email page print pageAll Topic Reviews
A Theory of Feelings Anger and Forgiveness"My Madness Saved Me"10 Good Questions about Life and Death12 Modern Philosophers50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a GodA Cabinet of Philosophical CuriositiesA Case for IronyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to Buddhist PhilosophyA Companion to FoucaultA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to HumeA Companion to KantA Companion to Phenomenology and ExistentialismA Companion to PragmatismA Companion to the Philosophy of ActionA Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyA Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Critical Overview of Biological FunctionsA Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of MindA Cursing Brain?A Delicate BalanceA Farewell to AlmsA Fragile LifeA Frightening LoveA Future for PresentismA Guide to the Good LifeA History of PsychiatryA History of the MindA Life Worth LivingA Manual of Experimental PhilosophyA Map of the MindA Metaphysics of PsychopathologyA Mind So RareA Natural History of Human MoralityA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Natural History of VisionA Parliament of MindsA Philosopher Looks at The Sense of HumorA Philosophical DiseaseA Philosophy of BoredomA Philosophy of Cinematic ArtA Philosophy of CultureA Philosophy of EmptinessA Philosophy of FearA Philosophy of PainA Physicalist ManifestoA Place for ConsciousnessA Question of TrustA Research Agenda for DSM-VA Revolution of the MindA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Stroll With William JamesA Tapestry of ValuesA Tear is an Intellectual ThingA Theory of FreedomA Thousand MachinesA Universe of ConsciousnessA Very Bad WizardA Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the CurtainA Virtue EpistemologyA World Full of GodsA World Without ValuesAbout FaceAbout the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the SelfAction and ResponsibilityAction in ContextAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionAction, Contemplation, and HappinessAction, Emotion and WillAdam SmithAdaptive DynamicsAddictionAddictionAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction Is a ChoiceAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAftermathAfterwarAgainst AdaptationAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HappinessAgainst HealthAgainst MarriageAgency and ActionAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and EmbodimentAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAl-JununAlain BadiouAlain BadiouAlasdair MacIntyreAlien Landscapes?Altered EgosAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Ethics for TodayAn Intellectual History of CannibalismAn Interpretation of DesireAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy An Introduction to Philosophy of EducationAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyAn Introductory Philosophy of MedicineAn Odd Kind of FameAnalytic FreudAnalytic Philosophy in AmericaAncient AngerAncient Models of MindAncient Philosophy of the SelfAngerAnimal LessonsAnimal MindsAnimals Like UsAnnihilationAnother PlanetAnswers for AristotleAnti-ExternalismAnti-Individualism and KnowledgeAntigone’s ClaimAntipsychiatryAre We Hardwired?Are Women Human?Arguing about DisabilityArguing About Human NatureAristotle and the Philosophy of FriendshipAristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's ChildrenAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAristotle, Emotions, and EducationArt & MoralityArt After Conceptual ArtArt in Three DimensionsArt, Self and KnowledgeArtificial ConsciousnessArtificial HappinessAspects of PsychologismAsylum to ActionAt the Existentialist CaféAtonement and ForgivenessAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutobiography as PhilosophyAutonomyAutonomy and Mental DisorderAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismBabies by DesignBackslidingBadiouBadiou's DeleuzeBadiou, Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking EmancipationBare Facts And Naked TruthsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBattlestar Galactica and PhilosophyBe Like the FoxBeautyBecoming a SubjectBecoming HumanBefore ConsciousnessBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing AmoralBeing HumanBeing Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory Being No OneBeing Realistic about ReasonsBeing ReducedBeing YourselfBelief's Own EthicsBending Over BackwardsBerlin Childhood around 1900Bernard WilliamsBertrand RussellBetter than BothBetter Than WellBetween Two WorldsBeyond HealthBeyond Hegel and NietzscheBeyond KuhnBeyond LossBeyond MelancholyBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond PostmodernismBeyond ReductionBeyond SchizophreniaBeyond the DSM StoryBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics in the ClinicBiological Complexity and Integrative PluralismBiology Is TechnologyBiosBipolar ExpeditionsBlackwell Companion to the Philosophy of EducationBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlues - Philosophy for EveryoneBlushBob Dylan and PhilosophyBody ConsciousnessBody Image And Body SchemaBody ImagesBody LanguageBody MattersBody WorkBody-Subjects and Disordered MindsBoundBoundaries of the MindBoyleBrain Evolution and CognitionBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-WiseBrainchildrenBrains, Buddhas, and BelievingBrainstormingBrave New WorldsBreakdown of WillBrief Child Therapy Homework PlannerBrief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and FaithBrief Therapy Homework PlannerBritain on the CouchBritish Idealism and the Concept of the SelfBrute RationalityBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyBut Is It Art?Camus and SartreCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCarving Nature at Its JointsCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsCassandra's DaughterCato's TearsCausation and CounterfactualsCauses, Laws, and Free WillChanging Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-ModernityChanging the SubjectChaosophyCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionCharles DarwinCherishmentChildhood and the Philosophy of EducationChildrenChildren, Families, and Health Care Decision MakingChoices and ConflictChoosing Not to ChooseChristmas - Philosophy for EveryoneCinema, Philosophy, BergmanCinematic MythmakingCity and Soul in Plato's RepublicClassifying MadnessClear and Queer ThinkingClinical EthicsClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyCodependent ForevermoreCoffee - Philosophy for EveryoneCognition and the BrainCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, ReflectionCognitive BiologyCognitive FictionsCognitive Neuroscience of EmotionCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Cognitive Theories of Mental IllnessCoherence in Thought and ActionCollected Papers, Volume 1Collected Papers, Volume 2College SexComedy IncarnateCommitmentCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentConcealment And ExposureConceptual Analysis and Philosophical NaturalismConceptual Art and PaintingConceptual Issues in Evolutionary BiologyConfessionsConfucianismConnected, or What It Means to Live in the Network SocietyConquest of AbundanceConscience and ConvenienceConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the SelfConsciousness EmergingConsciousness EvolvingConsciousness ExplainedConsciousness in ActionConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsole and ClassifyConstructing the WorldConstructive AnalysisContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Philosophy of BiologyContemporary Debates in Philosophy of MindContemporary Debates in Political PhilosophyContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Natural LawContested Knowledge: Social Theory TodayContesting PsychiatryContext and the AttitudesContinental Philosophy of ScienceControlControlling Our DestiniesConversations About Psychology and Sexual OrientationCopernicus, Darwin and FreudCrazy for YouCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCreating ConsilienceCreating HysteriaCreating Mental IllnessCreating Scientific ConceptsCreating the American JunkieCreation, Rationality and AutonomyCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCrimes of ReasonCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychiatryCritical PsychologyCritical ResistanceCritical Thinking About PsychologyCritical VisionsCross and KhoraCruel CompassionCTRL [SPACE]Cultural Psychology of the SelfCultural Theory: An IntroductionCulture and Psychiatric DiagnosisCulture and Subjective Well-BeingCulture of DeathCultures of NeurastheniaCurious EmotionsCurrent Controversies in Experimental PhilosophyCurrent Controversies in Values and ScienceCustom and Reason in HumeCustomers and Patrons of the Mad-TradeCutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together AgainCylons