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A Theory of Feelings Anger and Forgiveness"My Madness Saved Me"10 Good Questions about Life and Death12 Modern Philosophers50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a GodA Cabinet of Philosophical CuriositiesA Case for IronyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to Buddhist PhilosophyA Companion to FoucaultA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to HumeA Companion to KantA Companion to Phenomenology and ExistentialismA Companion to PragmatismA Companion to the Philosophy of ActionA Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyA Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Critical Overview of Biological FunctionsA Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of MindA Cursing Brain?A Delicate BalanceA Farewell to AlmsA Frightening LoveA Future for PresentismA Guide to the Good LifeA History of PsychiatryA History of the MindA Life Worth LivingA Manual of Experimental PhilosophyA Map of the MindA Metaphysics of PsychopathologyA Mind So RareA Natural History of Human MoralityA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Natural History of VisionA Parliament of MindsA Philosopher Looks at The Sense of HumorA Philosophical DiseaseA Philosophy of BoredomA Philosophy of Cinematic ArtA Philosophy of CultureA Philosophy of EmptinessA Philosophy of FearA Philosophy of PainA Physicalist ManifestoA Place for ConsciousnessA Question of TrustA Research Agenda for DSM-VA Revolution of the MindA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Stroll With William JamesA Tapestry of ValuesA Tear is an Intellectual ThingA Theory of FreedomA Thousand MachinesA Universe of ConsciousnessA Very Bad WizardA Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the CurtainA Virtue EpistemologyA World Full of GodsA World Without ValuesAbout FaceAbout the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the SelfAction and ResponsibilityAction in ContextAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionAction, Contemplation, and HappinessAction, Emotion and WillAdam SmithAdaptive DynamicsAddictionAddictionAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction Is a ChoiceAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAftermathAfterwarAgainst AdaptationAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HappinessAgainst HealthAgency and ActionAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and EmbodimentAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAl-JununAlain BadiouAlain BadiouAlasdair MacIntyreAlien Landscapes?Altered EgosAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Ethics for TodayAn Intellectual History of CannibalismAn Interpretation of DesireAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy An Introduction to Philosophy of EducationAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyAn Introductory Philosophy of MedicineAn Odd Kind of FameAnalytic FreudAnalytic Philosophy in AmericaAncient AngerAncient Models of MindAncient Philosophy of the SelfAngerAnimal LessonsAnimal MindsAnimals Like UsAnnihilationAnother PlanetAnswers for AristotleAnti-ExternalismAnti-Individualism and KnowledgeAntigone’s ClaimAntipsychiatryAre We Hardwired?Are Women Human?Arguing about DisabilityArguing About Human NatureAristotle and the Philosophy of FriendshipAristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's ChildrenAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAristotle, Emotions, and EducationArt & MoralityArt After Conceptual ArtArt in Three DimensionsArt, Self and KnowledgeArtificial ConsciousnessArtificial HappinessAspects of PsychologismAsylum to ActionAt the Existentialist CaféAtonement and ForgivenessAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutobiography as PhilosophyAutonomyAutonomy and Mental DisorderAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismBabies by DesignBackslidingBadiouBadiou's DeleuzeBadiou, Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking EmancipationBare Facts And Naked TruthsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBattlestar Galactica and PhilosophyBe Like the FoxBeautyBecoming a SubjectBecoming HumanBefore ConsciousnessBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing AmoralBeing HumanBeing Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory Being No OneBeing Realistic about ReasonsBeing ReducedBeing YourselfBelief's Own EthicsBending Over BackwardsBerlin Childhood around 1900Bernard WilliamsBertrand RussellBetter than BothBetter Than WellBetween Two WorldsBeyond HealthBeyond Hegel and NietzscheBeyond KuhnBeyond LossBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond PostmodernismBeyond ReductionBeyond SchizophreniaBeyond the DSM StoryBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics in the ClinicBiological Complexity and Integrative PluralismBiology Is TechnologyBiosBipolar ExpeditionsBlackwell Companion to the Philosophy of EducationBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlues - Philosophy for EveryoneBlushBob Dylan and PhilosophyBody ConsciousnessBody Image And Body SchemaBody ImagesBody LanguageBody MattersBody WorkBody-Subjects and Disordered MindsBoundBoundaries of the MindBoyleBrain Evolution and CognitionBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-WiseBrainchildrenBrains, Buddhas, and BelievingBrainstormingBrave New WorldsBreakdown of WillBrief Child Therapy Homework PlannerBrief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and FaithBrief Therapy Homework PlannerBritain on the CouchBritish Idealism and the Concept of the SelfBrute RationalityBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyBut Is It Art?Camus and SartreCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCarving Nature at Its JointsCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsCassandra's DaughterCato's TearsCausation and CounterfactualsCauses, Laws, and Free WillChanging Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-ModernityChanging the SubjectChaosophyCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionCharles DarwinCherishmentChildhood and the Philosophy of EducationChildrenChildren, Families, and Health Care Decision MakingChoices and ConflictChoosing Not to ChooseChristmas - Philosophy for EveryoneCinema, Philosophy, BergmanCinematic MythmakingCity and Soul in Plato's RepublicClassifying MadnessClear and Queer ThinkingClinical EthicsClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyCodependent ForevermoreCoffee - Philosophy for EveryoneCognition and the BrainCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, ReflectionCognitive BiologyCognitive FictionsCognitive Neuroscience of EmotionCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Cognitive Theories of Mental IllnessCoherence in Thought and ActionCollected Papers, Volume 1Collected Papers, Volume 2College SexComedy IncarnateCommitmentCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentConcealment And ExposureConceptual Analysis and Philosophical NaturalismConceptual Art and PaintingConceptual Issues in Evolutionary BiologyConfessionsConfucianismConnected, or What It Means to Live in the Network SocietyConquest of AbundanceConscience and ConvenienceConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the SelfConsciousness EmergingConsciousness EvolvingConsciousness ExplainedConsciousness in ActionConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsole and ClassifyConstructing the WorldConstructive AnalysisContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Philosophy of BiologyContemporary Debates in Philosophy of MindContemporary Debates in Political PhilosophyContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Natural LawContested Knowledge: Social Theory TodayContesting PsychiatryContext and the AttitudesContinental Philosophy of ScienceControlControlling Our DestiniesConversations About Psychology and Sexual OrientationCopernicus, Darwin and FreudCrazy for YouCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCreating ConsilienceCreating HysteriaCreating Mental IllnessCreating Scientific ConceptsCreating the American JunkieCreation, Rationality and AutonomyCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCrimes of ReasonCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychiatryCritical PsychologyCritical ResistanceCritical Thinking About PsychologyCritical VisionsCross and KhoraCruel CompassionCTRL [SPACE]Cultural Psychology of the