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A Theory of Feelings Anger and Forgiveness"My Madness Saved Me"10 Good Questions about Life and Death12 Modern Philosophers50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a GodA Cabinet of Philosophical CuriositiesA Case for IronyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to Buddhist PhilosophyA Companion to FoucaultA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to HumeA Companion to KantA Companion to Phenomenology and ExistentialismA Companion to PragmatismA Companion to the Philosophy of ActionA Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyA Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Critical Overview of Biological FunctionsA Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of MindA Cursing Brain?A Delicate BalanceA Farewell to AlmsA Frightening LoveA Future for PresentismA Guide to the Good LifeA History of PsychiatryA History of the MindA Life Worth LivingA Manual of Experimental PhilosophyA Map of the MindA Metaphysics of PsychopathologyA Mind So RareA Natural History of Human MoralityA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Natural History of VisionA Parliament of MindsA Philosopher Looks at The Sense of HumorA Philosophical DiseaseA Philosophy of BoredomA Philosophy of Cinematic ArtA Philosophy of CultureA Philosophy of EmptinessA Philosophy of FearA Philosophy of PainA Physicalist ManifestoA Place for ConsciousnessA Question of TrustA Research Agenda for DSM-VA Revolution of the MindA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Stroll With William JamesA Tapestry of ValuesA Tear is an Intellectual ThingA Theory of FreedomA Thousand MachinesA Universe of ConsciousnessA Very Bad WizardA Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the CurtainA Virtue EpistemologyA World Full of GodsA World Without ValuesAbout FaceAbout the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the SelfAction and ResponsibilityAction in ContextAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionAction, Contemplation, and HappinessAction, Emotion and WillAdam SmithAdaptive DynamicsAddictionAddictionAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction Is a ChoiceAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAftermathAfterwarAgainst AdaptationAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HappinessAgainst HealthAgency and ActionAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and EmbodimentAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAl-JununAlain BadiouAlain BadiouAlasdair MacIntyreAlien Landscapes?Altered EgosAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Ethics for TodayAn Intellectual History of CannibalismAn Interpretation of DesireAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy An Introduction to Philosophy of EducationAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyAn Introductory Philosophy of MedicineAn Odd Kind of FameAnalytic FreudAnalytic Philosophy in AmericaAncient AngerAncient Models of MindAncient Philosophy of the SelfAngerAnimal LessonsAnimal MindsAnimals Like UsAnnihilationAnother PlanetAnswers for AristotleAnti-ExternalismAnti-Individualism and KnowledgeAntigone’s ClaimAntipsychiatryAre We Hardwired?Are Women Human?Arguing about DisabilityArguing About Human NatureAristotle and the Philosophy of FriendshipAristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's ChildrenAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAristotle, Emotions, and EducationArt & MoralityArt After Conceptual ArtArt in Three DimensionsArt, Self and KnowledgeArtificial ConsciousnessArtificial HappinessAspects of PsychologismAsylum to ActionAtonement and ForgivenessAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutobiography as PhilosophyAutonomyAutonomy and Mental DisorderAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismBabies by DesignBackslidingBadiouBadiou's DeleuzeBadiou, Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking EmancipationBare Facts And Naked TruthsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBattlestar Galactica and PhilosophyBe Like the FoxBeautyBecoming a SubjectBecoming HumanBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing AmoralBeing HumanBeing Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory Being No OneBeing Realistic about ReasonsBeing ReducedBeing YourselfBelief's Own EthicsBending Over BackwardsBerlin Childhood around 1900Bernard WilliamsBertrand RussellBetter than BothBetter Than WellBetween Two WorldsBeyond HealthBeyond Hegel and NietzscheBeyond KuhnBeyond LossBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond PostmodernismBeyond ReductionBeyond SchizophreniaBeyond the DSM StoryBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics in the ClinicBiological Complexity and Integrative PluralismBiology Is TechnologyBiosBipolar ExpeditionsBlackwell Companion to the Philosophy of EducationBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlues - Philosophy for EveryoneBlushBob Dylan and PhilosophyBody ConsciousnessBody Image And Body SchemaBody ImagesBody LanguageBody MattersBody WorkBody-Subjects and Disordered MindsBoundBoundaries of the MindBoyleBrain Evolution and CognitionBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-WiseBrainchildrenBrains, Buddhas, and BelievingBrainstormingBrave New WorldsBreakdown of WillBrief Child Therapy Homework PlannerBrief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and FaithBrief Therapy Homework PlannerBritain on the CouchBritish Idealism and the Concept of the SelfBrute RationalityBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyBut Is It Art?Camus and SartreCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCarving Nature at Its JointsCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsCassandra's DaughterCato's TearsCausation and CounterfactualsCauses, Laws, and Free WillChanging Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-ModernityChanging the SubjectChaosophyCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionCharles DarwinCherishmentChildhood and the Philosophy of EducationChildrenChildren, Families, and Health Care Decision MakingChoices and ConflictChoosing Not to ChooseChristmas - Philosophy for EveryoneCinema, Philosophy, BergmanCinematic MythmakingCity and Soul in Plato's RepublicClassifying MadnessClear and Queer ThinkingClinical EthicsClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyCodependent ForevermoreCoffee - Philosophy for EveryoneCognition and the BrainCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, ReflectionCognitive BiologyCognitive FictionsCognitive Neuroscience of EmotionCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Cognitive Theories of Mental IllnessCoherence in Thought and ActionCollected Papers, Volume 1Collected Papers, Volume 2College SexComedy IncarnateCommitmentCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentConcealment And ExposureConceptual Analysis and Philosophical NaturalismConceptual Art and PaintingConceptual Issues in Evolutionary BiologyConfessionsConfucianismConnected, or What It Means to Live in the Network SocietyConquest of AbundanceConscience and ConvenienceConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the SelfConsciousness EmergingConsciousness EvolvingConsciousness ExplainedConsciousness in ActionConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsole and ClassifyConstructing the WorldConstructive AnalysisContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Philosophy of BiologyContemporary Debates in Philosophy of MindContemporary Debates in Political PhilosophyContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Natural LawContested Knowledge: Social Theory TodayContesting PsychiatryContext and the AttitudesContinental Philosophy of ScienceControlControlling Our DestiniesConversations About Psychology and Sexual OrientationCopernicus, Darwin and FreudCrazy for YouCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCreating ConsilienceCreating HysteriaCreating Mental IllnessCreating Scientific ConceptsCreating the American JunkieCreation, Rationality and AutonomyCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCrimes of ReasonCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychiatryCritical PsychologyCritical ResistanceCritical Thinking About PsychologyCritical VisionsCross and KhoraCruel CompassionCTRL [SPACE]Cultural Psychology of the SelfCultural Theory: An IntroductionCulture and Psychiatric DiagnosisCulture and Subjective Well-BeingCulture of DeathCultures of NeurastheniaCurious EmotionsCurrent Controversies in Experimental PhilosophyCustom and Reason in HumeCustomers and Patrons of the Mad-TradeCutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together AgainCylons in AmericaDamaged IdentitiesDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous EmotionsDaniel DennettDaniel DennettDark AgesDarwin and DesignDarwin's Dangerous IdeaDarwin's LegacyDarwin, God and the Meaning of LifeDarwinian PsychiatryDarwinian ReductionismDarwinizing CultureDating: Philosophy for EveryoneDeathDeathDeath and CharacterDeath and CompassionDeath and the AfterlifeDebating DesignDebating HumanismDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecomposing the WillDeconstructing PsychotherapyDeconstruction and DemocracyDeeper Than DarwinDeeper than ReasonDefending Science - within ReasonDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDegrees of BeliefDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDelusions and the Madness of the MassesDementiaDemons, Dreamers, and MadmenDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDennett’s PhilosophyDepression Is a ChoiceDepression, Emotion and the SelfDepthDerrida, Deleuze, PsychoanalysisDescartesDescartes and the Passionate MindDescartes' CogitoDescartes's Changing MindDescartes's Concept of MindDescribing Inner Experience?Descriptions and PrescriptionsDesembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Desire and AffectDesire, Love, and IdentityDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDeveloping the VirtuesDiagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDialectics of the SelfDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital SoulDimensional Models of Personality DisordersDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisjunctivismDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDispatches from the Freud WarsDisrupted LivesDistractionDisturbed ConsciousnessDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Do We Still Need Doctors?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Does the Woman Exist?Doing without ConceptsDon't Believe Everything You ThinkDonald DavidsonDonald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the MentalDoubting Darwin?Dreaming and Other Involuntary MentationDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV-TR CasebookDworkin and His CriticsDying to KnowDynamics in ActionDysthymia and the Spectrum of Chronic DepressionsEccentricsEducational MetamorphosesEffective IntentionsElbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth WantingEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbodied RhetoricsEmbodied Selves and Divided MindsEmbryos under the MicroscopeEmergencies in Mental Health PracticeEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotionEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion and PsycheEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotional ReasonEmotional ReasonEmotional TruthEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions, Value, and AgencyEmpathyEmpathy and AgencyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpathy in the Context of PhilosophyEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEnchanted LoomsEngaging BuddhismEngineering the Human GermlineEnjoymentEnvyEpicureanismEpistemic LuckEpistemologyEpistemology and EmotionsEpistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentEros and the GoodErotic MoralityEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssays in the Metaphysics of Mind Essays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEssays on Nonconceptual ContentEssays on Philosophical CounselingEssays on Reference, Language, and MindEssays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern PhilosophyEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEsssential Philosophy of PsychiatryEternal Sunshine of the Spotless MindEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in Human CloningEthical TheoryEthicsEthicsEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics and Values in PsychotherapyEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics in Plain EnglishEthics in PracticeEthics in Psychiatric ResearchEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEuropean Review of Philosophy. Vol. 5Everyday IrrationalityEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolutionEvolution and the Human MindEvolution's RainbowEvolutionary Origins of MoralityEvolutionary PsychologyExamined LifeExamined LivesExistential AmericaExistentialismExistentialism and Romantic LoveExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and NaturalismExperiments in EthicsExplaining ConsciousnessExplaining the BrainExplaining the Computational MindExplanatory PluralismExploding the Gene MythExploring HappinessExploring the SelfExpression and the InnerExpressions of JudgmentFaces of IntentionFact and ValueFact and Value in EmotionFacts, Values, and NormsFads and Fallacies in the Social SciencesFaith and Wisdom in ScienceFatherhoodFear of KnowledgeFearless SpeechFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFeelings of BeingFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminism and Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Interpretations of Rene DescartesFeminist TheoryField Notes from ElsewhereFinding Consciousness in the BrainFingerprints of GodFlesh in the Age of ReasonFolk Psychological NarrativesFolk Psychology Re-AssessedForces of HabitForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and RetributionFoucault 2.0Foucault and PhilosophyFoucault NowFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Ethical Practice, Research, and Teaching in PsychologyFour Views on Free WillFrank Ramsey (1903-1930)Free WillFree WillFree WillFree WillFree Will and Action ExplanationFree Will and LuckFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free WillFreedomFreedom and DeterminismFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom and ResponsibiltyFreedom and ValueFreedom EvolvesFreedom RegainedFreedom vs. InterventionFreedom, Fame, Lying, and BetrayalFreudFreud and the Question of PseudoscienceFreud As PhilosopherFreud's AnswerFreud, the Reluctant PhilosopherFriedrich NietzscheFrom Chance to ChoiceFrom Clinic to ClassroomFrom Complexity to LifeFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the HumanitiesFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrom Valuing to ValueFrontiers of ConsciousnessFrontiers of JusticeFurnishing the MindGalileo in PittsburghGenderGender and Mental HealthGender in the MirrorGender TroubleGenesGenes, Women, EqualityGenetic Nature/CultureGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetic SecretsGenocide's