in AmericaDamaged IdentitiesDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous EmotionsDaniel DennettDaniel DennettDark AgesDarwin and DesignDarwin's Dangerous IdeaDarwin's LegacyDarwin, God and the Meaning of LifeDarwinian PsychiatryDarwinian ReductionismDarwinizing CultureDating: Philosophy for EveryoneDeathDeathDeath and CharacterDeath and CompassionDeath and the AfterlifeDebating DesignDebating HumanismDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecomposing the WillDeconstructing PsychotherapyDeconstruction and DemocracyDeeper Than DarwinDeeper than ReasonDefending Science - within ReasonDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDegrees of BeliefDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDelusions and the Madness of the MassesDementiaDemons, Dreamers, and MadmenDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDennett’s PhilosophyDepression Is a ChoiceDepression, Emotion and the SelfDepthDerrida, Deleuze, PsychoanalysisDescartesDescartes and the Passionate MindDescartes' CogitoDescartes's Changing MindDescartes's Concept of MindDescribing Inner Experience?Descriptions and PrescriptionsDesembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Desire and AffectDesire, Love, and IdentityDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDeveloping the VirtuesDiagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDialectics of the SelfDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital SoulDimensional Models of Personality DisordersDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisjunctivismDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDispatches from the Freud WarsDisrupted LivesDistractionDisturbed ConsciousnessDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Do We Still Need Doctors?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Does the Woman Exist?Doing without ConceptsDon't Believe Everything You ThinkDonald DavidsonDonald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the MentalDoubting Darwin?Dreaming and Other Involuntary MentationDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV-TR CasebookDworkin and His CriticsDying to KnowDynamics in ActionDysthymia and the Spectrum of Chronic DepressionsEccentricsEducational MetamorphosesEffective IntentionsElbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth WantingEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbodied RhetoricsEmbodied Selves and Divided MindsEmbryos under the MicroscopeEmergencies in Mental Health PracticeEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotionEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion and PsycheEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotional ReasonEmotional ReasonEmotional TruthEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions, Value, and AgencyEmpathyEmpathy and AgencyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpathy in the Context of PhilosophyEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEnchanted LoomsEngaging BuddhismEngineering the Human GermlineEnjoymentEnvyEpicureanismEpistemic LuckEpistemologyEpistemology and EmotionsEpistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentEros and the GoodErotic MoralityEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssays in the Metaphysics of Mind Essays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEssays on Nonconceptual ContentEssays on Philosophical CounselingEssays on Reference, Language, and MindEssays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern PhilosophyEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEsssential Philosophy of PsychiatryEternal Sunshine of the Spotless MindEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in Human CloningEthical TheoryEthicsEthicsEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics and Values in PsychotherapyEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics in Plain EnglishEthics in PracticeEthics in Psychiatric ResearchEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEuropean Review of Philosophy. Vol. 5Everyday IrrationalityEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolutionEvolution and the Human MindEvolution's RainbowEvolutionary Origins of MoralityEvolutionary PsychologyExamined LifeExamined LivesExistential AmericaExistentialismExistentialism and Romantic LoveExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and NaturalismExperiments in EthicsExplaining ConsciousnessExplaining the BrainExplaining the Computational MindExplanatory PluralismExploding the Gene MythExploring HappinessExploring the SelfExpression and the InnerExpressions of JudgmentExtraordinary Science and PsychiatryFaces of IntentionFact and ValueFact and Value in EmotionFacts and ValuesFacts, Values, and NormsFads and Fallacies in the Social SciencesFaith and Wisdom in ScienceFatherhoodFear of KnowledgeFearless SpeechFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFeelings of BeingFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminism and Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Interpretations of Rene DescartesFeminist TheoryField Notes from ElsewhereFinding Consciousness in the BrainFingerprints of GodFlesh in the Age of ReasonFolk Psychological NarrativesFolk Psychology Re-AssessedForces of HabitForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and RetributionFoucault 2.0Foucault and PhilosophyFoucault NowFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Ethical Practice, Research, and Teaching in PsychologyFour Views on Free WillFrank Ramsey (1903-1930)Free WillFree WillFree WillFree WillFree Will and Action ExplanationFree Will and LuckFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free WillFreedomFreedom and DeterminismFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom and ResponsibiltyFreedom and ValueFreedom EvolvesFreedom RegainedFreedom vs. InterventionFreedom, Fame, Lying, and BetrayalFreudFreud and the Question of PseudoscienceFreud As PhilosopherFreud's AnswerFreud, the Reluctant PhilosopherFriedrich NietzscheFrom Chance to ChoiceFrom Clinic to ClassroomFrom Complexity to LifeFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the HumanitiesFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrom Valuing to ValueFrontiers of ConsciousnessFrontiers of JusticeFurnishing the MindGalileo in PittsburghGenderGender and Mental HealthGender in the MirrorGender TroubleGenesGenes, Women, EqualityGenetic Nature/CultureGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetic SecretsGenocide's AftermathGenomes and What to Make of ThemGerman Idealism and the JewGerman PhilosophyGetting HookedGilles DeleuzeGlobal PhilosophyGluttonyGod and Phenomenal ConsciousnessGoffman's LegacyGoing Amiss in Experimental ResearchGoodness & AdviceGrassroots SpiritualityGrave MattersGrave MattersGreedGreek Models of Mind and SelfGut ReactionsHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHabits of MindHallucinationHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of EmotionsHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness and EducationHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHappiness, Death, and the Remainder of LifeHard LuckHarmful ThoughtsHaving the World in ViewHealing PsychiatryHealing the Soul in the Age of the BrainHealth, Illness and DiseaseHealth, Science, and Ordinary LanguageHegelHeidegger and a Metaphysics of FeelingHeidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of BeingHermann von Helmholtz's MechanismHermeneutics As PoliticsHeterophobiaHeterosyncraciesHeuristics and BiasesHeuristics and the LawHidden ResourcesHidden SelvesHiding from HumanityHigh Art LiteHistorical OntologyHistory of Psychiatry and Medical PsychologyHistory, Historicity And ScienceHobbesHomosexualitiesHope and Dread in PsychoanalysisHot ThoughtHow Can I Be Trusted?How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Children Learn the Meanings of WordsHow Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?How Do We Know Who We Are?How Emotions WorkHow Emotions WorkHow History Made the MindHow Images ThinkHow is Nature Possible?How Propaganda WorksHow Science WorksHow Scientific Practices MatterHow Scientists Explain DiseaseHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Make Opportunity EqualHow to Solve the Mind-Body Problemhow to stop timeHow to Think More About SexHow We HopeHow We ReasonHuman CloningHuman Development, Language and the Future of MankindHuman EnhancementHuman Evolution, Reproduction, and MoralityHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman NatureHuman NatureHuman Nature and the Limits of ScienceHuman-Built WorldHumanismHumanism, What's That?HumanityHumans, Animals, MachinesHumeHumeHume on Motivation and VirtueHusserlHystoriesI of the VortexI Was WrongIdeas that MatterIdentifying the MindIdentity and Agency in Cultural WorldsIgnorance and ImaginationIllnessImagination and Its PathologiesImagination and the Meaningful BrainImagining NumbersImmortal RemainsImproving Nature?In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of HealthIn Defense of SentimentalityIn Love With LifeIn Praise of Athletic BeautyIn Praise of Natural PhilosophyIn Praise of the WhipIn Pursuit of HappinessIn Search of HappinessIn the Name of GodIn the Name of IdentityIn the Space of ReasonsIn the SwarmIn Two MindsInclusive EthicsIncompatibilism's AllureIndividual Differences in Conscious ExperienceInfinity and PerspectiveInformation ArtsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchIngmar Bergman, Cinematic PhilosopherInhuman ThoughtsInner PresenceInsanityIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntelligent VirtueIntentionIntentionality, Deliberation and AutonomyIntentions and IntentionalityIntentions and IntentionalityInterpreting MindsInterpreting NietzscheIntroducing Greek PhilosophyIntrospection and ConsciousnessIntrospection VindicatedIntuition, Imagination, and Philosophical MethodologyIntuitionismInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIrrationalityIs Academic Feminism Dead?Is It Me or My Meds?