SelfCultural Theory: An IntroductionCulture and Psychiatric DiagnosisCulture and Subjective Well-BeingCulture of DeathCultures of NeurastheniaCurious EmotionsCurrent Controversies in Experimental PhilosophyCurrent Controversies in Values and ScienceCustom and Reason in HumeCustomers and Patrons of the Mad-TradeCutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together AgainCylons in AmericaDamaged IdentitiesDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous EmotionsDaniel DennettDaniel DennettDark AgesDarwin and DesignDarwin's Dangerous IdeaDarwin's LegacyDarwin, God and the Meaning of LifeDarwinian PsychiatryDarwinian ReductionismDarwinizing CultureDating: Philosophy for EveryoneDeathDeathDeath and CharacterDeath and CompassionDeath and the AfterlifeDebating DesignDebating HumanismDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecomposing the WillDeconstructing PsychotherapyDeconstruction and DemocracyDeeper Than DarwinDeeper than ReasonDefending Science - within ReasonDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDegrees of BeliefDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDelusions and the Madness of the MassesDementiaDemons, Dreamers, and MadmenDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDennett’s PhilosophyDepression Is a ChoiceDepression, Emotion and the SelfDepthDerrida, Deleuze, PsychoanalysisDescartesDescartes and the Passionate MindDescartes' CogitoDescartes's Changing MindDescartes's Concept of MindDescribing Inner Experience?Descriptions and PrescriptionsDesembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Desire and AffectDesire, Love, and IdentityDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDeveloping the VirtuesDiagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDialectics of the SelfDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital SoulDimensional Models of Personality DisordersDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisjunctivismDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDispatches from the Freud WarsDisrupted LivesDistractionDisturbed ConsciousnessDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Do We Still Need Doctors?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Does the Woman Exist?Doing without ConceptsDon't Believe Everything You ThinkDonald DavidsonDonald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the MentalDoubting Darwin?Dreaming and Other Involuntary MentationDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV-TR CasebookDworkin and His CriticsDying to KnowDynamics in ActionDysthymia and the Spectrum of Chronic DepressionsEccentricsEducational MetamorphosesEffective IntentionsElbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth WantingEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbodied RhetoricsEmbodied Selves and Divided MindsEmbryos under the MicroscopeEmergencies in Mental Health PracticeEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotionEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion and PsycheEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotional ReasonEmotional ReasonEmotional TruthEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions, Value, and AgencyEmpathyEmpathy and AgencyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpathy in the Context of PhilosophyEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEnchanted LoomsEngaging BuddhismEngineering the Human GermlineEnjoymentEnvyEpicureanismEpistemic LuckEpistemologyEpistemology and EmotionsEpistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentEros and the GoodErotic MoralityEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssays in the Metaphysics of Mind Essays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEssays on Nonconceptual ContentEssays on Philosophical CounselingEssays on Reference, Language, and MindEssays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern PhilosophyEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEsssential Philosophy of PsychiatryEternal Sunshine of the Spotless MindEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in Human CloningEthical TheoryEthicsEthicsEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics and Values in PsychotherapyEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics in Plain EnglishEthics in PracticeEthics in Psychiatric ResearchEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEuropean Review of Philosophy. Vol. 5Everyday IrrationalityEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolutionEvolution and the Human MindEvolution's RainbowEvolutionary Origins of MoralityEvolutionary PsychologyExamined LifeExamined LivesExistential AmericaExistentialismExistentialism and Romantic LoveExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and NaturalismExperiments in EthicsExplaining ConsciousnessExplaining the BrainExplaining the Computational MindExplanatory PluralismExploding the Gene MythExploring HappinessExploring the SelfExpression and the InnerExpressions of JudgmentExtraordinary Science and PsychiatryFaces of IntentionFact and ValueFact and Value in EmotionFacts, Values, and NormsFads and Fallacies in the Social SciencesFaith and Wisdom in ScienceFatherhoodFear of KnowledgeFearless SpeechFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFeelings of BeingFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminism and Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Interpretations of Rene DescartesFeminist TheoryField Notes from ElsewhereFinding Consciousness in the BrainFingerprints of GodFlesh in the Age of ReasonFolk Psychological NarrativesFolk Psychology Re-AssessedForces of HabitForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and RetributionFoucault 2.0Foucault and PhilosophyFoucault NowFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Ethical Practice, Research, and Teaching in PsychologyFour Views on Free WillFrank Ramsey (1903-1930)Free WillFree WillFree WillFree WillFree Will and Action ExplanationFree Will and LuckFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free WillFreedomFreedom and DeterminismFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom and ResponsibiltyFreedom and ValueFreedom EvolvesFreedom RegainedFreedom vs. InterventionFreedom, Fame, Lying, and BetrayalFreudFreud and the Question of PseudoscienceFreud As PhilosopherFreud's AnswerFreud, the Reluctant PhilosopherFriedrich NietzscheFrom Chance to ChoiceFrom Clinic to ClassroomFrom Complexity to LifeFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the HumanitiesFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrom Valuing to ValueFrontiers of ConsciousnessFrontiers of JusticeFurnishing the MindGalileo in PittsburghGenderGender and Mental HealthGender in the MirrorGender TroubleGenesGenes, Women, EqualityGenetic Nature/CultureGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetic SecretsGenocide's AftermathGenomes and What to Make of ThemGerman Idealism and the JewGerman PhilosophyGetting HookedGilles DeleuzeGlobal PhilosophyGluttonyGod and Phenomenal ConsciousnessGoffman's LegacyGoing Amiss in Experimental ResearchGoodness & AdviceGrassroots SpiritualityGrave MattersGrave MattersGreedGreek Models of Mind and SelfGut ReactionsHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHabits of MindHallucinationHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of EmotionsHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness and EducationHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHappiness, Death, and the Remainder of LifeHard LuckHarmful ThoughtsHaving the World in ViewHealing PsychiatryHealing the Soul in the Age of the BrainHealth, Illness and DiseaseHealth, Science, and Ordinary LanguageHegelHeidegger and a Metaphysics of FeelingHeidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of BeingHermann von Helmholtz's MechanismHermeneutics As PoliticsHeterophobiaHeterosyncraciesHeuristics and BiasesHeuristics and the LawHidden ResourcesHidden SelvesHiding from HumanityHigh Art LiteHistorical OntologyHistory of Psychiatry and Medical PsychologyHistory, Historicity And ScienceHobbesHomosexualitiesHope and Dread in PsychoanalysisHot ThoughtHow Can I Be Trusted?How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Children Learn the Meanings of WordsHow Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?How Do We Know Who We Are?How Emotions WorkHow Emotions WorkHow History Made the MindHow Images ThinkHow is Nature Possible?How