AftermathGenomes and What to Make of ThemGerman Idealism and the JewGerman PhilosophyGetting HookedGilles DeleuzeGlobal PhilosophyGluttonyGod and Phenomenal ConsciousnessGoffman's LegacyGoing Amiss in Experimental ResearchGoodness & AdviceGrassroots SpiritualityGrave MattersGrave MattersGreedGreek Models of Mind and SelfGut ReactionsHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHabits of MindHallucinationHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of EmotionsHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness and EducationHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHappiness, Death, and the Remainder of LifeHard LuckHarmful ThoughtsHaving the World in ViewHealing PsychiatryHealing the Soul in the Age of the BrainHealth, Illness and DiseaseHealth, Science, and Ordinary LanguageHegelHeidegger and a Metaphysics of FeelingHeidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of BeingHermann von Helmholtz's MechanismHermeneutics As PoliticsHeterophobiaHeterosyncraciesHeuristics and BiasesHeuristics and the LawHidden ResourcesHidden SelvesHiding from HumanityHigh Art LiteHistorical OntologyHistory of Psychiatry and Medical PsychologyHistory, Historicity And ScienceHobbesHomosexualitiesHope and Dread in PsychoanalysisHot ThoughtHow Can I Be Trusted?How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Children Learn the Meanings of WordsHow Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?How Do We Know Who We Are?How Emotions WorkHow Emotions WorkHow History Made the MindHow Images ThinkHow is Nature Possible?How Propaganda WorksHow Science WorksHow Scientific Practices MatterHow Scientists Explain DiseaseHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Make Opportunity EqualHow to Solve the Mind-Body Problemhow to stop timeHow to Think More About SexHow We HopeHow We ReasonHuman CloningHuman Development, Language and the Future of MankindHuman EnhancementHuman Evolution, Reproduction, and MoralityHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman NatureHuman NatureHuman Nature and the Limits of ScienceHuman-Built WorldHumanismHumanism, What's That?HumanityHumans, Animals, MachinesHumeHumeHume on Motivation and VirtueHusserlHystoriesI of the VortexI Was WrongIdeas that MatterIdentifying the MindIdentity and Agency in Cultural WorldsIgnorance and ImaginationIllnessImagination and Its PathologiesImagination and the Meaningful BrainImagining NumbersImmortal RemainsImproving Nature?In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of HealthIn Defense of SentimentalityIn Love With LifeIn Praise of Athletic BeautyIn Praise of Natural PhilosophyIn Praise of the WhipIn Pursuit of HappinessIn Search of HappinessIn the Name of GodIn the Name of IdentityIn the Space of ReasonsIn the SwarmIn Two MindsIncompatibilism's AllureIndividual Differences in Conscious ExperienceInfinity and PerspectiveInformation ArtsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchIngmar Bergman, Cinematic PhilosopherInhuman ThoughtsInner PresenceInsanityIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntelligent VirtueIntentionIntentionality, Deliberation and AutonomyIntentions and IntentionalityIntentions and IntentionalityInterpreting MindsInterpreting NietzscheIntroducing Greek PhilosophyIntrospection and ConsciousnessIntrospection VindicatedIntuition, Imagination, and Philosophical MethodologyIntuitionismInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIrrationalityIs Academic Feminism Dead?Is It Me or My Meds?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is Oedipus Online?Is Science Neurotic?Is Science Value Free?Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Is There a Duty to Die?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJacques LacanJacques RancièreJacques RanciereJean-Paul SartreJohn McDowellJohn SearleJohn Searle's Ideas About Social RealityJohn Stuart MillJohn Stuart Mill and the Writing of CharacterJoint AttentionJokesJonathan EdwardsJudging and UnderstandingJustice for ChildrenJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeKantKant and MiltonKant and the Fate of AutonomyKant and the Limits of AutonomyKant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral ActionKant on Freedom, Law, and HappinessKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Anatomy of EvilKant's Anatomy of the Intelligent MindKant's Theory of VirtueKarl JaspersKarl PopperKey Concepts in PhilosophyKierkegaardKierkegaard as PhenomenologistKierkegaard's Concept of DespairKierkegaard's MuseKinds of MindsKinds, Things, and StuffKnowing, Knowledge and BeliefsKnowledge MonopoliesKnowledge, Belief, and CharacterKnowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessLacanLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLanguageLanguage in ContextLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Culture, and MindLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw and the BrainLaw, Liberty, and PsychiatryLaws, Mind, and Free WillLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberatory PsychiatryLife and ActionLife at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum, 1857-1997Life Is Not a Game of PerfectLife of the MindLife's FormLife, Death, & MeaningLife, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of UtilityLife, Sex, and IdeasLight in the Dark RoomLike a Splinter in Your MindLiving and Dying WellLiving NarrativeLiving Outside Mental IllnessLiving with DarwinLiving With One’s PastLockeLocke LockeLogic and the Art of Memory Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and LiteratureLooking for SpinozaLooking for The StrangerLost SoulsLOT 2LoveLoveLove's ConfusionsLove's VisionLove, Friendship, and the SelfLove, Sex & TragedyLuckyLudwig WittgensteinLustLyingMachine ConsciousnessMad for FoucaultMad TravelersMade with WordsMadness And Death In PhilosophyMadness and DemocracyMadness at HomeMadness Is CivilizationMaking Natural KnowledgeMaking Sense of EvolutionMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMaking the DSM-5Making the Social WorldMaking TruthMale Female EmailMan, Beast, and ZombieMandated Reporting of Suspected Child AbuseManiaManic Depression and CreativityMapping the Edges and the In-betweenMapping the Future of BiologyMarcus AureliusMaster PassionsMatters of the MindMe++Meaning and Moral OrderMeaning and Value in a Secular AgeMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMeaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and MindMeasuring HappinessMeasuring PsychopathologyMedia MadnessMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedicine and Philosophy in Classical AntiquityMedicine of the PersonMedicine, Mental Health, Religion, Science and Well-BeingMelancholy And the Care of the SoulMelancholy and the Otherness of GodMementoMemory and NarrativeMental ActionsMental CausationMental Causation and OntologyMental HealthMental Health At The CrossroadsMental Health Policy in BritainMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMerleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of PhilosophyMetacognition and Theory of MindMetacreationMetaethical SubjectivismMetaethicsMetal and FleshMetaphors of MemoryMetapoliticsMethods in MindMichel FoucaultMill's UtilitarianismMindMindMind and ConsciousnessMind and CosmosMind and MechanismMind GamesMind in a Physical WorldMind in Everyday Life and Cognitive ScienceMind in LifeMind TimeMind's LandscapeMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMind, Brain, and Free WillMind, Reason and ImaginationMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds and PersonsMinds, Brains, and LawMinds, Ethics, and