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is Oedipus Online?Is Science Neurotic?Is Science Value Free?Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Is There a Duty to Die?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJacques LacanJacques RancièreJacques RanciereJean-Paul SartreJohn McDowellJohn SearleJohn Searle's Ideas About Social RealityJohn Stuart MillJohn Stuart Mill and the Writing of CharacterJoint AttentionJokesJonathan EdwardsJudging and UnderstandingJustice for ChildrenJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeKantKant and MiltonKant and the Fate of AutonomyKant and the Limits of AutonomyKant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral ActionKant on Freedom, Law, and HappinessKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Anatomy of EvilKant's Anatomy of the Intelligent MindKant's Theory of VirtueKarl JaspersKarl PopperKey Concepts in PhilosophyKierkegaardKierkegaard as PhenomenologistKierkegaard's Concept of DespairKierkegaard's MuseKinds of MindsKinds, Things, and StuffKnowing, Knowledge and BeliefsKnowledge MonopoliesKnowledge, Belief, and CharacterKnowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessLacanLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLanguageLanguage in ContextLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Culture, and MindLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw and the BrainLaw, Liberty, and PsychiatryLaws, Mind, and Free WillLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberatory PsychiatryLife and ActionLife at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum, 1857-1997Life Is Not a Game of PerfectLife of the MindLife's FormLife, Death, & MeaningLife, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of UtilityLife, Sex, and IdeasLight in the Dark RoomLike a Splinter in Your MindLiving and Dying WellLiving NarrativeLiving Outside Mental IllnessLiving with DarwinLiving With One’s PastLockeLocke LockeLogic and the Art of Memory Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and LiteratureLooking for SpinozaLooking for The StrangerLost SoulsLOT 2LoveLoveLove's ConfusionsLove's VisionLove, Friendship, and the SelfLove, Sex & TragedyLuckyLudwig WittgensteinLustLyingMachine ConsciousnessMad for FoucaultMad TravelersMade with WordsMadness And Death In PhilosophyMadness and DemocracyMadness at HomeMadness Is CivilizationMaking Natural KnowledgeMaking Sense of EvolutionMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMaking the DSM-5Making the Social WorldMaking TruthMale Female EmailMan, Beast, and ZombieMandated Reporting of Suspected Child AbuseManiaManic Depression and CreativityMapping the Edges and the In-betweenMapping the Future of BiologyMarcus AureliusMaster PassionsMatters of the MindMe++Meaning and Moral OrderMeaning and Value in a Secular AgeMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMeaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and MindMeanings of ArtMeasuring HappinessMeasuring PsychopathologyMedia MadnessMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedicine and Philosophy in Classical AntiquityMedicine of the PersonMedicine, Mental Health, Religion, Science and Well-BeingMelancholy And the Care of the SoulMelancholy and the Otherness of GodMementoMemory and NarrativeMental ActionsMental CausationMental Causation and OntologyMental HealthMental Health At The CrossroadsMental Health Policy in BritainMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMerleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of PhilosophyMetacognition and Theory of MindMetacreationMetaethical SubjectivismMetaethicsMetal and FleshMetaphors of MemoryMetapoliticsMethods in MindMichel FoucaultMill's UtilitarianismMindMindMind and ConsciousnessMind and CosmosMind and MechanismMind GamesMind in a Physical WorldMind in Everyday Life and Cognitive ScienceMind in LifeMind TimeMind's LandscapeMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMind, Brain, and Free WillMind, Reason and ImaginationMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds and PersonsMinds, Brains, and LawMinds, Ethics, and ConditionalsMindshapingMindsightMindworldsMirror, MirrorMixed FeelingsMockingbird YearsModels of the SelfModern Social ImaginariesModern Theories of JusticeModernity and SubjectivityModernity and TechnologyMoody Minds DistemperedMoral BrainsMoral DimensionsMoral FailureMoral ImaginationMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral ParticularismMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology and Human AgencyMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Moral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMotherhoodMotive and RightnessMoving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New PsychiatryMultiple Analogies in Science and PhilosophyMultiple Identities & False MemoriesMusic, Madness, and the Unworking of LanguageMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Double UnveiledMy WayNarrativeNarrative and IdentityNarrative MedicineNarrative PsychiatryNarrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesNatural Ethical FactsNatural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeNatural MindsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveNaturalism and the Human ConditionNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalized BioethicsNaturalizing the MindNatureNature and NarrativeNear Death ExperienceNeither Bad nor MadNeither Victim nor SurvivorNeuro-Philosophy and the Healthy MindNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neurophilosophy at WorkNeurophilosophy of Free WillNeuropoliticsNeuropsychoanalysis in PracticeNeuroscience and PhilosophyNew Essays on the Explanation of ActionNew Philosophy for a New MediaNew Versions of VictimsNew Waves in Philosophy of ActionNietzscheNietzsche and Buddhist PhilosophyNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNietzsche's TherapyNietzsche, Culture and EducationNietzsche: The Man and His PhilosophyNihil UnboundNoir AnxietyNormative EthicsNormativityNorms of NatureNotebooks 1951-1959Notes Toward a Performative Theory of AssemblyNothing So AbsurdOblivionOn AnxietyOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn Being AuthenticOn BeliefOn BetrayalOn BullshitOn DelusionOn DesireOn EmotionsOn HashishOn Human NatureOn Human RightsOn Loving Our EnemiesOn Nature and LanguageOn PersonalityOn ReflectionOn Romantic LoveOn the EmotionsOn the Freud WatchOn the Government of the LivingOn the Human ConditionOn the InternetOn the Meaning of LifeOn the Philosophy of LawOn the Pragmatics of CommunicationOn the Punitive SocietyOn TruthOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne Hundred DaysOnflowOnly a Promise of HappinessOntology of ConsciousnessOpen MindedOpen Your EyesOrgans without BodiesOther MindsOur Last Great IllusionOur Own MindsOur Posthuman FutureOur StoriesOut of Its MindOut of Our HeadsOxford Guide to the MindOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Studies in Normative EthicsOxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPanic DisorderPanpsychismPanpsychism in the WestPartialityPassionate EnginesPassionate EnginesPathologies of BeliefPathologies of ReasonPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perceiving the WorldPerception & CognitionPerception and Basic BeliefsPerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPerceptual ExperiencePerfecting VirtuePerplexities of ConsciousnessPersistencePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal IdentityPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonal Identity and Fractured SelvesPersonhood and Health CarePersonsPersons and BodiesPersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPersons, Souls