Propaganda WorksHow Science WorksHow Scientific Practices MatterHow Scientists Explain DiseaseHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Make Opportunity EqualHow to Solve the Mind-Body Problemhow to stop timeHow to Think More About SexHow We HopeHow We ReasonHuman CloningHuman Development, Language and the Future of MankindHuman EnhancementHuman Evolution, Reproduction, and MoralityHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman NatureHuman NatureHuman Nature and the Limits of ScienceHuman-Built WorldHumanismHumanism, What's That?HumanityHumans, Animals, MachinesHumeHumeHume on Motivation and VirtueHusserlHystoriesI of the VortexI Was WrongIdeas that MatterIdentifying the MindIdentity and Agency in Cultural WorldsIgnorance and ImaginationIllnessImagination and Its PathologiesImagination and the Meaningful BrainImagining NumbersImmortal RemainsImproving Nature?In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of HealthIn Defense of SentimentalityIn Love With LifeIn Praise of Athletic BeautyIn Praise of Natural PhilosophyIn Praise of the WhipIn Pursuit of HappinessIn Search of HappinessIn the Name of GodIn the Name of IdentityIn the Space of ReasonsIn the SwarmIn Two MindsInclusive EthicsIncompatibilism's AllureIndividual Differences in Conscious ExperienceInfinity and PerspectiveInformation ArtsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchIngmar Bergman, Cinematic PhilosopherInhuman ThoughtsInner PresenceInsanityIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntelligent VirtueIntentionIntentionality, Deliberation and AutonomyIntentions and IntentionalityIntentions and IntentionalityInterpreting MindsInterpreting NietzscheIntroducing Greek PhilosophyIntrospection and ConsciousnessIntrospection VindicatedIntuition, Imagination, and Philosophical MethodologyIntuitionismInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIrrationalityIs Academic Feminism Dead?Is It Me or My Meds?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is Oedipus Online?Is Science Neurotic?Is Science Value Free?Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Is There a Duty to Die?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJacques LacanJacques RancièreJacques RanciereJean-Paul SartreJohn McDowellJohn SearleJohn Searle's Ideas About Social RealityJohn Stuart MillJohn Stuart Mill and the Writing of CharacterJoint AttentionJokesJonathan EdwardsJudging and UnderstandingJustice for ChildrenJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeKantKant and MiltonKant and the Fate of AutonomyKant and the Limits of AutonomyKant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral ActionKant on Freedom, Law, and HappinessKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Anatomy of EvilKant's Anatomy of the Intelligent MindKant's Theory of VirtueKarl JaspersKarl PopperKey Concepts in PhilosophyKierkegaardKierkegaard as PhenomenologistKierkegaard's Concept of DespairKierkegaard's MuseKinds of MindsKinds, Things, and StuffKnowing, Knowledge and BeliefsKnowledge MonopoliesKnowledge, Belief, and CharacterKnowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessLacanLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLanguageLanguage in ContextLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Culture, and MindLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw and the BrainLaw, Liberty, and PsychiatryLaws, Mind, and Free WillLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberatory PsychiatryLife and ActionLife at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum, 1857-1997Life Is Not a Game of PerfectLife of the MindLife's FormLife, Death, & MeaningLife, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of UtilityLife, Sex, and IdeasLight in the Dark RoomLike a Splinter in Your MindLiving and Dying WellLiving NarrativeLiving Outside Mental IllnessLiving with DarwinLiving With One’s PastLockeLocke LockeLogic and the Art of Memory Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and LiteratureLooking for SpinozaLooking for The StrangerLost SoulsLOT 2LoveLoveLove's ConfusionsLove's VisionLove, Friendship, and the SelfLove, Sex & TragedyLuckyLudwig WittgensteinLustLyingMachine ConsciousnessMad for FoucaultMad TravelersMade with WordsMadness And Death In PhilosophyMadness and DemocracyMadness at HomeMadness Is CivilizationMaking Natural KnowledgeMaking Sense of EvolutionMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMaking the DSM-5Making the Social WorldMaking TruthMale Female EmailMan, Beast, and ZombieMandated Reporting of Suspected Child AbuseManiaManic Depression and CreativityMapping the Edges and the In-betweenMapping the Future of BiologyMarcus AureliusMaster PassionsMatters of the MindMe++Meaning and Moral OrderMeaning and Value in a Secular AgeMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMeaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and MindMeanings of ArtMeasuring HappinessMeasuring PsychopathologyMedia MadnessMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedicine and Philosophy in Classical AntiquityMedicine of the PersonMedicine, Mental Health, Religion, Science and Well-BeingMelancholy And the Care of the SoulMelancholy and the Otherness of GodMementoMemory and NarrativeMental ActionsMental CausationMental Causation and OntologyMental HealthMental Health At The CrossroadsMental Health Policy in BritainMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMerleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of PhilosophyMetacognition and Theory of MindMetacreationMetaethical SubjectivismMetaethicsMetal and FleshMetaphors of MemoryMetapoliticsMethods in MindMichel FoucaultMill's UtilitarianismMindMindMind and ConsciousnessMind and CosmosMind and MechanismMind GamesMind in a Physical WorldMind in Everyday Life and Cognitive ScienceMind in LifeMind TimeMind's LandscapeMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMind, Brain, and Free WillMind, Reason and ImaginationMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds and PersonsMinds, Brains, and LawMinds, Ethics, and ConditionalsMindshapingMindsightMindworldsMirror, MirrorMixed FeelingsMockingbird YearsModels of the SelfModern Social ImaginariesModern Theories of JusticeModernity and SubjectivityModernity and TechnologyMoody Minds DistemperedMoral BrainsMoral DimensionsMoral FailureMoral ImaginationMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral ParticularismMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology and Human AgencyMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Moral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMotherhoodMotive and RightnessMoving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New PsychiatryMultiple Analogies in Science and PhilosophyMultiple Identities & False MemoriesMusic, Madness, and the Unworking of LanguageMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Double UnveiledMy WayNarrativeNarrative and IdentityNarrative MedicineNarrative PsychiatryNarrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesNatural Ethical FactsNatural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeNatural MindsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveNaturalism and the Human ConditionNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalized BioethicsNaturalizing the MindNatureNature and NarrativeNear Death ExperienceNeither Bad nor MadNeither Victim nor SurvivorNeuro-Philosophy and the Healthy MindNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neurophilosophy at WorkNeurophilosophy of Free WillNeuropoliticsNeuropsychoanalysis in PracticeNeuroscience and PhilosophyNew Essays on the Explanation of ActionNew Philosophy for a New MediaNew Versions of VictimsNew Waves in Philosophy of ActionNietzscheNietzsche and Buddhist PhilosophyNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNietzsche's TherapyNietzsche, Culture and EducationNietzsche: The Man and His PhilosophyNihil UnboundNoir AnxietyNormative EthicsNormativityNorms of NatureNotebooks 1951-1959Notes Toward a Performative Theory of AssemblyNothing So AbsurdOblivionOn AnxietyOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn Being AuthenticOn BeliefOn BetrayalOn BullshitOn DelusionOn DesireOn EmotionsOn HashishOn Human RightsOn Loving Our EnemiesOn Nature and LanguageOn PersonalityOn ReflectionOn Romantic LoveOn the EmotionsOn the Freud WatchOn the Government of the LivingOn the Human ConditionOn the InternetOn the Meaning