrida?Who's in Charge?Whose Freud?Why Everyone (Else) Is a HypocriteWhy God Won't Go AwayWhy Read Mill Today?Why the Mind is Not a ComputerWhy Things Matter to PeopleWhy Think?Why Think? Why Truth MattersWhy We DanceWider than the SkyWilliam Blake on Self and SoulWilliam James at the BoundariesWilliam James on Ethics and FaithWilling, Wanting, WaitingWisdom, Intuition and EthicsWise TherapyWitchcrazeWithin ReasonWithout ConscienceWittgensteinWittgenstein and Approaches To ClarityWittgenstein And PsychologyWittgenstein and PsychotherapyWittgenstein on Freud and FrazerWittgenstein Reads FreudWittgenstein Reads WeiningerWomen, Body, IllnessWomen, Madness and MedicineWords and ImagesWorld, Affectivity, TraumaWritten in the FleshYoga - Philosophy for EveryoneYour Drug May Be Your ProblemZizekZombies and Consciousness
This is a collection of papers by Tim Crane he published (with one exception) between 1992 and 2012 (more precisely only one was published before 1998). Most of them have been previously given in form of lectures on several occasions (for example materials that eventually resulted in The Given were presented on as many as eight occasions). The scope of the collection is the psychologism, though it is not taken in its traditional sense (i.e. as referring to logic and mathematic) but as a view "that the study of the mind should not be a purely conceptual investigation" (x). Expressed in a positive way, psychologism is about a psychological reality (i.e. the mind), which should be studied conceptually as well as phenomenologically and empirically.
The whole is divided into four parts. Each of them starts with a short introduction intended to up-date the content of older chapters, evaluate them, often in a self-critical way by referring to their weaknesses, errors, or confusions they introduce, and, sometimes, to explain why despite some weakness, the paper has been included in the volume. The book lacks an organic structure other than parts being organized in a way as to present the best the papers Crane published in the past. This gives impression that the volume as it is composed is a bit forced (for other critical remarks on the form of the volume see below). Part I (Chapt. 2-4) is mostly historical, Part II (Chapt. 5-8) is about intentionality, Part III (Chapt. 9-12) deals with perception and Part IV (Chapt. 13-16) with consciousness. Although the structure of the volume corresponds to four themes presented, the 16 chapters do not form what one could expect from, say, an entry on intentionality, perception or consciousness in SEP. The way Crane discusses problems and issue is tirelessly detailed. His analysis is rich and cannot be given its due in this review.
The collection opens with the only unpublished paper (Introduction: In Defence of Psychologism, pp. 1-19), in which Crane clarifies his interest in the mental (or the psychological): if there are such things as psychological facts, the analysis of the mental cannot be reduced to conceptual investigation only. In this sense semantic analysis of the mental and especially of intentionality is not sufficient. For example, in his conception of ideas, Crane claims, Frege goes beyond semantic account of intentionality because ideas (or states of mind) are subjective states (or episodes) and they "can have intentional content without being propositional attitudes" (15). By accepting this, Crane sides with anti-anti-psychologists not in the sense that anti-psychologism is false but rather because he dismisses the idea dominating in recent analytic philosophy that "the philosophy of mind has concerned itself with only what [he] call[s] 'conceptual investigation'" (18). In a word, he rejects anti-psychologism because it prevents a broader and more realistic conception of intentionality.
The aim of the first of three historical essays (Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence, pp. 25-39) is to elucidate Brentano's thinking about intentionality. That is important insofar as Brentano in this respect underwent a change of mind which is not taken into consideration in discussions of his views. Brentano's early (around 1874) position was that "phenomena are not real in themselves but only signs of a fundamentally unknowable independent reality; and that some things are, in a certain way, more real than others" (29). According to Brentano, all sciences, physics included, deal not with things themselves, but only with their appearances which, as such, are mind-dependent. The difference between sciences is to be explained by difference between the phenomena studied in them. Since all mental acts have as their objects phenomena, either physical or mental, Brentano adopted Scholastic term intentional inexistence, i.e. existence in the mental act. But around 1911 Brentano stopped claiming that "'[...] mental relation can have something other than a thing as it [sic!] object'" (37). His novel view was that objects of mental act can be real things and as such they transcend the mental act. To sum it up, the concept of intentional inexistence has been abandoned by Brentano himself.