ConditionalsMindshapingMindsightMindworldsMirror, MirrorMixed FeelingsMockingbird YearsModels of the SelfModern Social ImaginariesModern Theories of JusticeModernity and SubjectivityModernity and TechnologyMoody Minds DistemperedMoral BrainsMoral DimensionsMoral FailureMoral ImaginationMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral ParticularismMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology and Human AgencyMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Moral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMotherhoodMotive and RightnessMoving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New PsychiatryMultiple Analogies in Science and PhilosophyMultiple Identities & False MemoriesMusic, Madness, and the Unworking of LanguageMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Double UnveiledMy WayNarrativeNarrative and IdentityNarrative MedicineNarrative PsychiatryNarrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesNatural Ethical FactsNatural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeNatural MindsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveNaturalism and the Human ConditionNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalized BioethicsNaturalizing the MindNatureNature and NarrativeNear Death ExperienceNeither Bad nor MadNeither Victim nor SurvivorNeuro-Philosophy and the Healthy MindNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neurophilosophy at WorkNeurophilosophy of Free WillNeuropoliticsNeuropsychoanalysis in PracticeNeuroscience and PhilosophyNew Essays on the Explanation of ActionNew Philosophy for a New MediaNew Versions of VictimsNew Waves in Philosophy of ActionNietzscheNietzsche and Buddhist PhilosophyNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNietzsche's TherapyNietzsche, Culture and EducationNietzsche: The Man and His PhilosophyNihil UnboundNoir AnxietyNormative EthicsNormativityNorms of NatureNotebooks 1951-1959Notes Toward a Performative Theory of AssemblyNothing So AbsurdOblivionOn AnxietyOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn Being AuthenticOn BeliefOn BetrayalOn BullshitOn DelusionOn DesireOn EmotionsOn HashishOn Human RightsOn Loving Our EnemiesOn Nature and LanguageOn PersonalityOn ReflectionOn Romantic LoveOn the EmotionsOn the Freud WatchOn the Government of the LivingOn the Human ConditionOn the InternetOn the Meaning of LifeOn the Philosophy of LawOn the Pragmatics of CommunicationOn the Punitive SocietyOn TruthOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne Hundred DaysOnflowOnly a Promise of HappinessOntology of ConsciousnessOpen MindedOpen Your EyesOrgans without BodiesOther MindsOur Last Great IllusionOur Own MindsOur Posthuman FutureOur StoriesOut of Its MindOut of Our HeadsOxford Guide to the MindOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPanic DisorderPanpsychismPanpsychism in the WestPartialityPassionate EnginesPassionate EnginesPathologies of BeliefPathologies of ReasonPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perceiving the WorldPerception & CognitionPerception and Basic BeliefsPerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPerceptual ExperiencePerfecting VirtuePerplexities of ConsciousnessPersistencePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal IdentityPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonal Identity and Fractured SelvesPersonhood and Health CarePersonsPersons and BodiesPersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPersons, Souls and DeathPerspectives on ImitationPerspectives on PragmatismPessimismPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenal ConsciousnessPhenomenal IntentionalityPhenomenology and ExistentialismPhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophersPhilosophers on MusicPhilosophers without GodsPhilosophical CounselingPhilosophical Counselling and the UnconsciousPhilosophical DevicesPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical History and the Problem of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in Psychiatry IIPhilosophical MethodologyPhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophical Myths of the FallPhilosophical Perspectives on DepictionPhilosophical Perspectives on Technology and PsychiatryPhilosophical PracticePhilosophical Reflections on DisabilityPhilosophizing About Sex Philosophizing the EverydayPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy and LivingPhilosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy and PsychotherapyPhilosophy and Science FictionPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CulturePhilosophy and the Moving ImagePhilosophy and the NeurosciencesPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy As FictionPhilosophy BitesPhilosophy Bites BackPhilosophy for Counselling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy for LifePhilosophy in a New CenturyPhilosophy in an Age of SciencePhilosophy in Children's LiteraturePhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BodyPhilosophy of Film and Motion PicturesPhilosophy of LovePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and MarriagePhilosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionPhilosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple PersonalityPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Public HealthPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhilosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophy on TapPhilosophy PracticePhilosophy the Day after TomorrowPhilosophy's Role in Counseling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhilosophy, Politics, DemocracyPhotography and PhilosophyPhysical RealizationPhysicalism and Its DiscontentsPhysicalism and Mental CausationPhysicalism, or Something Near EnoughPhysician-Assisted DyingPillar of SaltPin-up GrrrlsPlatoPlatoPlato, Not Prozac!Platonic Ethics, Old and NewPluralistic CasuistryPolarities of ExperiencesPolitical EmotionsPopper, Objectivity and the Growth of KnowledgePornPorn StudiesPornography, Sex, and FeminismPortrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young ManPostcolonial DisordersPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPower and the SelfPower SplitPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical ConflictsPractical Identity and Narrative AgencyPractical PhilosophyPractical RulesPractical Tortoise RaisingPractically ProfoundPracticing Feminist Ethics in PsychologyPragmatic BioethicsPragmatismPragmatism, Old And NewPraise and BlamePredicative MindsPreferences and Well-BeingPrescriptions for the MindPresocraticsPrimary and Secondary QualitiesPrimates and PhilosophersPrivacyPrivileged AccessProblems in MindProblems of RationalityProzac As a Way of LifeProzac BacklashProzac on the CouchPsyche and SomaPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric Cultures ComparedPsychiatric Diagnosis and ClassificationPsychiatric EthicsPsychiatric HegemonyPsychiatric PowerPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry and Philosophy of SciencePsychiatry and ReligionPsychiatry as a Human SciencePsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry in SocietyPsychiatry in the New MilleniumPsychiatry in the Scientific ImagePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsycho-Physical Dualism TodayPsychoanalysis and Narrative MedicinePsychoanalysis and the Philosophy of SciencePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and PhilosophyPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology, Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of Human RelationshipsPsychotherapy and ConfidentialityPsychotherapy