of LifeOn the Philosophy of LawOn the Pragmatics of CommunicationOn the Punitive SocietyOn TruthOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne Hundred DaysOnflowOnly a Promise of HappinessOntology of ConsciousnessOpen MindedOpen Your EyesOrgans without BodiesOther MindsOur Last Great IllusionOur Own MindsOur Posthuman FutureOur StoriesOut of Its MindOut of Our HeadsOxford Guide to the MindOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPanic DisorderPanpsychismPanpsychism in the WestPartialityPassionate EnginesPassionate EnginesPathologies of BeliefPathologies of ReasonPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perceiving the WorldPerception & CognitionPerception and Basic BeliefsPerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPerceptual ExperiencePerfecting VirtuePerplexities of ConsciousnessPersistencePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal IdentityPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonal Identity and Fractured SelvesPersonhood and Health CarePersonsPersons and BodiesPersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPersons, Souls and DeathPerspectives on ImitationPerspectives on PragmatismPessimismPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenal ConsciousnessPhenomenal IntentionalityPhenomenology and ExistentialismPhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophersPhilosophers on MusicPhilosophers without GodsPhilosophical CounselingPhilosophical Counselling and the UnconsciousPhilosophical DevicesPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical History and the Problem of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in Psychiatry IIPhilosophical MethodologyPhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophical Myths of the FallPhilosophical Perspectives on DepictionPhilosophical Perspectives on Technology and PsychiatryPhilosophical PracticePhilosophical Reflections on DisabilityPhilosophizing About Sex Philosophizing the EverydayPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy and LivingPhilosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy and PsychotherapyPhilosophy and Science FictionPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CulturePhilosophy and the Moving ImagePhilosophy and the NeurosciencesPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy As FictionPhilosophy BitesPhilosophy Bites BackPhilosophy for Counselling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy for LifePhilosophy in a New CenturyPhilosophy in an Age of SciencePhilosophy in Children's LiteraturePhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BodyPhilosophy of Film and Motion PicturesPhilosophy of LovePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and MarriagePhilosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionPhilosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple PersonalityPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Public HealthPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhilosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophy on TapPhilosophy PracticePhilosophy the Day after TomorrowPhilosophy's Role in Counseling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhilosophy, Politics, DemocracyPhotography and PhilosophyPhysical RealizationPhysicalism and Its DiscontentsPhysicalism and Mental CausationPhysicalism, or Something Near EnoughPhysician-Assisted DyingPillar of SaltPin-up GrrrlsPlant MindsPlatoPlatoPlato, Not Prozac!Platonic Ethics, Old and NewPluralistic CasuistryPolarities of ExperiencesPolitical EmotionsPopper, Objectivity and the Growth of KnowledgePornPorn StudiesPornography, Sex, and FeminismPortrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young ManPostcolonial DisordersPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPower and the SelfPower SplitPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical ConflictsPractical Identity and Narrative AgencyPractical PhilosophyPractical RulesPractical Tortoise RaisingPractically ProfoundPracticing Feminist Ethics in PsychologyPragmatic BioethicsPragmatismPragmatism, Old And NewPraise and BlamePredicative MindsPreferences and Well-BeingPrescriptions for the MindPresocraticsPrimary and Secondary QualitiesPrimates and PhilosophersPrivacyPrivileged AccessProblems in MindProblems of RationalityProzac As a Way of LifeProzac BacklashProzac on the CouchPsyche and SomaPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric Cultures ComparedPsychiatric Diagnosis and ClassificationPsychiatric EthicsPsychiatric HegemonyPsychiatric PowerPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry and Philosophy of SciencePsychiatry and ReligionPsychiatry as a Human SciencePsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry in SocietyPsychiatry in the New MilleniumPsychiatry in the Scientific ImagePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsycho-Physical Dualism TodayPsychoanalysis and Narrative MedicinePsychoanalysis and the Philosophy of SciencePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and PhilosophyPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology, Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of Human RelationshipsPsychotherapy and ConfidentialityPsychotherapy As PraxisPublic PhilosophyPunishmentPure ImmanencePurple HazePursuing MeaningQuality of Life and Human DifferenceQueer PhilosophyQuestions for FreudQuestions for FreudQuine and Davidson on Language, Thought and RealityRaceRace in Contemporary MedicineRadiant CoolRadical AlterityRadical ExternalismRadical HopeRational and Social AgencyRational CausationRational Choice in an Uncertain WorldRationality + Consciousness = Free WillRationality and FreedomRationality and the Reflective MindRationality in ActionRawls, Dewey, and ConstructivismRe-creating MedicineRe-EmergenceRe-Engineering Philosophy for Limited BeingsReading AutobiographyReading Bernard WilliamsReading SartreReadings in the Philosophy of TechnologyReal MaterialismReal Natures and Familiar ObjectsReal ScienceRealism in ActionReason & EmancipationReason in ActionReason in PhilosophyReason's GriefReasonably ViciousReasoning About Rational AgentsReasoning in Biological DiscoveriesReasons from WithinReasons without RationalismReclaiming CognitionReclaiming the SoulReconceiving SchizophreniaReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecreative MindsRediscovering EmotionRediscovering EmpathyReference and ExistenceReference and the Rational MindReflections On How We LiveReframing Disease ContextuallyRefusing CareRegulating SexReinventing the SoulRelativism and Human RightsRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyReliable ReasoningReligion without GodRelying on OthersRemembering HomeResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility from the MarginsRestraining RageRethinking ExpertiseRethinking IntrospectionRethinking Mental Health and DisorderRethinking RapeRethinking the DSMRethinking the Sociology of Mental HealthRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfReturn to ReasonRevolt, She SaidRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard Rorty's New PragmatismRightsRights, Democracy, and Fulfillment in the Era of Identity PoliticsRise And Fall of Soul And SelfRitalin NationRobert NozickRousseauRousseau and the Dilemmas of Modernity Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to 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The collection of papers titled Hume on Motivation and Virtue, edited by Charles Pigden, aims to address three issues for which the editor quite rightfully says that they "loom large in contemporary ethical thought" (4). The issues in question are: 1. What is the correct interpretation of Hume's 'Motivation Argument'? 2. How should one read Hume's 'Slavery of Reason Thesis' (SRT for short)? 3. Can Hume's theory without ambiguity be qualified as that of a "virtue theorist"? Correspondingly, the collection can be divided into three parts. The first five papers, written by Richard Joyce, Norva Lo, Charles Pigden, Michael Smith, and Graham Oddie, are concerned with Hume's Motivation Argument. The second group of papers -- viz. those by Constantine Sandis, Stephen Finlay, Kent Hurtig, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, and Luke Russell -- focus on the Slavery of Reason Thesis. The collection ends with papers written by Christine Swanton, Annette Baier, and Rosalind Hursthouse, which discuss Hume's account of virtues.