Wittgenstein and Intentionality (pp. 40-60) is a treatment of the later Wittgenstein's use of this concept. Although the corresponding word is not there, the idea is, Crane claims, "central at all stages of his philosophical development" (40). As for the early Wittgenstein, even if there is a little about philosophy of mind, intentionality can be detected through the concept of representation. This is because in the Tractatus thought and reality stand in internal relation. In his middle period (e.g. Philosophical Grammar) Wittgenstein thought of relation between thought and reality as grammatical. For example expectations and fulfillment are related by a grammatical rule. Finally, in thePhilosophical Investigations, esp. §§428-465, Wittgenstein says more - still without using the word - on intentionality, i.e. relation between thought and particular real thing. Doing so, he developed his position of the middle period. The relation or similarity between expectation and its fulfillment or between wishes and their satisfaction consists in the fact that expectation and wishes are expressed in the same words that are used to describe, respectively, fulfillment and satisfaction. Relations are, therefore, "merely reflections of grammatical propositions" (51). The rest of the chapter is devoted to discussion of P. M. S. Hacker's reading of Wittgenstein. Crane makes there also a critical remark as to the insufficiency of Wittgenstein's description of the relation between what is expected and what fulfils the expectation: there is more to this relation than grammar.
In essay four (The Origins of Qualia, pp. 61-86) Crane touches upon the problem of qualia, the very center of the mind-body problem (the denial of this is the rationale of Chapt. 10), by making a point first about how qualia are understood by several philosophers and about their existing or not, then about the origin of qualia. Crane connects the dispute about qualia to the dispute about sense-data in the philosophy of perception. Both disputes are characterized by disagreement about whether differences between experiences results from differences in objects or from differences in properties of experiences. In its contemporary version the role played by the problem of qualia is to provide an objection to physicalism: if there are qualia, i.e. non-physical facts, then physicalism is false. After considering the thesis that qualia are properties of (public) physical objects and refuting it, Crane analyses another thesis, i.e. that qualia are properties of experiences, and he considers its two versions: qualia as either intentional or non-intentional properties of experiences. The conclusion is somehow technical: given various and conflicting ways the term qualia has been used, Crane suggests to stop speaking about qualia in experience at all. (However, as he says in the introduction to Part I, this paper should be read together with a more recent one, The Given (2012), included in Part III of the volume, as a superseding of it.)
Part II contains four papers dealing with intentionality (or aboutness, or of-ness, or directedness) of the mental. In the first of them (Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental, pp. 92-110), Crane starts by spelling out reasons for which Brentano's thesis (i.e. that "intentionality 'is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena [...]'" (91)) is commonly rejected. Crane's concern is to conceive of any meaning of intentionality so that Brentano's thesis could be accepted, since, he believes, the rejection of his thesis is based on a misunderstanding. First of all, on a closer look the supposed non-intentionality of bodily sensations or some emotions - which is to contradict the thesis - falls down. For example, in pain one's mind is directed on his pain. Moreover, this being directed on it manifests itself in various ways: by concentrating on, attending to, trying to ignore it. (Argument against non-intentionality of sensations will be presented once again in The Intentional Structure of Consciousness - in a more detailed and developed way, see below.) As for so-called undirected emotions, e.g. anxiety, they are directed on objects, though these objects are not easy to determine. Sometimes this happens because people are not able to express what their emotions are about (we could, I think, distinguish two cases here: one is when people are not able to do so but they could be, for example by a deeper inspection and acquiring better linguistic tools, the second pertains to emotions which as such are ineffable, as this is the case of Kierkegaard's Abraham). An emotion can refer to "one's position in the world" (102) or to nothingness. Crane defends here the thesis that all mental phenomena exhibit intentionality by putting forward two features of it: its apparent relationality and its fine-grained character. In the last section Crane speculates if intentionality can be shared by the non-mental.