and DeathPerspectives on ImitationPerspectives on PragmatismPessimismPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenal ConsciousnessPhenomenal IntentionalityPhenomenology and ExistentialismPhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophersPhilosophers on MusicPhilosophers without GodsPhilosophical CounselingPhilosophical Counselling and the UnconsciousPhilosophical DevicesPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical History and the Problem of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in Psychiatry IIPhilosophical MethodologyPhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophical Myths of the FallPhilosophical Perspectives on DepictionPhilosophical Perspectives on Technology and PsychiatryPhilosophical PracticePhilosophical Reflections on DisabilityPhilosophizing About Sex Philosophizing the EverydayPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy and LivingPhilosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy and PsychotherapyPhilosophy and Science FictionPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CulturePhilosophy and the Moving ImagePhilosophy and the NeurosciencesPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy As FictionPhilosophy BitesPhilosophy Bites BackPhilosophy for Counselling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy for LifePhilosophy in a New CenturyPhilosophy in an Age of SciencePhilosophy in Children's LiteraturePhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BodyPhilosophy of Film and Motion PicturesPhilosophy of LovePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and MarriagePhilosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionPhilosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple PersonalityPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Public HealthPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhilosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophy on TapPhilosophy PracticePhilosophy the Day after TomorrowPhilosophy's Role in Counseling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhilosophy, Politics, DemocracyPhotography and PhilosophyPhysical RealizationPhysicalism and Its DiscontentsPhysicalism and Mental CausationPhysicalism, or Something Near EnoughPhysician-Assisted DyingPillar of SaltPin-up GrrrlsPlant MindsPlatoPlatoPlato, Not Prozac!Platonic Ethics, Old and NewPluralistic CasuistryPolarities of ExperiencesPolitical EmotionsPopper, Objectivity and the Growth of KnowledgePornPorn StudiesPornography, Sex, and FeminismPortrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young ManPostcolonial DisordersPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPower and the SelfPower SplitPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical ConflictsPractical Identity and Narrative AgencyPractical PhilosophyPractical RulesPractical Tortoise RaisingPractically ProfoundPracticing Feminist Ethics in PsychologyPragmatic BioethicsPragmatismPragmatism, Old And NewPraise and BlamePredicative MindsPreferences and Well-BeingPrescriptions for the MindPresocraticsPrimary and Secondary QualitiesPrimates and PhilosophersPrivacyPrivileged AccessProblems in MindProblems of RationalityProzac As a Way of LifeProzac BacklashProzac on the CouchPsyche and SomaPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric Cultures ComparedPsychiatric Diagnosis and ClassificationPsychiatric EthicsPsychiatric HegemonyPsychiatric PowerPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry and Philosophy of SciencePsychiatry and ReligionPsychiatry as a Human SciencePsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry in SocietyPsychiatry in the New MilleniumPsychiatry in the Scientific ImagePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsycho-Physical Dualism TodayPsychoanalysis and Narrative MedicinePsychoanalysis and the Philosophy of SciencePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and PhilosophyPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology, Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of Human RelationshipsPsychotherapy and ConfidentialityPsychotherapy As PraxisPublic PhilosophyPunishmentPure ImmanencePurple HazePursuing MeaningQuality of Life and Human DifferenceQueer PhilosophyQuestions for FreudQuestions for FreudQuine and Davidson on Language, Thought and RealityRaceRace in Contemporary MedicineRadiant CoolRadical AlterityRadical ExternalismRadical HopeRational and Social AgencyRational CausationRational Choice in an Uncertain WorldRationality + Consciousness = Free WillRationality and FreedomRationality and the Reflective MindRationality in ActionRawls, Dewey, and ConstructivismRe-creating MedicineRe-EmergenceRe-Engineering Philosophy for Limited BeingsReading AutobiographyReading Bernard WilliamsReading SartreReadings in the Philosophy of TechnologyReal MaterialismReal Natures and Familiar ObjectsReal ScienceRealism in ActionReason & EmancipationReason in ActionReason in PhilosophyReason's GriefReasonably ViciousReasoning About Rational AgentsReasoning in Biological DiscoveriesReasons from WithinReasons without RationalismReclaiming CognitionReclaiming the SoulReconceiving SchizophreniaReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecreative MindsRediscovering EmotionRediscovering EmpathyReference and ExistenceReference and the Rational MindReflections On How We LiveReframing Disease ContextuallyRefusing CareRegulating SexReinventing the SoulRelativism and Human RightsRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyReliable ReasoningReligion without GodRelying on OthersRemembering HomeResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility from the MarginsRestraining RageRethinking ExpertiseRethinking IntrospectionRethinking Mental Health and DisorderRethinking RapeRethinking the DSMRethinking the Sociology of Mental HealthRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfReturn to ReasonRevolt, She SaidRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard Rorty's New PragmatismRightsRights, Democracy, and Fulfillment in the Era of Identity PoliticsRise And Fall of Soul And SelfRitalin NationRobert NozickRousseauRousseau and the Dilemmas of Modernity Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on DeconstructionRules, Reason, and Self-KnowledgeSaints, Scholars, and Schizophrenics: Mental Illness in Rural IrelandSartreSartreSartreSartre in Search of an EthicsSatisficing and MaximizingSaving GodScandalous KnowledgeSchizophreniaSchizophrenia and the Fate of the SelfSchizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion?SchopenhauerSchopenhauer's TelescopeScienceScience and EthicsScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologyScience and SpiritualityScience and the Pursuit of WisdomScience Fiction and PhilosophyScience Fiction and PhilosophyScience in Civil SocietyScience in DemocracyScience RulesScience WarsScience, Consciousness and Ultimate RealityScience, Policy, and the Value-Free IdealSciences from BelowScientific EvidenceScientific IrrationalismScientific PerspectivismScientific PluralismScientific Realism and the Rationality of ScienceScratching the Surface of BioethicsSecond NatureSecond OpinionsSecond PhilosophySecrets of the MindSecular Philosophy and the Religious TemperamentSecurity, Territory, PopulationSeeing and VisualizingSeeing DoubleSeeing Fictions in FilmSeeing RedSeeing Wittgenstein AnewSeeing, Doing, And KnowingSelfSelf and OtherSelf and SubjectivitySelf, No Self?Self-ConsciousnessSelf-ConstitutionSelf-ExpressionSelf-FulfillmentSelf-Knowledge and ResentmentSelf-Knowledge and Self-DeceptionSelf-Made MadnessSelf-Reference and Self-AwarenessSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessSelvesSentimental RulesSexing the BodySexualized BrainsShades of LonelinessShame and GuiltShame and NecessityShame and PhilosophyShop Class as SoulcraftShynessSigns, Mind, And RealitySimone de BeauvoirSimple MindednessSimulating MindsSimulation and SimilaritySinging in the FireSisyphus's BoulderSituating SemanticsSix Questions of SocratesSkeptical FeminismSkepticismSketch for a Theory of the EmotionsSleeping With Extra-TerrestrialsSlothSocial EpistemologySocial PhenomenologySocializing MetaphysicsSociological Perspectives on the New GeneticsSocratesSocrates CafeSocrates in LoveSocratic Moral PsychologySoft SubversionsSoren KierkegaardSorting Things OutSoul Made FleshSound SentimentsSovereign VirtueSpeaking My MindSpinozaSpinoza and Deep EcologySpinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good LifeSpinoza on MonismSpirits and ClocksSplit DecisionsStich and His CriticsSticks and StonesStiffedStoicismStoicismStoicismStoicism and EmotionStories MatterStranger from AbroadStrong FeelingsStructures of AgencySubjectivity and Being SomebodySubjectivity and OthernessSubjectivity and SelfhoodSubjectivity and SelfhoodSuffering, Death, and IdentitySupersizing