A glance at the names that have contributed to the collection immediately suggest that one should expect to find high quality papers in it and, it should be added, the collection meets the expectation. Hume on Motivation and Virtue contains essays many of which present subtle but complex arguments using technical vocabulary. It is primarily intended for academics and advanced students of philosophy, since it requires the attention of readers who are familiar both with metaethics and with Hume's moral theory.
Joyce's 'Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume' purports to show that "even if Hume does have expressivist leanings, this does not exclude his also robustly endorsing a cognitivist metaethical view" (48). Joyce quite rightfully suggests both that what he calls "Hume's expressivist leaning" exists in Hume's work, and that this fact is not indicative of Hume's metaethical stance. In addition, it is hard not to be inclined towards Joyce's "positive metaethical stance", which "mixes elements of traditional expressivism with elements of cognitivism" and "is neutral between moral realism and radical moral scepticism" (30-31); as well as towards Joyce's insight that reading Hume from this positive vantage point contributes to our understanding of Hume's moral theory. According to Joyce, having a moral belief does not necessarily lead to having a motivation to act in accordance with it, so qualifying Hume's Motivation Argument as expressivist in nature, or as one providing ad hoc support to expressivism, does not give justice to it. Joyce's chief claim is that non-cognitivism, or expressivism, does not really imply motivational internalism, as much as motivational internalism does not imply expressivism. Hence, according to Joyce, the Motivation Argument does not really enable expressivists to explain motivational efficacy of moral judgments better than cognitivists.
Joyce also claims that it might not be possible to adjudicate between two competing cognitivist-based expressivist interpretations of Hume -- namely the realist interpretation, represented by Copp's 'realist-expressivism', and the sceptical interpretation, represented by 'error theoretic expressivism' based on Mackie's 'Error Theory' (49). I have personally found it hard, though, to share Joyce's "reservations about the determinacy of Hume's metaethical outlook" (30), in spite of the fact that Joyce is right in saying that metaethics has reached "an impasse in establishing whether Hume's occasional expressivist tendencies are mixed with a cognitivism that is committed to success or…to scepticism" (53).
Norva Lo's paper 'Is Hume Inconsistent? -- Motivation and Morals' raises concerns about interpretability of the Motivation Argument, which exist in virtue of "the ambiguity in Hume's terminology" (58). Lo presents three different internalist readings of the argument, and claims that the alleged inconsistencies in Hume's theory (generated by the conflict between Hume's internalism and other commitments found in his account of moral evaluation) do not exist because "internalist readings of Hume are indefensible" (60), and because "Hume is not an internalist" about motivation (76). Lo's arguments in favor of "non-internalist" reading of Hume are insightful, and defend what I think to be a correct and still not sufficiently recognized thesis that Hume's moral theory does have an objectivist twist (65); albeit a thesis the correctness of which Lo tries to establish on the wrong reasons (and I will mention but two).
First, Lo maintains quite a popular thesis that when Hume argued against 'moral rationalism' he primarily argued against the view that is concerned with motivation (75-6). All I am going to say on it here -- since the issue can quite easily be tracked in recent literature on Hume -- is that it might be more plausible to read Hume's view of 'moral rationalism' as that of a view of in what moral facts consist in, rather than one concerned with motivational efficacy of beliefs. (This should significantly affect traditional metaethical reading of Hume.) This brings us to the second problem in Lo's paper, which is captured in her optimism about Hume's stance on the ontological status of moral properties. Lo argues against an anti-metaphysical interpretation of Hume, by saying that "moral properties are said to be ontologically objective…[though also] conceptually subjective" (65-6; original emphases). Without going into much detail here, this optimism is unconvincing in virtue of Hume's negative epistemic argument, which can be found in Treatise 3.1.1 (acknowledged by Lo (75)), which is accompanied by quite strong scepticism about the ontological status of moral properties -- viz. they are not to be equated with objects of reason: "[M]orality consists not in any relations [emphasis added], that are the objects of science…[and] it consists not in any matter of fact [original emphasis], which can be discovered by understanding" (THN, 468). Having this in mind, the problem in Lo's account is not that she thinks that moral properties are akin to secondary-qualities, but in that she fails to explain how exactly could have Hume attributed "existence" to moral properties (facts), and considered them "objective" and epistemically available to moral agents, if they cannot be equated with any of the known objects of 'Reason' -- as Hume argues -- and if moral properties (e.g., 'virtue') can belong to actions without simultaneously and necessarily being epistemic objects of the Sentiment -- as Lo argues (65).
Of course, Lo did make an attempt to ground her argument in an interpretation of Hume's 'General Point of View' (GPV for short), according to which the view in question rests on "ideal" epistemic conditions -- a point which, although easily found in contemporary readings of Treatise 3.3.1, is not as easily found in Hume. Lo suggests that the GPV makes room for "the possibility that an action is virtuous without us actually feeling such a sentiment towards it" (65, 68-70) -- hence granting objective status to moral properties. Lo does have a point in saying that the GPV gives an objectivist twist to Hume's theory, but she pushes the point too far. First, Lo seems to be oblivious not only of Hume's explicit scepticism about the authority of judgments made from the General Point of View in his 'Of The Standard of Taste' (Essays, 243-4), but also of the fact that the GPV was introduced to solve the problem of surface-apparent "stability" of moral judgments, rather than of their "objectivity" (where 'objectivity' is traditionally grounded in specific ontological status of properties in question), as Lo and other "Ideal Observer" interpreters of Hume would like to see it. Second, Lo does not recognize the possibility that separability of moral properties from individual moral subject's sentimental reaction to known circumstances and relations is not a sufficient reason for attribution of existence to moral properties (even if in a non-robust sense of the term). Lo's confusion lies in her belief that the only way one can justify qualifying any theory (not just Hume's) as one having an objectivist twist, is by grounding it on traditionally conceived ontological theses. This belief, at least in the context of Hume's theory, will not aid interpretation of Hume's theory if, as I believe, Hume's battle with his moral rationalist opponents is primarily fought on ontological and epistemic grounds. The 'objectivity' of Hume's theory might be of a different kind than participants in the traditional realist -- anti-realist debate in metaethics will allow or even grasp as possible.