Intentional Objects (pp. 111-123) is about the nature and character of that kind of objects. For Crane, intentional objects as such have no nature, this is no special nature that would distinguish them from other objects. An object is intentional only insofar as it is an object of some subject's intention (accordingly, x can be an intentional object for you but not for me, for men but not for dogs, for sighted but not for the blind etc. - but it can be also an intentional object for both you and me). Crane rejects Anscombe's approach on which intentional object would "be a kind of direct object in the grammatical sense" (118). He says rightly that "it would surely be surprising if the idea of an intentional object [...] were mere shadows of the grammar" (118). (How, I would ask, it could be a matter of syntax, given differences of syntax between languages?) Crane says that in recent debates the concept of intentionality has been replaced with that of representation. But what is more useful than this kind of re-alignment is rather, in Crane's opinion, a distinction between intentional object and intentional content. For example the same object can be presented in two different states of mind in two different ways which means that these two states of mind, though directed on the same object, differ in content (in the next chapter he will explicitly say, when speaking about a pain in one's nonexistent ankle, that intentionality is a relation "not to an actually existing object, but to an intentional content", 146). However, it is more accurate "to say that thoughts are about their objects than to say that they are about their contents." (122) This is why Crane suggests to reformulate the issue and to say that "[t]houghts havecontents, and it is because of this that they are about their objects" (122 -- but I wonder why the opposite could not be said). He concludes that as long as we use the notion of aboutness, we need the notion of intentional object.
In The Intentional Structure of Consciousness (pp. 124-148) Crane starts with presenting a strong claim that "only minds, or states of mind, are conscious" (122). But the claim he defends in this chapter is that "consciousness is a form of intentionality" (122-123). For example, pain is a mental state in which mind is directed on a part of the body felt in this occurrence of pain. What is at stake is that by distinguishing the object of the intentional state and the state itself we can see better that "all mental states are intentional" (the view he calls intentionalism), the thesis that many deny. He embarks on arguing that sensations are intentional. Section 2 has a lot in common with what has been already said in previous papers. What is new is a concept - used after Searle - of intentional mode of an act (i.e. way of relating the subject to the content of his intentional act, be it belief, hope, desire etc.). Section 3 provides an argument against the thesis that sensations are not intentional. Sensations are intentional because they are not objectless, as non-intentionalists claim: (bodily) sensations have objects, e.g. a part of the body affected in the sensation. From this moment Crane distinguishes two versions of intentionalism. Weak intentionalism admits that all mental states are intentional but some of them have non-intentional properties (i.e. qualia). Crane rejects this view because in sensation there are no qualia separable from the intentional awareness of, say, pain. Strong intentionalism (i.e. a view that no mental state has any non-intentional mental properties) exists in two versions, representationalism and perceptual theory. The first is to admit that sensations are representations of states of affaires. But, Crane objects, in some sensations its subject is not well aware of the states of affaires these sensations represent. In the second, the one Crane defends and called perceptual theory, (bodily) sensations are considered as a form of perception of what is going on in one's body. On this view sensations differ in their intentional mode. If I understand correctly, it could be said more precisely that they differ in the intentional mode of perception of what is felt (or perceived) in a sensation, hence a name of this theory.
The last chapter of Part II (Intentionalism, pp. 149-169) is, insofar as it is deals with the idea that all mental states are intentional, repeating thoughts presented elsewhere in the volume. Brentano's famous passage as well as intentionality's object, content, and mode are introduced once again. This is not to say that the chapter is worthless. It should be noted that Crane introduces a new term to paraphrase intentionality which is self-transcendence. He also clarifies better, in my opinion, his use ofobject, i.e. "whatever it is on which your state of mind is directed" (151). That includes things that exist as well as things that do not. Next, Crane touches upon the relation of intentional mode and intentional content looking for what determines what and, then, he analyzes two sorts of intentionalism. Pure intentionalism (called also pure representationalism - remember that in the previous paper representationalism is presented as one of two versions of strong intentionalism), i.e. a claim that "the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by its intentional content alone" (154, or that "the phenomenal character of a conscious state of mind is determined by its representational or its intentional content" (169)) is rejected it in its both versions, strong (claiming the identity of the phenomenal character of a mental state with its representational content) as well as weak (considering the phenomenal character as determined or by supervening on its representational content). A better option is impure intentionalism, i.e. a thesis that "the entire mental character of a mental state is determined by its intentional nature" (158, or that "the phenomenal character of a conscious state is determined by its intentional content and its intentional mode" (169)), phenomenal character of a mental state included. At the end of the chapter (section 5), Crane discusses once again arguments in favor of sensations' and moods' being directed on some objects.