As PraxisPublic PhilosophyPunishmentPure ImmanencePurple HazePursuing MeaningQuality of Life and Human DifferenceQueer PhilosophyQuestions for FreudQuestions for FreudQuine and Davidson on Language, Thought and RealityRaceRace in Contemporary MedicineRadiant CoolRadical AlterityRadical ExternalismRadical HopeRational and Social AgencyRational CausationRational Choice in an Uncertain WorldRationality + Consciousness = Free WillRationality and FreedomRationality and the Reflective MindRationality in ActionRawls, Dewey, and ConstructivismRe-creating MedicineRe-EmergenceRe-Engineering Philosophy for Limited BeingsReading AutobiographyReading Bernard WilliamsReading SartreReadings in the Philosophy of TechnologyReal MaterialismReal Natures and Familiar ObjectsReal ScienceRealism in ActionReason & EmancipationReason in ActionReason in PhilosophyReason's GriefReasonably ViciousReasoning About Rational AgentsReasoning in Biological DiscoveriesReasons from WithinReasons without RationalismReclaiming CognitionReclaiming the SoulReconceiving SchizophreniaReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecreative MindsRediscovering EmotionRediscovering EmpathyReference and ExistenceReference and the Rational MindReflections On How We LiveReframing Disease ContextuallyRefusing CareRegulating SexReinventing the SoulRelativism and Human RightsRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyReliable ReasoningReligion without GodRelying on OthersRemembering HomeResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility from the MarginsRestraining RageRethinking ExpertiseRethinking IntrospectionRethinking Mental Health and DisorderRethinking RapeRethinking the DSMRethinking the Sociology of Mental HealthRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfReturn to ReasonRevolt, She SaidRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard Rorty's New PragmatismRightsRights, Democracy, and Fulfillment in the Era of Identity PoliticsRise And Fall of Soul And SelfRitalin NationRobert NozickRousseauRousseau and the Dilemmas of Modernity Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on DeconstructionRules, Reason, and Self-KnowledgeSaints, Scholars, 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The collection is made up of contributions supporting either simple or complex approaches to the question of personal identity. While the latter approach (also sometimes referred to as reductionism) is about explicating the notion of personal identity by pointing out to other phenomena, the former (called also non--reductionism) is based on the premise that personal identity cannot be explicated by any other term for it is simple and unanalyzable. Yet, in both cases, there is no room for doubt about personal identity as such because it is taken for granted and no position denying it is discussed in the volume (which explains why Hume, for example, is seldom referred to).
The collection is divided into three sections, each consisting of four essays. Those of the first outline the framework of the discussion on personal identity; the next four (plus one reply) contain arguments for one or another of the approaches (simple or complex); the last set of essays focus more specifically on elaborating the simple view. This is a deliberate step, since, as we are informed from the very beginning, "the simple view is poorly understood, and therefore deserves more attention than it has received so far" (an opinion already voiced in 2010 by Olson) (1).
In the Introduction, the editors clarify, first, that the so--called problem of personal identity can in fact embrace four distinct questions (i.e. biographical or narrative identity, personhood, metaphysical nature or, finally, diachronic identity) and, secondly, that epistemic criteria of personal identity are not to be confused with ontic criteria. In other words, finding out if there is an identity between two persons is a different issue from whether they actually are one and the same person. A person can still be the same even if she is no longer recognizable. For example, "[b]iological and psychological continuity may be regarded as epistemic criteria for diachronic identity, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for personal identity" (3). As it is stated clearly, the book is a consideration of personal identity in its ontic dimension. The Introduction in itself is a useful account of what the debate on personal identity currently is about and not just -- as it is often the case -- a mere summary of the essays included in the volume. The editors present there main issues, tenets and arguments, as well as the problems raised by the complex (both in its biological and psychological versions) and the simple approaches.
Chapter 1 ("Chitchat on personal identity" by D. Barnett) is modeled on Plato's dialogue form (consequently with no bibliography at all). Two twin brothers are trying to find out which of them is the person on the photo they find in their attic. From this they engage into asking more and more questions about how to determine personal identity. They tackle the role of the brain, sensory experience (past and present), body, sensations, feelings, beliefs, memories, intellect as well as other features of a conscious being or personality traits. In order to grasp the core of the personal identity they proceed by a progressive elimination. The outcome is quite Platonic because we arrive at the following aporia: ""[...] How in the world could I be a squad?" -- "In some sense it seems possible; in some sense it doesn't [...]"" (42). With this dictum it seems that there would be no possible clear--cut response since, as it emerges from the dialogue, the complex as well as simple view has each its own descriptive advantages and flaws.
"In search of the simple view" by Eric T. Olson is an attempt at both determining the common denominator of the complex and simple views and finding a distinction between the two positions (for example while it could seem that a denial that our identity can be indeterminate is common to all advocates of the simple view, it appears that also some supporters of the complex view say the same). The main distinction would be to accept or reject such a thing as a criterion of identity, hence the complex view amounts to criterialism and the simple view to anti--criterialism. Olson spells out why for example Cartesianism is wrongly considered as a paradigm case of a simple view, while in fact it is a version of criterialism and, consequently, of the complex view (unless, as he states, Cartesianism would claim that although "personal identity consists in identity of soul, identity of soul insists in nothing" (56) -- yet this position, called bruteness, is denied by some Cartesians). Olson discusses next the confusion between evidential and constitutive criteria of personal identity. This happens when conditions used for judging about personal identity are taken to be constitutive for it. In conclusion Olson appeals to the fact that philosophers disagree about explanatory demands as well as about questions to be answered. Since "some philosophers expect more facts to be explained than others do, and there is probably some correlation between this and whether one holds a view classified as complex or one classified as simple" (62), it is hard to elucidate satisfactorily a criterion distinguishing both kinds of view and, as he concludes, "[t]he simple view remains elusive" (62). It could however be asked if the complex view is not elusive as well, not to speak about the divide itself between both views.