In his 'If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What?', Charles Pigden makes two interesting points: First, "Hume was not arguing for non-cognitivism since he was not a non-cognitivist" (80). Second, "[s]o far as the Motivation Argument is concerned, cognitivists and rationalists can both rest easy" because, according to Pigden, the argument "fails both as an argument for non-cognitivism and as an argument for Hume's favored thesis, that moral distinctions are not derived from reason" (80-1; original emphasis). As in the case with Joyce's and Lo's essays, Pigden's essay is valuable, amongst other things, for defending a view that Hume should not be read as an outright non-cognitivist.
Problems in Pigden's argument, however, are generated not only by his reading of Hume as an outright cognitivist, or by his thinking that Motivation Argument was the highpoint of Hume's attack on moral rationalism, but also by the fact that it rests on the utterly false metaethical dogma, according to which Hume deployed a logical thesis in Treatise 3.1.1 -- viz. the "No-Ought-From-Is observation" -- against moral rationalism. This might not be a problem if Pigden does not believe that since he had "thrashed No-Ought-From-Is to death" (81), he is not only in position to debunk non-cognitivist reading of Hume's Motivation Argument, but also to show that Hume's attack on moral rationalism fails. Those who share Pigden's views of Hume's Treatise 3.1.1 might find this argument to be convincing, but the argument will appear to be riddled with problems to those who think that "No-Ought-From-Is observation" is not there to be thrashed, and who think that Hume's the Motivation Argument does not bear the brunt of Hume's assault on moral rationalism. (What needs to be thrashed is "the Is-Ought debate" about Hume, which is in need of a different closure than the one Pigden hopes to give.) Simply put, rationalists might not be in position to rest as easy as Pigden would want them to.
Smith's 'The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism' joins the debate about whether Hume is a cognitivist or non-cognitivist, and whether the Motivation Argument can be read as containing an internalist premise or not. Smith is concerned with making two points: first, that Pigden's and Lo's arguments suffer from internal inconsistencies, in virtue of which their claim that Hume "was plainly a cognitivist" (108) must be rejected; second, that Hume's Motivation Argument is "a rational reconstruction of Hume's argument" rather than an argument that can without ambiguity be attributed to Hume (108, 115). I think Smith's quite dense argument succeeds at least in showing that such rational reconstruction of Hume's views is plausible -- as long as one has in mind that it is but a reconstruction. In addition, if one accepts Smith's reasons that desires are necessary constituents of moral beliefs (120), then one should accept his point that Pigden and Lo are mistaken in reading the Motivation Argument as making a claim "that is wholly and solely about causation" (117). According to Smith, the claim is rather one "about the causal and rationalizing powers of belief" (120). This, however, might not be a correct point about Hume at all, if one has in mind that Treatise 3.1.1 provides specific negative arguments about the role of 'Reason [alone]' in moral evaluation, and not about the belief.
Smith's argument rests on his analysis of Hume's introduction of the 'General Point of View', according to which Hume's point was that "a moral judgment is an endorsement [emphasis added] of the desires that we would have under certain conditions" (115-6), which Smith sees as evidence of Hume's non-cognitivism. Smith claims that "the moral view" is just "a matter of having an attitude of approval towards those attitudes of approbation and disapprobation that we would have if we were in the relevant conditions" (116). The problem might be, I think, that conditions for the applicability of the notion of "endorsement", on Smith's reading, tell us that "the moral view" is not just what he claims it is -- viz. just "a matter of having an attitude"; for it seems to me that with his reading of Hume's General Point of View, Smith actually grounded moral judgments (hence, the moral view) not in attitudes, but rather in counterfactual beliefs about one's point of view -- viz. in beliefs about what one would feel under certain conditions -- hence, on inductive empirical generalizations stemming from the activity of 'Reason' (a thesis which Hume adamantly argues in both Treatise and the Second Enquiry). In other words, Smith's point (unfortunately for Smith) gives more oomph to Reason in moral evaluation (more than Hume can take), though he intended it to be a point about the role of belief in it.
Smith's argument hinges on whether his claim that a moral judgment is "an endorsement of the attitudes...that we would have if we were to adopt a general point of view" (115) implies not only that the cognitive activity is an integral element in 'moral evaluation' -- i.e., that it sets the stage on which 'Sentiment' gives us epistemic access to moral properties, a point clearly made by Hume in Treatise and Second Enquiry -- but also that causal reasoning (not beliefs) does much more than just setting the stage, and Hume adamantly denied this possibility by arguing that moral judgments are made only after "the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself…Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, some sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous" (EPM, 290-1).
Smith's argument is (as much as the entire traditional metaethical debate about Hume is) focused on understanding the respective roles of 'belief' and 'desire' in moral evaluation, rather than on understanding the roles of 'Reason' and 'Sentiment' in it. I believe this to be one of the causes of the impasse in metaethical reading of Hume of which Joyce spoke in the first essay in the collection. In fact, this is why Smith's argument on the nature of the relation between belief and desire in Hume, actually defends a positive idea in Hume scholarship -- which is that Reason does more than non-cognitivist readers of Hume (not Hume himself) thought possible -- while simultaneously having a negative consequence, which lies in breaching Hume's surgically precise but also quite subtle separation of the roles played by faculties of Reason and Sentiment in moral evaluation. This paradox reflects what seems to be one of the main problems in metaethical reading of Hume, namely that of approaching Hume from the vantage point of the contemporary "belief-desire" debate, and thinking that it can help in reading of the 17th and 18th century "Reason-Sentiment" debate.
Graham Oddie's 'Experience of Value' is quite insightful in that it establishes the link between Hume's moral phenomenology and moral epistemology on one side, with realism on the other side. Having said this, once Oddie's definition of realism is understood -- viz. as a mixture of cognitivism, robust metaphysical realism, and non-naturalism about values (121) -- the reader's initial excitement might dampen more than slightly. The disappointment comes from the fact that Oddie believes that phenomenology offers support to realism by default -- a belief shared by all other realists, be it robust or sensibility theorists, naturalistic or non-naturalistic -- which is a belief much in need of critical evaluation. However, the reader must acknowledge that Oddie's aim is not to provide exegetical analysis of Hume's account of moral evaluation, but to show that rationalist theses "are in fact compatible with many of Hume's central insights about the phenomenology of value, and that in fact Hume's insights can be put to service to help meet the epistemic challenge to value realism (121-2). This is, I believe, a laudable aim to have, and a correct direction to pursue, in spite of the fact that I do not agree with the version of realism that Oddie puts forth as compatible with Hume's moral epistemology and phenomenology.