Part III is mostly about whether the intentional content of perception is propositional or conceptual. In The Non-conceptual Content of Experience (pp. 175-195) Crane asks if concepts determine the way things and, more generally, the world is perceived. The chapter is also about to what extent concepts are involved in an experience and what it does mean for an experience to have content without concepts. Crane suggests that a content is non-conceptual insofar as there is no necessity of possessing concepts to characterize canonically a state of whose the content is in question. Then he analyzes what it means for a state to have (or better: possess) conceptual and non-conceptual content ("[t]o possess a concept is to be in intentional states whose inferential relations are an appropriate function of their contents", (186)). Finally referring to cases of perceptual illusion, Crane argues that the idea of non-conceptual content is applicable to perception. In illusion perception is a different state than belief, since their contents are different: the latter's content is conceptual, while the former's is not. Concepts occur only after the content of perception has been conceptualized and this is what occurs in beliefs. As such, beliefs are about general facts which are not perceptible (this remark is patently Aristotelian in spirit)[].
Is There a Perceptual Relation? (pp. 196-216, of which a refined title would be, as Crane suggests it in the introduction (174) Can experience be characterized essentially in terms of a relation to the existing objects of experience?, which is better because there is no doubt that there is a perceptual relation), is a discussion of disagreement between representationalism and qualia theory. But the very motive of discussing this disagreement is to deny Block's claim that it is "the 'greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind'" (197). As for the philosophy of perception, the existence of qualia is not, in Crane's view, an important issue at all. Crane disputes the transparency thesis by pointing out to non-real objects of an experience and, next, by appealing to examples of experiences in which instantiated are properties of this experiences, not of their object/s (e.g. experiencing things blurrily without experiencing these things as blurry). The partial denial of the transparency thesis makes of Crane an opponent of both representationalism and qualia theory. He can reject them both because while representationalism is undermined by argument from hallucination, qualia theory is undermined by argument from illusion. Discussing the question whether intentionality is or not a relation, Crane tells us that insofar as "perceptual representation is intrinsic to the perceptual state itself" (208), intentionality is not-relational to object of experience, though it could be said that it is relational to the propositional content of an experience. Crane mentions the disjunctivist theory which, in order to preserve the relationality of perception, proposes to account for genuine perception and hallucination separately. In the final section, Crane comes back to the theory of qualia, which is a form of intentionalism, and concludes that since "the debate about qualia should be seen as an in-house dispute among intentionalists" (215), the qualia theory is not an important issue within the whole philosophy of perception.
From this we can expect that Crane's answer to the question Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? (217-234) will be negative. The reader learns again about object and content within the theory of intentionality. New ideas are: aspect (in fact relatively new, since it has been presented already in Chapt. 5 & 7), absence (whether object of an intentional state is real or unreal) and accuracy. They are reasons for introducing the idea of content. A crucial claim Crane makes is that the content of an experience does not have to be propositional. The argument he relies on is that a proposition is either true or false while the content of an experience, say a picture, is neither true nor false. It is rather more or less accurate. The main difference between truth and accuracy is that the former does not admit of degrees while the latter does. By the same token, propositions are used to assert things what is not the case of pictures. Moreover, it seems absurd to speak about asserting or denying experiences what is the case of propositions. Experiences do not stand in logical relations either. The chapter ends with remarks on non-conceptual content of experience (the topic having been already presented in Chapt. 9).