In "Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation" Ryan Wasserman examines the indeterminacy argument as it is stated by Parfit ("it is possible for questions about personal identity to lack determinate answers" (63)). Opponents argue that since personal identity cannot be indeterminate, complex view must be wrong. But the premise itself, i.e. that personal identity cannot be indeterminate, is rarely discussed. At first glance, it seems that it cannot be indeterminate and, as Wasserman says, "something deep inside of me says that there must be an answer" (64). Even if only intuitive, this conviction is so strong that it should be examined. There are several versions of the complex view (depending on what is referred to as the basis of the identity), but all of them are referring to the continuity or connectedness -- which, in turn, is a vague criterion ("[h]ow continuous does a series need to be to be continuous?", 65). Wasserman appeals to the notion of obligation, especially moral obligation in order to show that if identity is indeterminate, obligation would be indeterminate too, and this cannot be accepted. Yet again he relies on intuition claiming that question of obligations must be determinately answered. Otherwise many issues in moral matters turn out to be indeterminate too. Wasserman falsifies the complex view by refuting the indeterminacy obligation which results from the indeterminacy of personal identity which, in turn, results from the complex view (this is what he calls the indeterminacy argument). Although the indeterminacy argument is subject to both epistemicist and subjectivist response these two in turn are subject to objections presented by Wasserman. His conclusion is however a bit disappointing or, at least, too poetical, as he ends with the following paragraph: "If personal identity is genuinely indeterminate, then that is all we can ask for. Perhaps that is all we need." (81).
Another attempt at clarifying the distinction between the complex and the simple view is presented in "Personal identity and its perplexities" by Harold W. Noonan. After reformulating the question about personal identity into one about the necessary condition for being person Noonan sets the distinction between the simple and the complex view of identity as considered diachronically. The main part of the paper is centred on the indexicality of the concept of a person, that is that personal identity is one's own: it is mine, yours, his etc. In the course of his discussion he declares himself a psychological continuer theorist. Finally Noonan argues against indeterminacy -- a theme touched upon already in Wasserman's paper -- that could be involved in personal identity. He underlines the difference between questions about personal identity and questions about the conditions of personhood, and he distinguishes indeterminacy as related to the "person", into epistemic indeterminacy and ontic indeterminacy. Although he applies his conceptual distinctions throughout the analysis in the last part of the paper I do not see where, if at all, he concludes.
In part II Richard Swinburne ("How to determine which is the true theory of personal identity") by analyzing what is metaphysically possible and particularly logically possible wants to determine which of two -- simple or complex -- theories of personal identity is true. And so he starts with a clarification on logical necessity, the possibility and impossibility of sentences. From there he tries to solve the disagreement between the complex and simple theorists by way of determining if either of them accepts the logical impossibility of personal identity as understood by them. He therefore analyses the expression "is the same person as" applying it to both theories. Swinburne -- unlike complex theorists who focus on continuity of body, memory and character -- points out to "direct awareness of personal identity" which is linked to a sort of "overlapping conscious events [that] are experiences of the same person, from which it follows that any stream of such events are also experiences of the same person" (114). That kind of awareness is, so to speak, undeniable and "can only be described as an awareness of himself as a continuing subject of experience" (114). I could therefore think that identity is a logical consequence of the notion of subject. By virtue of being a subject a person is ""immune to error though (sic!) misidentification"" (119). In a word, he who uses the word "I" when referring to his experiences knows the essence of that word because he is the subject of the experiences that happen to him. And yet his knowledge of how to use "I" is not determined by "any continuity of brain, memory of character" (119). Finally, Swinburne, if I understand him correctly, associates the "I" with all the experiences, establishing it as the human soul. As he concludes, "the only essential properties necessary for a person to exist are the essential properties of any soul, which -- I suggest -- are simply the one property of having (in some sense) a capacity to be conscious" (122). One might ask, however, whether or not these essential properties are to be identified in their content with the above--mentioned existential experiences. But this is a point that Swinburne does not address.
Sydney Shoemaker ("Against simplicity") first argues for complex identity of other things than persons, trees in his case. He arrives at Lockean claim that "[t]emporally proximate instantiations of the property must belong to the same tree, since otherwise we would have different trees, occupying the same place at the same time" (127), and, thereby, tree must exist as spatio--temporally continuous. This is why, Shoemaker suggests, "[t]he diachronic unity relation cannot be simple and unanalyzable if its obtaining requires spatio--temporal continuity or causal connectedness" (129). From there on, Shoemaker applies his argument to personal identity. He claims that in this case too, its persistence over time "consists in phenomena occurring over a period of time and depends on successive stages of the behaviour being manifested by one and the same person" (130) or else we would be led to extreme skepticism in judging other minds. (I wonder if he is not confusing the epistemic and ontic requirements here.) Shoemaker goes on claiming that "[a]ny state, psychological or not, necessarily belongs to the thing of which it is a subject, and so gets its identity from the identity of its subject" (132) -- now I wonder what remains of the subject of, for instance, memory if the subject is devoid of it on and in what sense memory is direct (see 130) if it is just a state that belongs to its subject. The former need not entail the latter, as directness and belonging seem to be different categories. Moreover, this is all the more intriguing because later on Shoemaker avoids or reformulates circularity by the notion of holism[]: but, as far as I understand holism and apparently Shoemaker too ("[t]he nature of the properties and the nature of the persistence conditions of the things that have them cannot be explained independently of one another", 135), what is included under that label is one and indivisible, hence simple, and it is separable only conceptually. Similarly, if "in the most cases our concept of a property is far from including a full specification of its causal profile" (135)[], it should be shown that the relation between "the nature of the trans--temporal identity and the nature of the causal profiles of the properties" (135) is ontic and not only epistemic. If the former is the case -- as Shoemaker would have us believe ("a conceptual holism"[]) -- it would rather give more strength to the simple than the complex view of identity.