Oddie explains that he accepts several theses about Hume: that Hume thought "that pure reason alone could not discover truths about morality in particular or about value in general", the commonly held thesis that Hume maintained that no interesting evaluative judgments ('Ought') can be derived from purely non-evaluative judgments ('Is'), and the thesis that reason cannot be in logical opposition with direct passions. The important thesis rejected by Oddie is that Hume argued, "that the passions do not represent anything [as being part of the fabric of the world]" (122-3). Analysis of our moral experience, according to Oddie, tells us that passions are representative, because phenomenological descriptions capture "appearances of value" (123); that is, passions are representative of the "value of the state" one is in. Oddie argues that "basic experiences of value" are "Hume's direct passions, desires and aversions" (Ibid.), which is both consistent with Hume's theory and compatible with the epistemic commitments of realism. Unfortunately, Oddie takes the Motivation Argument to be Hume's "powerful" and one of the most important arguments against rationalism, and accepts Smith's claim that metaethical reading of Hume depends on the issue whether desires are beyond rational criticism or not, and that Hume though that "'desires are subject to rational criticism'" (128). This is what will cause Oddie's paper to fall short of its aim.
Oddie's argument is, I believe, mistaken in virtue of his failure to acknowledge the fact that Hume made the point that one's moral judgments (not desires) are subject to rational criticism; if they are, that is, based on passions that are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism -- even if passions are not rationally criticisable at all, a point clearly explained in 'Of the influencing motives of the will': "[A] passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment [of understanding]." (THN, 416; emphasis added) Acknowledging this point about Hume, however, demands letting go of some deeply entrenched theses about Hume, in virtue of which many popular arguments and debates about Hume must suffer serious revision.
What of Oddie's aim? It is my impression that Oddie should be concerned not as much with the Motivation Argument, or Hume's internalism, but with Hume's arguments in moral epistemology and ontology, which, I believe, do not fit well with Oddie's project. As far as phenomenology is concerned, everything hinges on the conditions that Oddie wants to establish as being constitutive of "genuine experiences of value". Though it is true that "[i]f there are genuine experiences of value they could stand to values as ordinary perceptual experiences stand to the objects of perception" (133), I am not sure that Hume's ontology would allow him to accept the stronger sense in which this analogy can be understood (since even the perception of secondary qualities relies on existence of objects "out there" in the world, no matter how "perspectival" it can get). If Oddie opts for the weaker sense in which analogy can be read -- viz. that the condition of "seeming or appearing good to me" entails that passions are representative of something (moral properties) that gives worthiness to whatever is desired -- then I am still at a loss as to how it helps the kind of realism that Oddie commits himself to, or what this something might be according to Hume. Speaking of 'valuer-neutral facts about value' or 'adequate response to value' (139) might be insightful but does not really help the reader to see what exactly in Hume's moral theory fits with Oddie's non-naturalistic realism about value.
Essays six through ten are concerned with issues stemming from the interpretative debate about Hume's thesis that "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions" (THN, 413), or Slavery of Reason Thesis (SRT). In 'Hume and the Debate on 'Motivating Reasons'', Constantine Sandis makes two main claims: first, that "the standard map of available positions [on motivation] leaves no space for his [Hume's] view", because Hume denied the thesis that moral subjects are motivated by reasons -- a thesis accepted by all sides in the debate (142-3). What motivates us, according to Sandis' reading of Hume, is nothing but a moral belief (145, 147-9). The thesis must be praised since it rests on the acknowledgment of the conceptual distinction between cognition (Reason) and cognitive states (beliefs). On Sandis' analysis of Hume's use of the concept of 'Reason', "beliefs for Hume are all sentiments" (147), which is a controversial reading of Hume, but also one that needs to be considered. The second of the two main claims in Sandis' paper is that Hume's Motivation Argument succeeds against moral rationalism, because it aims to prove that moral distinctions are not derived from reason. The point that I have made in relation to Pigden's essay, which should be repeated here, is that if Motivational Argument is not the only argument against rationalist thesis that moral distinctions are derived from reason, then Sandis' argument fails; for the issue of "derivability" of moral distinctions is, for Hume, very much an epistemic issue, which hinges on Hume's theses on the ontological status of moral properties, and not only on the issue of motivational efficacy of either of Reason or beliefs.
Sandis' paper is followed by Stephen Finlay's 'Against All reasons? Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm', in which Finlay argues that the view according to which Hume was an instrumentalist about practical reason (155) is groundless, because "Hume is a radical and consistent champion of the desire-dependence thesis, who denies the existence of any rational norm" (156; original emphasis). Finlay's aim is to show that there is nothing absurd in Hume's thesis that reason does not give us insight into anything that ought rationally to be done -- not even an instrumental norm of reason, which is qualified by Finlay as "a dogma in contemporary ethical theory". Finlay's paper needs careful attention, for it does recognize that the link between action and moral judgment, according to Hume, is not and cannot be a direct product of reason; though one should be careful not to confuse this claim with or thinks that it entails the claim that "anything goes" in morality (against which Hume introduced the GPV).
Kent Hurtig's 'Why Internalists about Reasons should be Humeans about Motivation' aims to show that internalism about reasons commits one to Humeanism about motivation, thus denying Bernard Williams' thesis that internalism about reasons is compatible with cognitivism about motivation. According to Hurtig, the question is not whether cognitivism per se is incompatible with the thesis that beliefs are motivationally inert, but whether internalism about reasons is consistent with the thesis that the agent's subjective motivational set, which provides grounds for Williams' internalist definition of reasons -- i.e., X has motivational pull and can count as a reason for an agent to do p only if X is part of the agent's motivational set -- contains not only dispositions, but also beliefs; Hurtig argues that this possibility is out of the question for a cognitive motivational internalist (182-4).
Papers by Herlinde Pauer-Studer ('Humean Sources of Normativity') and Luke Russell ('Two Sources of Normativity: Korsgaard vs. Hume') offer critical discussion of Korsgaard's Kantian-based criticism of Hume's (instrumentalist) account of practical reasoning. Korsgaard's issues with Hume originate in her opinion that the consequence of Hume's account of practical rationality is that "anything goes" in morality -- i.e., that the "immoral reasons" will yield action as much as "moral reasons" will, because reasons do nothing but follow desires. In other words, on Korsgaard's reading of Hume's account of instrumental rationality, the authority of "normative requirements" does not go far enough, or not as far as Korsgaard would like them to go.
Herlinde Pauer-Studer makes two points against Korsgaard's reading of Hume. First, Korsgaard's account of Hume's view of practical rationality does not do justice to Hume's idea because, according to Pauer-Studer, it is not true that "the normative force of the instrumental principle can only be established in case the ends pursued do have unconditional value" (192-200) -- a point, I must add, well made against quite influential metaethical view on what conditions can be taken into consideration as constitutive of normative authority. The second point is that we should not accept Korsgaard's claim that a Humean reflective endorsement method is a deficient account of practical rationality (200-203).