The Given (pp. 235-255) is among the most recent texts (together with Chapt. 1, 13 & 16) and as such presents the best, I suppose, Crane's current position. Several distinctions are presented, e.g. a distinction between two meanings of experiential content (a phenomenological content, i.e. conveyed to the subject in an experience, and propositional content, i.e. what the subject brings to experience). Crane's main stress is on the distinction between concrete (real) content and general (abstract) content. The former is unrepeatable, while the latter can be shared in different experiences of the same subject or even by different subjects. (This distinction parallels the one between perception and belief, see below.) If the content of an unrepeatable experience can be described and thereby become propositional, the description is made by abstraction or generalization of the real and does not grasp all elements of the individual and concrete event. This is why the description of a representation is by no means representation itself. Representation is instantiated from a particular perspective, in a particular moment, in a particular experience. Representation is "specific to me and to this particular experience" (250). Hence there are two meanings or conception of content. Phenomenological content is "something spatiotemporal, concrete, particular, and specific to its subject" (254), while semantic content is propositional because it describes the phenomenological content. By saying that the phenomenological conception "has a certain priority" over the semantic one, Crane once again seems to side with, so to speak, the Aristotelian perspective in which the concrete precedes ontologically the abstract (but there is no word about Aristotle in the book).
Part IV is the shortest of all and its two last chapters (15 & 16) are strictly polemical. It mainly discusses anti-psychologistic assumptions of the kind as to impede "a proper understanding of the phenomenology of consciousness" (258). In Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought (261-280) Crane starts with a qualification that the consciousness he has in mind is phenomenal consciousness, something that he takes for granted (maybe because "[a]ll theories of consciousness recognize" (phenomenal) consciousness' existence (262)). It can be neither reduced nor defined. His second claim concerns phenomenal intentionality, i.e. intentionality "relat[ing] to how things appear" (262). Crane's aim is to explain "how thought can be conscious in the same sense as sensation and sensory experiences" (263). After analyzing - once again in this volume - the qualia theory and the higher-order thought of consciousness as inadequate in accounting for consciousness involved in both thought and sensation (the former is rather inadequate as for thought, while the latter as for sensation), Crane discards Block's distinction of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness as useless in accounting for consciousness occurring in both thought and sensation. Crane understands consciousness as an occurrence of bringing what is known to mind and not as a persisting state. The distinction between occurrence versus persisting state is the same as between something unfolding over time versus instantiation of properties. Since belief is a persisting state that lasts also when a person, say, goes to sleep, while a thought is "an episode of thinking something" (276), only the latter is conscious. To put it another way: "when reflecting consciously on one's belief" what is brought to mind is not another belief but a conscious thought. Crane concludes that, since thoughts and sensory experiences "are episodes or events in the 'stream' of a subject's consciousness" (278) which means that they occur as "events or processes that have a particular temporal extent and duration" (279), both are conscious in the same way.
Chapt. 14, 15 and 16 are attacking not as much physicalism itself as physicalists' arguments. In the essay Subjective Facts (281-297) the issue is about denying that all facts in the world are objective by pointing out to facts subjective in character. Crane relies on Jackson's knowledge argument based on a thought-experiment about Mary, yet he uses the argument in order to argue for the existence of subjective facts and not, as it is often used, against physicalism. For Crane objections of physicalists against the whole argument and its premises are wrong, but, notwithstanding, the argument itself does not undermine physicalism, since it only shows that there are such things as subjective, other than physical facts. Crane remarks that not only physics can tell nothing about how things are experienced but also any kind of scientific knowledge, be it psychology or physiology, cannot either. Accordingly, subjective facts are different from "'book-learning' facts" (293), facts that can be named as objective. And since there are facts which are learnt by "certain kinds of experience, or occup[y] a certain position in the world", there are subjective facts. They are subjective in the sense that their existence unlike the existence of, say, books depends on the existence of experiencing subjects. The existence of subjective facts are not, however, an argument against physicalism insofar as it amounts to a claim that facts in the sense of propositional knowledge are physical, yet physicalism should not claim that "physics must state all the facts" (296). Crane suggests that "a physicalist can (and should) sensibly deny that all knowledge is [...] physical knowledge" (296) - at least knowledge, as it is understood in the knowledge argument. As it is, representation of reality is not the same as reality itself, and facts about the former are not of the same nature as facts about the latter.
Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts (298-306) dismantles the idea of phenomenal concepts as they are understood by Papineau, especially in his refutation of anti-physicalist arguments. For Papineau phenomenal concepts are nothing but what involves or recreates their referents (for example "the pain is a constituent of the act of introspection" (299)). But, in fact, as Crane shows, this is not a phenomenal concept of some taste which makes someone recognize and, more importantly, remind the taste in question but rather an experience of tasting it.