the MindSurprise, Uncertainty, and Mental StructuresSurrealist Painters and PoetsSurviving DeathSurviving HitlerSweet DreamsSynaptic SelfSynesthesia : A Union of the SensesSzasz Under FireTaking ActionTaking the Red PillTaking Wittgenstein at His WordTalking Back to PsychiatryTalking Cures and Placebo EffectsTalking to Our SelvesTalking with SartreTaming AngerTeach Yourself PostmodernismTechnology and the Good Life?Teleological RealismTen Years of Viewing from WithinTerrence MalickThe Act of ThinkingThe Activity of BeingThe Aesthetic MindThe Aesthetics of DisappearanceThe Age of GeniusThe Age of InsanityThe Altruism EquationThe Altruistic BrainThe American ParadoxThe Anti-Oedipus PapersThe Antidepressant EraThe Anxieties of AffluenceThe Art of Adolf WolfliThe Art of LivingThe Art of LivingThe Asymmetrical BrainThe Autonomy of MoralityThe Bakhtin CircleThe Beginning of PhilosophyThe Beginnings of Western ScienceThe Belief InstinctThe Beloved SelfThe Bifurcation of the SelfThe Big Book of ConceptsThe Biology and Psychology of Moral AgencyThe Birth of BiopoliticsThe Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of ScienceThe Blank SlateThe Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of MedicineThe Bodhisattva's BrainThe Body ReaderThe Body/Body ProblemThe Bounds of AgencyThe Bounds of CognitionThe Brain and the Meaning of LifeThe Caldron of ConsciousnessThe Cambridge Companion to AdornoThe Cambridge Companion to AtheismThe Cambridge Companion to BerkeleyThe Cambridge Companion to DeweyThe Cambridge Companion to Feminism in PhilosophyThe Cambridge Companion to LacanThe Cambridge Companion to Life and DeathThe Cambridge Companion to Plato's RepublicThe Cambridge Companion to QuineThe Cambridge Companion to Science and ReligionThe Cambridge Companion to Simone de BeauvoirThe Cambridge Companion to SocratesThe Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyThe Cambridge Companion to the StoicsThe Cambridge Introduction to Michel FoucaultThe Cambridge Medical Ethics WorkbookThe Cambridge Textbook of BioethicsThe Case against Assisted SuicideThe Case for HumanismThe Case for Pragmatic PsychologyThe Case of the Female OrgasmThe Certainty of UncertaintyThe Challenge of ThingsThe Character of ConsciousnessThe Clinical and Forensic Assessment of PsychopathyThe Cognitive Basis of ScienceThe Cognitive Neuroscience of ConsciousnessThe Cognitive Science of ScienceThe Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual InvestigationsThe Concept of the Gene in Development and EvolutionThe Concepts of PsychiatryThe Conceptual Evolution of DSM-5The Condition of MadnessThe Conscious BrainThe Conscious MindThe Conscious SelfThe Consolation of PhilosophyThe Consolations of PhilosophyThe Constitution of AgencyThe Constitution of SelvesThe Construction of Human KindsThe Construction of Power and Authority in PsychiatryThe Continuum Companion to Kant The Courage of TruthThe Creation of PsychopharmacologyThe Creation of the Modern WorldThe Crucible of ConsciousnessThe Crucible of ExperienceThe Cultural Context of Health, Illness, and MedicineThe Cultural Origins of Human CognitionThe Culture of Our DiscontentThe Death of PsychotherapyThe Delay of the HeartThe Deleuze ConnectionsThe Disappearance of the Social in American Social PsychologyThe Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New RepublicThe Disordered MindThe Dissolution of MindThe Domain of ReasonsThe Domestication of LanguageThe Dream DrugstoreThe Early Modern SubjectThe Ecstasy of CommunicationThe Ego TunnelThe Emergence of SexualityThe Emotional BrainThe Emotional Construction of MoralsThe EmotionsThe EmotionsThe Empathy GapThe Empire of TraumaThe Empirical StanceThe Engaged IntellectThe Enigma of HealthThe Erotic PhenomenonThe Essential William JamesThe Ethical BrainThe Ethical Dimensions of the Biological and Health SciencesThe Ethical WayThe Ethics of Human CloningThe Ethics of Human EnhancementThe Ethics of IdentityThe Ethics of PsychoanalysisThe Ethics of SufferingThe Ethics of the Family in SenecaThe Ethics of the LieThe Evolution of Agency and Other EssaysThe Evolution of LanguageThe Evolution of MoralityThe Evolution of the Private Language ArgumentThe Evolved ApprenticeThe ExistentialistsThe Explanation of Social ActionThe Extended MindThe Extinction of DesireThe Fate of KnowledgeThe Feeling BodyThe Feeling of What HappensThe Form of Practical KnowledgeThe Fountain of YouthThe Freud WarsThe Future for PhilosophyThe Future of Human NatureThe God DebatesThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Greeks and the IrrationalThe Healing VirtuesThe Heart & Soul of ChangeThe Heart of William JamesThe History of Human RightsThe Human AnimalThe Hungry SoulThe Hypomanic EdgeThe Idea of the SelfThe Illusion of Conscious WillThe Illusion of Freedom and EqualityThe Imagery DebateThe Importance of Being UnderstoodThe Imprinted BrainThe Improbability of GodThe Inessential IndexicalThe Infidel and the ProfessorThe Innate MindThe Innate Mind: Volume 3The Intentional BrainThe Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of FreedomThe Knotted SubjectThe Language of GodThe Language of ThoughtThe Last PhysicianThe Legacy of John RawlsThe Limits and Lies of Human Genetic ResearchThe Limits of Autobiography The Limits of MedicineThe Logic of AffectThe Loss of SadnessThe Lost Art of HappinessThe Madness of Adam and EveThe Madonna of the FutureThe Making of a PhilosopherThe Making of Friedrich NietzscheThe Making of the Modern SelfThe Man Who Wasn't ThereThe Mark of the BeastThe Matrix and PhilosophyThe Matter of the MindThe Matter of the MindThe Meaning of AddictionThe Meaning of DisgustThe Meaning of FriendshipThe Meaning of MindThe Meaning of the BodyThe Meaning of the BodyThe Measure of MadnessThe Measure of MindThe Medicalization of Everyday LifeThe Medicalization of SocietyThe Meme MachineThe Metaphor of Mental IllnessThe Metaphysical ClubThe Metaphysics of CapitalThe Metaphysics of ScienceThe Metaphysics of Scientific RealismThe Mind and its DiscontentsThe Mind Doesn't Work That WayThe Mind Has MountainsThe Mind in NatureThe Mind IncarnateThe Mind's ProvisionsThe Mind, the Body and the WorldThe MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive SciencesThe Moral Challenge of Alzheimer DiseaseThe Moral Demands of MemoryThe Moral Psychology HandbookThe Most Human HumanThe Most Solitary of AfflictionsThe Multiple Realization BookThe Mystery of ExistenceThe Myth of an AfterlifeThe Myth of Digital DemocracyThe Myth of PainThe Nature and Future of PhilosophyThe Nature and Structure of ContentThe Nature of ConsciousnessThe Nature of DignityThe Nature of IntelligenceThe Nature of LifeThe Nature of MelancholyThe Nature of NormativityThe Nature of Sexual DesireThe Nature of the MindThe Nature of the SelfThe Necessity Of MadnessThe Neuron and the MindThe New AtheismThe New Disability HistoryThe New Idea of a UniversityThe New IntuitionismThe New PhrenologyThe New PragmatismThe New Rational TherapyThe New Science of the MindThe Nietzschean SelfThe Origin of Consciousness in the Social WorldThe Other Bishop BerkeleyThe Overman in the MarketplaceThe Oxford Companion to the MindThe Oxford Handbook of Free WillThe Oxford Handbook of HumeThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and PsychiatryThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of BiologyThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of DeathThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of EmotionThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of MindThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of PerceptionThe Oxford Handbook of RationalityThe Oxford Handbook of the SelfThe Paradox of Self ConsciousnessThe Parallax ViewThe Paranormal and the Politics of TruthThe Phenomenology ReaderThe Philosopher's "I"The Philosopher's Autobiography The Philosopher's Secret FireThe Philosophical BabyThe Philosophical Breakfast ClubThe Philosophical Foundations of Modern MedicineThe Philosophical IThe Philosophical ParentThe Philosophical PractitionerThe Philosophy of Andy WarholThe Philosophy of Animal MindsThe Philosophy of Animal MindsThe Philosophy of CreativityThe Philosophy of DeathThe Philosophy of DeceptionThe Philosophy of Elizabeth AnscombeThe Philosophy of ExpertiseThe Philosophy of Food The Philosophy of Free WillThe Philosophy of HeideggerThe Philosophy of InformationThe Philosophy of LawThe Philosophy of LivingThe Philosophy of Merleau-PontyThe Philosophy of Motion PicturesThe Philosophy of NeedThe Philosophy of PhilosophyThe Philosophy of PsychiatryThe Philosophy of PsychologyThe Philosophy of ReligionThe Philosophy of SartreThe Philosophy of Science and Technology StudiesThe Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary ReadingsThe Philosophy of William JamesThe Philosophy of WineThe Physics of ConsciousnessThe Physiology of TruthThe