Luke Russell makes a distinction between two kinds of normativity -- viz. motivational and justificatory (latter having a weaker and a stronger strain); and, according to Rusell, it is the stronger strain of the justificatory notion of normativity that underlines Korsgaard's criticism of Hume: "Korsgaard rejects Humean ethics precisely because she believes that Humean reflective endorsement fails to provide positive justifying reasons for morality [i.e., for all of our moral beliefs and practices]" (208). The main aim of Russell's paper is to show that one of the reasons why "a Humean approach [to normativity] is preferable" to that of Korsgaard's approach (209) is the fact that "Korsgaard's own neo-Kantian account of morality is no more able to meet the strong requirement than is the account offered by her Humean opponents" (208).
The last group of papers in the collection are concerned with Hume's "virtue theory". What is at stake in the debate between Annette Baier and Christine Swanton is the question of what makes a certain trait a virtue, and to what extent Hume's account of virtue has universalistic (normative) or anthropological (sceptical-empirical) flavor. Swanton's 'What sort of a virtue theorist is Hume?' makes three important claims: first, she correctly interprets Hume as saying that virtues are beyond the epistemic reach of "reason alone" (227) -- this is, I believe, one of the main points Hume makes against moral rationalism. Second, she -- incorrectly on my reading of Hume -- argues that Hume's attack on reason's epistemic reach in morality is not inconsistent with the thesis that "properties as virtues and beauty are qualities in objects which are [emphasis added] powers [original emphasis] naturally fitted to produce certain sentiments in creatures constituted as we are constituted" (228). According to Swanton, these properties (or putative facts) "are not 'in the objects themselves'" but rather that "the properties which cause approbation in suitable observers are naturally fitted to cause this" (Ibid.). Swanton's point is that via a "'finer internal sense'", which is operating under the suitable conditions (taxonomy of which is given on page 229), moral subjects gain epistemic insight into "authoritative" virtues. Third, Swanton argues that what makes something a virtue is not a single criterion (e.g., the standard of utility, or the good of mankind), but plurality of criteria (231, 246-7).
There are a number of problems in Swanton's argument, and I will mention two. First, her claim that moral properties are nothing but "'natural fittingness' of the relations [emphasis added] detected by a true judge" (237) has too much of a flavor of epistemic objects of reason; which include not only demonstrable relations -- or "immutable" and "eternal" relations, which Swanton rightfully rejects as candidates to be considered as epistemic objects of moral knowledge -- but also relations that are not susceptible of demonstration yet still are epistemic objects of reason alone (like the relation of contiguity, on which Swanton relies in her analysis of the notion of 'bond' or 'love' as a "substantive basis of virtue" (237-9)).
Second, Swanton fails to see that Hume's account of "general rules", the grasp of which is on Swanton's reading necessary (not sufficient though) in understanding the authority of "a true [moral or aesthetic] judge [who detects putative virtues]" (237, 246), is not as optimistic nor as useful to Swanton's argument as she seems to suggest. Hence, Swanton's view of Hume might not be without ambiguity itself. In "Of The Standard of Taste", for instance, Hume argues not only that it is natural to seek a standard or a general rule in evaluation (Essays, 229) -- as Swanton rightfully brings forth -- but also that "where there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external situation as is entirely blameless on both sides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above the other; in that case a certain degree of diversity in judgment is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments" (Essays, 244). It seems to me that in interpreting Hume, the notion of a "true judge" needs to be used with more care.
Swanton's essay is followed by Baier's 'Kinds of Virtue Theorist', which reflects, I believe, a justified worry about Swanton's argument -- namely, that Swanton tends to disregard one important aspect of Hume's moral theory, namely its sociological or anthropological aspect (in virtue of which Hume is sceptical about certain things). In other words, Baier's essay shows that Hume's account of human nature, and that of the moral discourse and practice, might be sceptical about the authority of norms to which Swanton refers, as much as it is an account trying to explain and justify the appearance of authoritative norms in our experience of moral discourse and practice. As Charles Pigden eloquently captures the Baier-Swanton debate in the 'Introduction': "Swanton gives us Hume without ambiguities. Baier wants to put the ambiguities back in" (28). Indeed, Baier asks: "Is Hume's account of the virtues a sceptical one, a descriptive one, a normative one? Or might it be all of these?" (250); and suggests that "as a virtue theorist Hume is descriptive as much as normative, that he may be a sceptical virtue theorist, that he is anti-voluntarist, and that he is not completely anti-deontological" (251). Baier concludes that Hume "would find Swanton's response to him very agreeable, as long as someone supplies the sceptical epilogue" (257). In her 'Reply to Baier', Swanton addresses some of the issues raised by Baier against her take on Hume.
The last paper in the edition is Rosalind Hursthouse's 'Hume on Justice', the main contention of which is "that Hume's discussion of justice is in fact an attack on that concept of rights we think of as having motivated the American and French revolutions…[which] has blinded most readers to the power and plausibility of Hume's attack…" (265) In other words, on Hursthouse reading of Hume, Hume's argument on justice was not based on the belief in existence of some "ideal code of natural law" in virtue of which civil law can be judged to be just (or as a law respecting certain existing rights) -- as revolutionaries believed against the Ancient Régime in France, or against the British colonial authorities in North America -- but rather on the belief that our evaluative judgment of the civil law depends on the usefulness of the law within a society. In other words, on Hursthouse's take on Hume's account of justice, rights that are respected by just laws are not discovered but established, and governed by the norm of utility.
What to say of the entire collection? In spite of the disagreements I have with what I am calling the traditional metaethical views on Hume, Charles Pigden has chosen well in editing the collection. Hume on Motivation and Virtue is a thought-provoking, must read kind of collection, since it provides not only a valuable insight into several fundamental issues that are the foci of metaethics since 1950s, but also an insight into how these issues are approached from the vantage point of a younger generation of metaethicians, who belong to a tradition that is much richer and more diverse than it was in its recent past. As such, it is a collection any student in philosophy should want to have, and one that must attract attention of Hume scholars.
Finally, I must add that I have found the collection to be too traditional due to the fact that many authors that have contributed to it adhere to theses about Hume that are long in need of either debunking or serious revision; like the thesis that Hume was concerned with the 'No-Ought-From-Is' thesis (or 'Yes-Ought-From-Is' thesis for that matter), or the thesis that the Motivation Argument has a prominent place in Hume's attack on moral rationalism, or the thesis that what we have to say on the role of belief in morality determines our reading of Hume's theses on the role of Reason in it, etc. To me, theses like these might have a lot to do with metaethics, but they should stop being dogmatically defended by all sides in the metaethical debate at least when interpretation of Hume's theory is concerned. A change of perspective on some of these traditional metaethical theses on Hume might actually be more useful to metaethics, then arguing for or against them is; after all, metaethics has reached an impasse at least partly because of a long lasting influence of these theses.
© 2012 Dejan Simkovic
Dejan Simkovic, PhD candidate at The University of Sydney.