The volume ends with Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness (307-315) which is a critical discussion of concept of (knowledge of) acquaintance. It is used by Tye to respond to anti-materialist arguments (e.g. the explanatory gap argument) by appealing to the distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. Crane first demonstrates that Tye's notion of acquaintance is different from knowing things in ordinary sense and as such it must be a technical notion corresponding to something which "does not require knowledge of truths at all, it need not admit of degrees, and it is event-like" (311). It is about "a special kind of 'objectual knowledge' which we only get by being conscious" (312). It can be, therefore, satisfactory replaced by the notion of conscious experience of the world (experience is a way of getting knowledge and acquaintance refers to a special kind of experiences, e.g. seeing, hearing). At this point, Crane reiterates his claim that some truths about the world and some facts are known only be being experienced, e.g. non-propositional knowledge (seeing red for example). And to be experienced, he says, "the knower [is required] to have an experience" (314-315).
Crane states in the Preface that he was attentive to "correcting [...] occasional grammatical or bibliographical error[s]" (xii). Unfortunately insufficiently. Depending on paper, more or less misspellings or mistakes occur (e.g. four in the Introduction, unpublished previously; three on p. 22). There are errors in quotes and references too. For instance, what Brentano claims is not that "intentionality 'is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena [...]'" (91), but that 'intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena' (this blunder must look surprising, since Crane is one of the editors of the series which republished the English translation of Brentano's work); A. Byrne's passage cannot come from p. 157 of his article (242), since it appeared on pp. 231-250 (as it results from References (347)). It is odd enough to see references to the papers, that have become now chapters of the volume, by pointing to their first version, in a journal for example, and not to the volume itself the reader has in hand. An example of this can be the following in the Chapt. 11: "[g]iven what I have said in this essay, it follows that I should withdraw my claim in this work [...]" (231) [my italics] - I am confused what both this do refer to. A reference is to The Non-conceptual Content of Experience, what now is Chapt. 9 of the volume. We read about Travis forthcoming work (238) but you would in vain look for its title. All this gives an impression that the volume is not satisfactorily set.
I think also that a general paper by Crane with the full structure of intentional act/state/intentionality would be a recommendable addition to the volume or at least a general table with taxonomy of views. Positions of a pure intentionalism being called pure representationalism, representationalism presented as one of two versions of strong intentionalism, weak and strong intentionalism, impure and pure intentionalism etc. would be more transparent, especially because the terminology applied by Crane is more than once variable. A couple of example will show the size of the problem. Once "two dimensions of variation in any intentional state of a subject" (130), i.e. mode and content, are stressed, once "three dimensions of variation in the ways one's states of mind might be directed upon an object" (157), i.e. object[], mode and content are underscored. Aspectual shape is, together with directedness[], one of two essential features of intentionality (see 129), then aspects are desire or fear (221). Yet, desire, as well as belief, and hope are called the intentional mode (130), but, then, belief and hope, together with perception or judgment are called attitudinal components (270). Maybe a remark "feeling and seeing [...] what Searle and I call mode, and what others would call attitude" (156) would make it more clear but still the reader can be affected by a kind of theaetetian dizziness. Crane defines content as "[t]he particular way in which the intentional object is represented" (152), but in a different chapter this very feature of being "always apprehended in a certain way" (104, 129: "always presented under a certain aspect, or in a certain way" (129)) is called aspectual shape, and in a different section of the same chapter Crane states: "presentation of an object with an aspectual shape is [...] intentional content" (135, see also 221: "fact that an object is represented under an aspect is [...] the content of that state")[].
Crane gives a description of the structure of intentionality as follows: subject-intentional mode-intentional content (see 130). But this refers to intentional relation only, while a model of the full structure of intentionality would be helpful. All the more, aspect is on another occasion an idea coupled with absence and accuracy, and, moreover, we are told that "[t]hey do not all apply to each intentional state, but at least one of them applies to every kind" (221). Crane does not develop this point and we don't know under which conditions they apply or to what extent they are contingent or optional categories of an intentional state. Given all these elements, a beginner or less skillful reader can be lost. For the same reason a general, even schematic, overview would be welcome.