Pleasure CenterThe Pleasure's All MineThe Plural SelfThe Politics of AgencyThe Politics of HappinessThe Politics of PersonsThe Portfolio and the DiagramThe Postnational SelfThe Poverty of Radical OrthodoxyThe Power of FeelingsThe Practice of Everyday LifeThe Practices of the SelfThe Presence of MindThe Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday LifeThe Primacy of the SubjectiveThe Prism of GrammarThe Private Life of the BrainThe Problem of PunishmentThe Problem of the SoulThe Prosthetic ImpulseThe Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the Conscious BrainThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of HappinessThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe PsychopathThe Pursuit of PerfectionThe Pursuit of UnhappinessThe Race for ConsciousnessThe Rational AnimalThe Rational ImaginationThe Really Hard ProblemThe Reasons of LoveThe Red and the RealThe Relevance of Philosophy to LifeThe Representational and the PresentationalThe Revolt of the PrimitiveThe Right to Refuse Mental Health TreatmentThe Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial ModelThe Rise of the Conservative Legal MovementThe Robot's RebellionThe Roman StoicsThe Routledge Companion to Free WillThe Routledge Companion to PhenomenologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-BeingThe RoutledgeFalmer Reader In The Philosophy Of Education The Rules of InsanityThe Schopenhauer CureThe Science MythThe Science of AddictionThe Science of Self-ControlThe Search for MeaningThe Second-Person StandpointThe SecretThe Secret History of EmotionThe SelfThe Self and Its EmotionsThe Self AwakenedThe Self-Organizing Social MindThe Self?The Selfish Gene PhilosophyThe Shattered SelfThe Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of PhilosophyThe Shortest ShadowThe Significance of ConsciousnessThe Silent World of Doctor and PatientThe Simpsons and PhilosophyThe Situated SelfThe Sleep of ReasonThe Social Construction of What?The Social Nature of Mental IllnessThe Solitary SelfThe Soul at WorkThe Soul Knows No BarsThe Spinoza ProblemThe Stoic Art of LivingThe Stoics On Determinism And CompatibilismThe Structure of ThinkingThe Struggle against DogmatismThe Subject's Point of ViewThe Subjective SelfThe Sublime Object of PsychiatryThe Subtlety of EmotionsThe Talking CureThe Tears of ThingsThe Therapy for the SaneThe Therapy of DesireThe Things We Do and Why We Do ThemThe Toothpaste of ImmortalityThe Transformation of PsychologyThe Transhumanist ReaderThe Trolley Problem MysteriesThe Turing TestThe Uncertain SciencesThe Undiscovered WittgensteinThe Unity of ConsciousnessThe Uses of PessimismThe Varieties of Religious ExperienceThe Vehement PassionsThe View from WithinThe Virtues of FreedomThe Virtues of HappinessThe Volitional BrainThe Wages of SinThe Web of LifeThe Whole ChildThe Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the MonsterThe Wing of MadnessThe Wonder of ConsciousnessThe Work of MourningThe Works of AgencyThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the WorldThe World of PerceptionThe World of PerversionTheoretical Issues in Psychology: An IntroductionTheories of Human NatureTheory and RealityTheory of MindTherapeutic ActionThere is No Such Thing as a Social ScienceThere's Something About Mary Things and PlacesThinking About FeelingThinking about Free WillThinking and SeeingThinking for CliniciansThinking for CliniciansThinking of AnswersThinking through the BodyThinking TwiceThinking with WhiteheadThis is Madness TooThomas KuhnThomas KuhnThomas Kuhn's ""Linguistic Turn"" and the Legacy of Logical EmpiricismThought in a Hostile WorldThought in ActionThought's FootingThreads of LifeThree Faces of DesireThrough the Looking GlassTime and IdentityTo Have Or To Be?TolerationTortured SubjectsTowards a Science of Consciousness IIITowards Non-BeingTraumaTrauma, Truth and ReconciliationTrue to LifeTrue to Our FeelingsTrusting on the EdgeTrusting the Subject?Truth & PredicationTruth and Truth-MakingTruth and TruthfulnessTruth as One and ManyTuringTwo Great Problems of LearningTwo Regimes of MadnessUgly FeelingsUmbr(a)Unconscious knowing and other essays in psycho-philosophical analysisUnderstanding EmotionsUnderstanding EvilUnderstanding Kant's EthicsUnderstanding LoveUnderstanding MarriageUnderstanding Moral ObligationUnderstanding PeopleUnderstanding Phenomenal Consciousness Undoing GenderUnifying HinduismUniversitiesUnlearning or 'How NOT to Be Governed?'Unnatural SelectionUnprincipled VirtueUnsanctifying Human Life: Essays on EthicsUnto OthersUpheavals of ThoughtUsers and Abusers of PsychiatryValue-Free Science?Values and Psychiatric DiagnosisVarieties of Anomalous ExperienceVarieties of MeaningVarieties of Practical ReasoningViolence Against WomenViolence and the BodyVirtue, Rules, and JusticeVirtue, Vice, and PersonalityVirtues and Their VicesVirtues of ThoughtVision and BrainVision and MindVision's InvisiblesVisual CultureVital NourishmentVulnerability, Autonomy, and Applied EthicsW. K. Clifford and "The Ethics of Belief"Waking LifeWandering SignificanceWays of KnowingWeakness of Will and Practical IrrationalityWeakness of Will from Plato to the PresentWeakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation ThoughtWelfare and Rational CareWhat Are We?What Art IsWhat Emotions Really AreWhat Good Are the Arts?What If Medicine Disappeared?What Is a Human?What Is an Emotion: Classic and Contemporary ReadingsWhat Is Good and WhyWhat Is Medicine?What is Mental Disorder?What Is Posthumanism?What Is Secular Humanism?What Is the Good Life?What is the Self?What Is This Thing Called Happiness?What Is Thought?What Makes Us Think?What Nietzsche Really SaidWhat Should I Believe?What Should I Do?What We Owe to Each OtherWhat Would Aristotle Do?What's Good on TVWhat's Wrong with Children's RightsWhat's Wrong With Science?When Self-Consciousness BreaksWhere Biology Meets PsychologyWhere the Action IsWhere the Roots Reach for WaterWhispers from the EastWho Rules in ScienceWho Was Jacques Derrida?Who's in Charge?Whose Freud?Why Everyone (Else) Is a HypocriteWhy God Won't Go AwayWhy Read Mill Today?Why the Mind is Not a ComputerWhy Things Matter to PeopleWhy Think?Why Think? Why Truth MattersWhy We DanceWider than the SkyWilliam Blake on Self and SoulWilliam James at the BoundariesWilliam James on Ethics and FaithWilling, Wanting, WaitingWisdom Won from IllnessWisdom, Intuition and EthicsWise TherapyWitchcrazeWithin ReasonWithout ConscienceWittgensteinWittgenstein and Approaches To ClarityWittgenstein And PsychologyWittgenstein and PsychotherapyWittgenstein on Freud and FrazerWittgenstein Reads FreudWittgenstein Reads WeiningerWomen, Body, IllnessWomen, Madness and MedicineWords and ImagesWorld, Affectivity, TraumaWritten in the FleshYoga - Philosophy for EveryoneYour Drug May Be Your ProblemZizekZombies and Consciousness
The handbook under review collects thirty original papers divided in six parts ranging from the definition of emotion, through the history of philosophy of emotion, analyses of its relation with practical reason and with the self to the role of emotion in morality and arts (for a full content see  at the end of the review).
The primary expertise of authors is philosophy, but some of them hold positions at departments of psychology, psychiatry, law, medicine, and psychopathology. As it is explained by the editor in his Introduction "[t]he emotions are messier, seeming somehow to be represented on both sides of the mind-body divide - both paradigmatically mental and paradigmatically bodily" (p. 1). This is an important point to be kept in mind because the ambition of the collection is to supply a broader view. The rationale of the book, and especially of its division into the six parts, corresponds to reasons lying at the origin of the "dramatic change in philosophical interest in the emotions" (p. 2) that has taken place during the last decades. They are, mainly, an increasing interest of philosophers of mind in empirical work, "an increasing awareness on the part of philosophy of the importance of emotion in practical reason", "a change in the landscape of philosophical ethics" where "the importance of emotion [...] began to be properly appreciated" (pp. 2-3), and the importance of emotion as it is shown by philosophical aesthetics: music, literature, film, theatre, and plastic arts.
The volume, as it is, contains papers varying in character: whereas some are presenting status quaestionis in a general and approachable way, others are more analytical. Some authors are exposing their own research or even a theory, others deal with an account of discussions of an issue. This also concerns the format of papers: the shortest one is a 12-page one, nearly three times as shorter as the longest one. While some papers provide a long, even 4- or 5-page bibliography, others have no bibliography at all.