E. J. Lowe's ("The probable simplicity of personal identity") two main points are that (1) the simple view of identity is more probable than the complex, and as such the simple view is nothing more than the most plausible option, and (2) diachronic and synchronic identity are not different sorts of identity. According to Lowe anyone who wants to avoid epistemic presuppositions about identity or difference between two persons is in serious need of a criterion of personal identity. Yet, Lowe is careful in making assumptions whether or not such criterion can successfully be found. Sections on logical identity (especially with reference to Frege's two--level identity criteria) are followed by remarks on what a person is. Since the essence of a person has been understood differently by different philosophers, this has given rise to different conceptions of person's identity. Persons -- apart from being "or at least capable of being, aware of" (145) herself -- "are not really a single kind of thing" (145). In what follows Lowe discusses Locke's criterion of personal identity together with Reid's and Butler's charges of circularity made against it, along with the criticism which, as he says, applies to any psychological account of personal identity, namely: if personal identity is based on experiences and experiences are properties of a person, then the criterion is circular because "we cannot both individuate persons in terms of their experiences [...] and individuate personal experiences in terms of the persons having them" (150). Lowe's view is that a person is an entity, with distinctive properties such as thought and feeling, rather than a mere property or feature of some other thing, for example of his brain. If therefore "persons really are fundamental in our ontological scheme [...], then we simply should not expect to be able to appeal to other entities of suitable kinds in their case" (152). Accordingly, even if this is hard to prove a negative thesis like the simplicity thesis, skepticism about the reality of persons is not to be recommended by any means. But given that complex accounts are proven flawed, the simple theory of personal identity seems to be the better option. The last section of the paper is devoted to an objection made to Lowe's argument against neo--Lockean criterion by Shoemaker. Chapter 8 in turn, is a one--page reply to Lowe by Shoemaker.
Martine Nida--Rümelin in "The non--descriptive individual nature of conscious beings" starts by distinguishing conscious (also called experiencing) individuals from other kinds of individuals (such as material objects) in virtue of the former's having a non--descriptive individual nature. Having a non--descriptive individual nature means that "the constitutional basis of [a conscious beings'] existence is non--descriptive" (160), which amounts to saying that such constitutional basis "can only be described using a rigid designator which directly or indirectly refers to" (161) it. While in the case of material (i.e. non--conscious) individuals there is no hidden feature of their existence, in the case of conscious individuals "every formulation of the constitutional basis of [their] existence requires rigid reference to" (165) them themselves. In other words, while there may exist a perfect counterpart for a material object, in the case of a conscious being its only perfect counterpart is that very being itself. The being of a person consists in "living that person's life [...] experienc[ing] the world from that person's perspective [...] hav[ing] that person's body, and [...] enjoy[ing] that person's pleasures" (168). However, "from one's perspective" is not to be taken psychologically, e.g. imagining to be like someone in some important respects or imagining to be in someone's situation. It rather refers to the fact of being the very subject of experiencing, i.e. that subject that exists rather than non--exists, especially because, for that particular subject, it is fundamentally different whether he exists or not. Similarly, the mental activity of a person is non--descriptive because the only way to grasp it is to refer to that person's mental activity. And referring to her own being itself means referring to what is her personal identity. As she puts it, "[t]he difference lies in nothing but who is experiencing that life" (173) with the manifest corollary that "according to our understanding of what it is to be an experiencing subject, it is essential for being an experiencing subject that one's individual nature is non--descriptive" (173). In the final part of her paper Nida--Rümelin refers to elements of her more general position wherein, it seems to me, she is close to a Heideggerian approach. For she writes: "the nature of what it is to be an experiencing subject is revealed to us by being a subject of experience" (176), and even more explicitly: "[i]n order to find out what it is to be an experiencing subject, we need not wait for any scientific discovery: we simply have to uncover what we implicitly knew all along" (176), which could also be compared with C. G. Jung's claim that "one understands nothing psychological unless one has experienced it oneself".
In "Personal identity: a not--so--simple simple view" Lynne Rudder Baker starts from the claim that being essentially a person means being a person at any time she exists (we can not think about still existing without being person). She takes the simple view, yet in a way different from the standard case, according to which persons are immaterial. For Baker person is embodied with the ability to think of herself as herself. The body is her support for person--level activities with the unique feature that they are first--personal (not--persons share only third--personal persistence conditions). As she writes, "[...] first--person perspective is a property instance that cannot be divided or duplicated. So, a molecule--for--molecule replica of [one's] body would not have [his] first--person perspective" (182). What she calls her not--so--simple simple view is this: "a person is a being with a first--person perspective essentially and persists as long as her first--person perspective is exemplified" (182) with the qualification that she must possess mechanism supporting her first--person reference to herself as herself. One of the differences between her and other simple views is that Baker admits a degree of identity, because human persons come into existence gradually. Another one is that she admits parts of persons although they should be understood only as ordinary -- and not mereological -- parts. The fact that there are no informative criteria of personal identity (because personhood is a basic property and because it is not susceptible to a non--personal or sub--personal account) should not be a concern. This is the very fact that so far as human beings are irreducible persons, any informative persistence conditions must be avoided. Baker ends by listing six of several uniquely human features (e.g. having self--narratives, having war crimes, international courts and human rights) that emerge from those shared with non--human animals. They are meant to be the evidence of "an ontological difference between human and animals" (191). I wonder, however, to what extent she adopted a similar approach to that of Nicolai Hartmann, who insisted in his work on strata of reality by referring to their ontological features.
Christian Kanzian ("Is "person" a sortal term?") explores to what extent "person" can be understood as a sortal term in the analysis of personal identity and once again addresses the opposition between the complex and the simple views. Although he is concerned more with semantics, he remarks in his introduction that "[a]n absolute complex view is impossible" (193), because -- here Kanzian could have referred to Aristotle -- we cannot go back in infinitum. Since one must stop at some point, its supporters, so Kanzian claims, "might start with a complex view, but end as supporters of simple, non--analyzable units, whatever they are" (193). After discussing arguments in favour of person--not--being--a--sortal--term claim (its ancestor being Gilbert of Poitiers who claimed that personhood is something added to the human being, hence personhood is accidental) which is flawed because an accidental term has no identification function and for this reason cannot be the ground one refers to, then in favour of person--being--a--sortal--term claim (its ancestor being Boethius for whom person is a substance--kind), also flawed because it switches to dualism, and finally "the don't care" view (which is flawed by being semantically inconsistent; this is the case of Peter Singer), Kanzian passes on to setting "person" as a semantically unique term. Although there are no empirical criteria connected with "person", it is dependent on other terms, which means that "person" is an incomplete one. Being dependent on something else does not amount however to being reducible to something else. In other words, while "person" can be dependent conceptually it does not mean that person is reducible ontologically. Hence Kanzian's conclusion: "diachronic personal identity [...] must be simple [...] but dependent in a unique way on something which is not simple: for example on human identity. It is incomplete in nature, because of its essential dependence on something complex." (203)
Dean Zimmerman in "Materialism, dualism, and "simple" theories of personal identity", the longest paper of the volume, after presenting a detailed background of the complex/simple theory controversy (e.g. he discusses Parfit's mentioning of Chisholm as non--reductionist) and setting a new definition of reductionism, puts forward a thesis about "the supervenience of personal identity upon microphysical facts, or upon microphysical facts supplemented only by "impersonal" psychological facts" (212). This thesis is next analyzed in two versions: physicalist and non--physicalist reductionism with a separate paragraph in which Zimmerman offers thought experiments to test whether materialism is a better option than dualism. This is yet another paper that concludes with an aporia ("loose ends and confessions" in Zimmerman's wording), since while some arguments are inconclusive as to providing "reasons for believing in a dualism of persons and bodies [...], other considerations push [...] toward dualism" (234).