As Crane informs himself, "not everything [he] say[s] in the[se] essays is wholly consistent in the rest" (xii). I suppose nobody would look for the consistency here. However, given repetitiveness on the one hand, and inconsistency on the other one can ask how to read the whole volume. More specifically what to think about what can look as inconsistency within the same paper, for example in the Chapt. 11 we are told first that "it does not follow from the way I have introduced the notion of content that content must be propositional" (222), but then, in the conclusion, Crane says that he "ha[s] argued that experience does not have propositional content" (234), while a couple of lines below we read: "experience might be representational without being a propositional attitude". On the one hand, the chapters of the book can be read in any order whatsoever, as if they were written by several hands, but then the book is not representative since some issues are analyzed less (the case of consciousness[]), while others are simply neglected (the case of affectivity[]). On the other, it can be read as an evidence of Crane's philosophical evolution. In this last case the volume will serve as valuable scripta minora to Crane's fans. In both cases it can be, nonetheless, regarded as a useful lesson in philosophy as well as a vital contribution to a better understanding of what "[p]sychologism about the psychological" (255) is.
[] It is curious that Crane's thesis about perception being non-propositional is close to Brentano's first class' feature, yet not referred to by Crane: a simple presentation without recognizing or denying it.
[] Crane's elucidation of what object is is not clear enough to me. For instance, he says "[i]n the case of fear [...] what you fear is the object of your fear, not its content" (153-154). I am not sure if he is right saying that. I doubt if there is such a general thing like an object tout court. Maybe, even if you fear "the dog around the corner", this dog in meant in a certain aspect, the dog that I perceive as a danger to me and so on. Likewise, "[i]f I see a rabbit, the rabbit is the intentional object of my experience" (208) - but there is no rabbit simpliciter - it is such and such rabbit being so and so and I wonder how Crane understand in this context his own remarks about "the object presented under certain aspect and not under others" (129) or "[t]he particular way in which the intentional object is represented" (152). I would like to know more about what is and what constitutes aspect, mode and content in fearing a dog or seeing a rabbit. In a word, I think that an analysis of some examples with all categories applied altogether would be a nice picture of how Crane understands these terms.
[] This must be directedness at another level, directedness of directedness so to speak, if we remember that intentionality is sometimes described as directedness (see 88) and we are still to claim that directedness and aspectual shape are two elements of intentionality.
[] Crane does not spell out enough in what sense he speaks about experience, an ambiguous word in English. Has he in mind empirical experience (what is meant in German by Erfahrung) or experiential experience (Erlebnis)? For instance, both in Husserl and Wittgenstein (see e.g. Zettel 96 vs 189) we meet Erfahrung as well as Erlebnis and depending on translation, they are rendered by the same word or differently. I think in a treatment of the kind Crane offers us this should be better explicated. And the Indexdoes not help, since only one occurrence of experience is listed. This is striking insofar as Crane discusses it in detail more than once (e.g. 132, 217, 293-294, and more particularly 286 and (or versus ?) 287 where specifying if experience refers to experimental or experiential would be welcome).
[] In what concerns Part IV, Crane tells us that it does not "present a systematic treatment of the problems of consciousness and the mind-body problem" (258). True, the fourth part is short and one could wonder if this is because Crane considers consciousness less important than, say, perception, or simply because he has less to say about it. It can suggest also that the three first parts are systematic treatments of, respectively, history of intentionality, intentionality and perception. I would like to learn more aboutattention (see 230) or dream(ing), perhaps as important as hallucination and illusion are for the book's topic.
[] Even if Crane devotes some pages to affectivity, there is no treatment of affectivity in the volume. This is a serious lack. For instance, in Brentano affectivity (Gemütsbewegung) is one of three classes of psychical phenomena and as such it possesses features it does not share with presentation and judgment and as such needs a part or, at the least, a separate chapter.
© 2014 Robert Zaborowski
Robert Zaborowski, email@example.com, Polish Academy of Sciences & University of Warmia and Mazury