(1) John Deigh's paper deals with the dichotomy of emotion understood as feeling and affective state on the one hand and as cognitive state and centered on thought on the other. Deigh refers to James' attack on an earlier empiricist view that emotions are either simple or complex sensations or impressions (in both cases emotions can be abstracted from their causes and effects). James is historically important but his position does not fit in with the fact that there are - according to Freud - unconscious or repressed feelings. Deigh claims that bodily feelings (sensations) should be therefore marked off from emotions which are about something and are intentional: "what it is about, is determined by the evaluative judgment it contains" (pp. 25-26). With such a tenet a cognitive approach to emotions emerges (emotions are "evaluative judgments of a certain kind", p. 26), a formula that reminds an old Stoic approach for which emotions are (false) judgments of value. But this, in turn, is exposed to an objection that some emotions arise when an appropriate judgment is lacking (this is the case of recalcitrant emotions, an example being often referred to is a fear felt by a person looking down from a precipice when staying in a safe place). In his further discussion of the nature of emotion Deigh first gives an account of a reformed cognitivist view (an evaluative judgment can be a perception), then the criticism of this position (relating to emotions of beasts and babies) and defense, next, the neuroscience's approach in whose view emotions are essentially feelings. The position called neo-Jamesian is the following: "the feelings of bodily changes in which an emotion consists are intentional phenomena" (p. 32). Deigh ends with Goldie's proposal for whom feelings are "an essential element of the experience of emotion", but not to be identified with feelings of bodily changes (p. 37). An experience of an emotion is "an intentional state that consists in part in feelings toward the emotion's object" (p. 37).
(2) Aaron Ben-Ze'ev presents his own theory of what an emotion is. In his view emotions "are probably the most complex mental phenomena (p. 41). As it is difficult to find features allowing for a clear-cut delimitation of what emotions are, Ben-Ze'ev's method is to use "prototype categories", that is criteria which constitute "the sufficient and necessary conditions for membership" (p. 42). The advantage of the method is that it is possible to include phenomena being more or less typically emotions. The list of fundamental emotional features includes: instability, intensity, partiality, duration to which Ben Ze'ev adds basic components such as: cognition, evaluation, motivation and feelings ("[t]he difference between typical characteristics and basic components is that characteristics are properties of the whole emotional experience, whereas components express a conceptual division of the elements of this experience", p. 47). Moreover, for a fuller account Ben Ze'ev introduces two other factors (change as typical emotional cause and personal concern as typical emotions concern). Ben Ze'ev insists on distinguishing the evaluative component of the emotions from the moral evaluation of the entire state. He also discusses emotional intensity, then makes some remarks on the affective realm which includes sentiments, moods, affective traits, and affective disorders. In the second part of the paper Ben-Ze'ev touches on emotions considered as general mental mode. Since they are the most complex, comprehensive and dynamic of all mental modes, "no single mental element can adequately define emotions" (p. 56). Ze'ev goes on with, among others, looking at relation between feeling and thinking noticing that they are sometimes associated, sometimes not. Finally, he acknowledges that emotion "is a part of a greater affective realm, which also includes sentiments, moods, affective traits, and affective disorders" (p. 61).
(3) Roddy Cowie points to the role emotions plays in people's lives. Since there is a rich material to use, Cowie chooses to rely on "research on 'emotion-oriented computing" (p. 64). This area can be helpful in optimizing everyday description and language, which is an important task especially because the term 'emotion' is ambiguous and has inclusive as well as exclusive senses (narrow and broad meanings of the term). Cowie describes individual parts of emotional life which depends on several units (such as segment, emergent emotion, established emotion or emotional episode). Emotion can be described also in terms of dimension. Three of them are standard (positive or negative valence, strength and potency, i.e. power to deal with relevant events). Less frequent dimensions are unpredictability, engagement, andintensity. Emotion should be considered also as tied up with feeling, appraisal, action tendency, and expression. Cowie looks for a set of global conditions which cover "the whole of emotional life", the task being at the stage of the project. He underlines also the existing gap between the dynamic nature of emotion and the static nature of its description - "an optimized descriptive system needs to include ways of describing key processes as well as states" (p. 89).
(4) Ronald de Sousa touches on interaction between science and philosophy. According to him philosophers of emotions have been in contradiction one with another, whereas science finds firm empirical facts. De Sousa's explanation to clarify the role of emotions in motivation and behaviour is that of a "two-track mind" ("our behaviour derives from two relatively independent processing systems with different evolutionary origins in the brain", p. 96). After setting arguments against phenomenology (e.g. not all mental phenomena, including emotions, are accessible to consciousness), de Sousa passes on to the model of a two-track mind (which explains also the co-existence of both the intuitive and the analytic type of processes) and discusses two illustrative puzzles: the limits of free will (focusing on the idea of a will as such) and of imagination. Then he points to the question of separability of cognitive and emotional responses. This is exactly the case of a psychopath who can calculate and reason correctly and even arrives at correct moral judgments but does not act appropriately. Evidence provided by psychiatry shows that "[a] brain lesion in the area responsible for controlling emotional response made subjects more "rational"" (p. 112). Therefore, it can be the case that emotions are responsible for authentically moral acts. However, if we do not grasp emotions, free will or motivation in satisfactory way, it is not because "we are puppets of determinism but because the mechanism involved are just too complicated" (p. 113).
(5) A. W. Price starts by remarking that according to Greeks emotions are not just intentional but rather propositional. They contain a propositional core, e.g. 'being angry' means 'being angry that x'. Price examines passages from earlier dialogues and then passes to the Republic where a tripartition of the soul displays a separate and important role of emotions. Later on, Plato gave up tripartition, and thumos (which corresponded to the emotive part of the soul) is considered more broadly. In the Laws, Plato draws a new image: "[o]ur affections are like sinews or cords pulling against one another" (p. 127). Emotions are closer to reason than appetite. Aristotle developed a path opened by Plato and treated emotions systematically in the way that in the Rhetoric he conveys a definition of what emotions are and accounts for several emotions. In two Ethics, the definition of emotion is developed ('things that are accompanied by pleasure or pain' or: 'things that, as such, are accompanied for the most part by perceptual pleasure and pain', p. 133). Price emphasizes "the role of imagination in feeling emotions" (p. 136) and the spontaneity of emotional beliefs which need not be contrary to reason. In Aristotle "deliberation is a process of calculation and reflection" (p. 137), but since selection of deliberation and of action relies on the agent's perception of his situation, on his being attracted and repelled, "[t]he practical eye is the eye of the heart, not just of the head' (p. 137). For this reason in Aristotle ethical education has much to do with education of emotions. Although Aristotle differentiates emotions (e.g. anger from hatred), his general approach is comprehensive, including several kinds of emotions: "he prefers a determinable definition that applies to a wide range of affections that are heterogeneous" (p. 140).
(6) Christopher Gill analyses two Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism and Epicureanism, of which the former has much more to say about emotions. By many features the Stoic view is akin to the contemporary interest in cognitive theories of emotions. Gill presents Stoic and Epicurean views on emotions as related to human psychology, human physiology, natural functioning and value and, finally, to interpersonal or social relations. As to the Stoic theory of emotion, "we rely on latter ancient summaries of doctrine" (p. 145), which means that we often deal with an interpretation. The general point in the Stoics is to know whether an emotion, which is an assent to an impulse, is rational or irrational. In the latter case we deal with negative emotions (pathe tout court), in the former with good emotions (eupatheiai). Since most emotions follow an irrational belief, they are generally regarded as negative, harmful and to be eradicated. But this is not to be taken too literally: good emotions - which are ascribed to a wise person - "reflect correct valuations and express positive attitudes towards virtue" (p. 151). As to the Epicureans, evidences for their view of emotions are even scarcer. In Gill's opinion "the Epicurean view of emotions is revisionist, as compared with conventional ideas" (p. 155). It complies with their explanation of human physiology and physical dimension of human psychology, that is, with their atomic account of nature: "individual human beings are supposed to have certain emotional tendencies or predispositions according to their atomic make-up" (p. 157). Since human beings can modify them, they are held responsible for their emotions. Epicurus made several classifications of emotions (natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, neither natural nor necessary). The letter by Epicurus, written at his agony, testifies how different-order emotions can counterbalance one another: joy in his mind is not hampered by his extreme physical pain.