Hud Hudson ("The morphing block and diachronic personal identity") looks for the best criterion of diachronic personal identity and such that would be understood as constitutive rather than epistemic. He examines the issue from the materialist position ("a human person is identical to a certain, highly organized, material object", (237)) and more particularly by analyzing perdurantism (object is extending in four dimensions and composed of temporal as well as spatial parts) and endurantism (object is an entity extending in three spatial dimensions) approaches. Hudson presents then a conception of time because the concept of diachronic personal identity is strongly determined by how time is understood. For instance, to assume that only present and past things exist (growing block theory) is largely different from assuming that only present and future things exist (shrinking block theory). Hudson carries on his analysis from a substantivalist position, i.e. identifying "times hyperplanes, and incorporat[ing] a certain independence or recombination principle for space--time points", taking "space--time to be a concrete particular with an ontological status not reducible to relations between material objects" and "identif[ying] space--time and its extended sub--regions with either pluralities or else fusions of uncountably many, simple, unextended, space--time points" (240). Such morphing block theory is the most promising alternative for "the theories of personal identity that share the causal dependence requirement" (248). Although Hudson presents a series of charges against that position, the morphing block option makes possible a simple view of identity without resort to the causal dependence requirement.
Taken as a whole this is an amazing collection of papers. It mirrors the intricacy of the topic and, since both parties are similarly convincing, a reader can feel lost which of two views to adopt. One can have -- at least I had -- the same impression as after reading one of Plato's early dialogues: now I know no more what personal identity is.[] The fact that there is little, if at all, dogmatism on either side is to be praised because this makes the book philosophically fruitful. For example after having read it an impression can be that the divide between simple and complex view is not as straightforward as it would be expected: in the diversity of viewpoints there is much more than a clear--cut dichotomy. Moreover, some papers are only sketches or investigations of sort with no ambition of reaching a strict conclusion. We find a good deal of provisional solutions (not to speak about papers with no solution at all), hesitations, queries, confessions and so on. In this sense the book is aporetical in its very character. This is not surprising given the nature and essence of personal identity. Whether simple or complex it seems that there is a thing such as personal identity.[] Alternatively one could say that either view can be accurate, depending on what perspective is taken. For instance, Plato, similarly to some extent, hesitates whether the soul is simple (monoeides) or composite (polueides). Apparently the former is more useful in explaining the persistence of the soul, while the second fits better in spelling out the internal conflict. Finally, one could also wonder if the entire question about personal identity being simple or complex is not erroneously formulated.
My main concern is to see that feelings, or if you will, the whole of the affective life, i.e. affectivity, is used so little, if at all, throughout the chapters of the book. This is all the more surprising because some authors refer to what they call experience, yet without explicating what they understand by that term. I would be inclined to think that the notion of experience includes affectivity but this does not go without saying and therefore should be elucidated. Some remarks made by supporters of both the simple as well as -- and this is extremely interesting -- the complex view relating to experience give the impression that affectivity could be conceived of as their common denominator. Affectivity -- unless I am mistaken, in which case I would say experience -- emerges as a crucial element in revealing the essence of personal identity. For example Shoemaker does not use that category, yet he claims that, for instance, "identity judgment appears to be one I know to be true without the use of any criterion of identity. My knowledge of it seems to be direct and not grounded on evidence of identity of any sort." (130) I am willing to believe that knowledge mentioned here is not only of intellectual character but has also an experiential component which, in turn, is not entirely devoid of an affective side.
Last not least, the issue of personal identity with a couple of points discussed in the volume has been interestingly presented -- though in a literary form -- for example by Thomas Mann in his novel Transposed Heads. For a reader of it several passages of the volume may seem repetitive, especially when one thinks about examples of thought experiments of removing and transplanting one's brain/head into/onto another's body.
As it is, the volume is rich and offers much food for thought. It is impressive how the contributors argue in different ways for either of two views discussed. Yet since the arguments are often fine--grained, this book is not easy to read. I would rather recommend it as a starting--point or inspiring stimulation for a further inquiry into personal identity.
For a similar procedure of reshaping what is believed to be a vicious circle by means of holism -- though in a different realm -- see B. W. Helm, Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts in: Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford 2010, p. 313: "[t]he circularity of the account is therefore a normal part of such holism and is not at all vicious".
A similar concern is expressed by M. Evans, A Partisan's Guide to Socratic Intellectualism in: S. Tenenbaum (ed.). Desire, practical reason, and the good, Oxford 2010, p. 22: "each of us has an infinite number of beliefs, most of which are so complex that no mortal creature could ever succeed in expressing them".
For a similar mutual causal relationship between character and emotions see Aristotle: earlier emotions determine later character which, in turn, determines subsequent emotions and so on, and so forth.
As a matter of fact, not only early dialogues -- a feeling of similar dizziness recurs in Theaetetus's famous passage (155c: "sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim", transl. H. N. Fowler).
The fact that there is no clear solution reached (or even reachable) should not be considered as an argument against personal identity as such. One could easily appeal to a case of competing particle and wave theories of light. Nobody should infer from that duality in explanation that there is no such thing as light.
© 2014 Robert Zaborowski
Robert Zaborowski, firstname.lastname@example.org Polish Academy of Sciences & University of Warmia and Mazury