(7) Peter King encapsulates the Middle Ages' theories of emotions. Although several accounts of emotions have been proposed and no single theory dominated during this period, a sort of consensus can be made: emotions are "cognitively penetrable and somatic" (p. 167). Theories of the Middle Ages focused mainly on delight, anger, distress, and fear, but they too were interested in drives or urges, as well as in moods. The views King presents are those of Augustine (who adopted Stoic terminology but rejected their idea of a total extirpation of emotions, since some emotions, i.e. compassion, love of enemies, anger at sinners, fear of God etc. are essential to Christian way of life; they are therefore Christian emotions and include willing or are kinds of willing), then of Anselm (emotions are one kind of motivation, the second being moral concern) and Abelard (emotions have motivational force which, when confirmed by an assent, "generate an intention to act in a certain way", p. 173), Jean de la Rochelle (whose interest was in systematic and taxonomic classification and who developed a distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible emotions made first by Phillip the Chancellor), Aquinas who by his systematic treatise eclipsed his predecessors (Aquinas distinguished eleven main emotions, six concupiscible plus five irascible, and treated the issue in detail, e.g. he observed that the same objet can produce different emotions which means that the object is the same really but different formally (intensionally)), Scotus and Ockham (some emotions are actions of the will, not mere passions of the will; for Scotus emotions are a feature of intellective as well as of sensitive appetite, for Ockham 'passive' emotions are the causal by-products of 'active' emotions of the will)), and Suarez (who erased the distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible emotions since they are only two different functions of the emotions).
(8) Kate Abramson looks into 17th-century sentimentalist philosophy. She intends to undermine the anthropologist distinction between "guilt-centered" and "shame-centered" cultures. In order to do so, she takes contempt, shame and disdain as her evidence cases. After presenting objections against contempt (mainly Kant's), she shows that contempt as well as shame does not have to have a total character: you can hold a person in contempt because of one particular aspect which is not relevant to the person qua person. An alternative Abramson suggests is to look at contempt, shame and disdain as focused "on some particular feature" (p. 198) rather than on the whole ("that liar" not as a person as such). A globalizing approach should be distinguished from the psychological possibility of localized contempt or shame. Abramson insists on distinguishing "bearing attitude x toward a person on account of some feature of their character or conduct" and "bearing attitude x toward some particular feature of a person's character or conduct" (p. 200). She agrees that contempt is typically character-focused rather than action-focused, but character is to be considered in aspects more than globally. Another argument for aspect-focused model is that one can experience different feelings towards the same person: anger and contempt for the same person but anger because of one thing while contempt because of another thing. Abramson ends with pointing out that localized contempt, shame or disdain are corollary of the mixed nature of person's characters, the fact which the sentimentalists were well aware of.
(9) Anthony Hatzimoysis examines emotions in phenomenology. There is a good ground for doing this since "[p]henomenology has done more than any other school of thought for bringing emotions to the forefront of philosophical enquiry" (p. 215). Two major figures chosen among many others are Heidegger and Sartre. As to Heidegger we do not meet Gefühl and Affekt frequently in his works. Heidegger uses mostly Stimmung, which can be rendered by 'mood' or 'attunement'. The main illustration of mood Heidegger conveys is fear, in other authors "a paradigmatic case of emotion" (p. 237). The central claim Heidegger makes is that "unless we approach a thing with a certain Stimmung, the thing will not reveal itself to us as it really is" (p. 218), which is not to be confused with a claim that "in seeing or intuiting something, we (simultaneously) experience certain feelings or passions" (p. 218). The acquirement of the awareness of being-in-the-world is enabled by an experience which is affective by nature: as a matter of fact "emotions disclose Dasein to itself as being-in-the-world, in a pre-reflective etc. manner" (p. 223). Although the intellectual fortitude of Sartre is shallower than Heidegger's, Hatzimoysis recognizes that Sartre proves to be "crucial in all subsequent discussions of emotion" (p. 224). According to Hatzimoysis Sartre didn't claim that emotions are actions (this is a catch phrase stemming from inaccurate and selective readings). For Sartre the main problem is to approach psychic phenomena as such because emotions do not exist in isolation but are embedded in human nature and the world. For this reason it would be more adequate to speak about an emotional episode, of which emotion is the main constituent but not the only one. On the whole, Sartre's stance reminds that of Heidegger: for "'[e]motion is a specific way of apprehending the world'" (p. 234).
(10) Louis C. Charland's paper has much to do with non English-writing philosophers, often "ignored in the Anglo-Saxon 'newspeak' of modern emotion theory" (p. 239). After setting some semantic problems relevant to vocabulary of affectivity (passion, emotion, sentiment, mood), Charland advocates for the term 'passions' as appropriate for "positing complex affective states of long duration" (p. 239). The term 'passions' should be, therefore, regained both for the history of emotions as well as for the current research. Charland makes short comments on Descartes (who used both words, passion and emotion, and underscored that their value relies on their use), Hume (using passions and emotions too, but confusing the distinction between both), Crichton (distinguishing passion from emotion, the latter being effect of the passion, the former being a more complex affective state having 'object'), Pinel (passions are enduring for months or years, albeit evolving in intensity over time, whereas emotions are of short duration; Pinel noticed that passions are "recalcitrant to the method of analysis" [...] "[b]ecause of their elusive nature", p. 246), Esquirol (who referred to the therapeutic role of some emotions; for him passions are states of long duration, additionally, "organized around a fixed idea" (p. 248), finally passions, unlike emotions, have a significant intellectual component), Kant (using emotion (short term and urgent) as well as passions (of long duration and appearing gradually), both being pathological), and Ribot (passions are an exaggerated tendency and a form of motor activity while emotions appear suddenly, last a short time, with sudden onset and quick extinction; passions are stable, emotions unstable). Because of such differences passions form a natural kind and should not be confused "with our other two affective posits, namely feelings and emotions" (p. 255) - all three "constitute the affective realm, the domain of 'affectivity'" (p. 255).
(11) Jon Elster explores "emotions and rationality as causes of choice and action" (p. 264). In Elster's view emotions cannot be rational, since rationality as a feature can be ascribed only to choice while emotions are typically not chosen. The paper's aim is to see "whether emotions might enhance rationality" (p. 264) and the answer he gives is, again, in the negative. First Elster presents a model of rational choice (a rational choice is a choice of an optimized behaviour), then a model of emotional choice (although emotions, at least some of them, have cognitive causal antecedents, emotions and emotional choices are minimally rational because they lead to a choice of means to realize the agent's beliefs which, in turn, can be the effects as well as the causes of emotions). Next he considers the idea of weakness of will and presents objections to this. Here Elster takes on his own notion of a temporary preference reversal: an act against normal preferences may be induced by emotions which support new preferences under the circumstances. Although they are provisional, they are most important at the moment of making a choice and are responsible for a momentary giving up on normal preferences. The problem with choice induced by emotions is that they are of short duration and often disappear together with their causes. Moreover, the same emotion can lead to several action tendencies (this fact too speaks against their rationality). Elster carries on by discussing the impact of emotions on formal preferences (such as risk aversion, impatience, urgency; the issue is complex, e.g. urgency can be highly adaptive, but in many cases waiting is costless) as well as impact of emotions in formation of belief and in gathering information (Elster's view is that emotions not only do not enhance the rationality of belief formation but they, moreover, deform beliefs in several ways, they do so because of e.g. hastiness or inappropriate need for closure when there is no enough information). Impatience is a general feature of emotions what puts them in opposition to rationality. On the other hand emotions tend to cause overinvestment in collecting information (a feature Elster describes as 'hyperrationality').
(12) Sabine A. Döring argues for being emotional and claims that being able to control fully one's emotions or not having them at all would not be a gain but a loss. She refers to a case of the so-called 'inverse akrasia' in order to show that acting rationally can amount to acting against one's better judgement. Accordingly, emotions, on some conditions, "can provide us with information about the world" and "are sometimes more reliable than judgements in telling an agent what he has reason [taken as 'objective reason'] to do" (p. 285). Döring relates cases when acting on objective reasons may be irrational and acting on subjective reasons is rational: in some cases, emotions can be more appropriate to the situation than a judgment and give us better reasons to act than our judgment does. Next Döring considers conflicts between emotions and judgments that are rational conflicts, which means that they are conflicts concerning how the world actually is. According to her, such conflicts differ from conflicts between judgments because they do not involve contradictions: to judge one thing (e.g., I am safe) and to feel another (e.g., I am in danger) is not contradictory. A subject judging and feeling contradictorily about the same thing does not contradict himself (Döring draws a parallel with perception and a famous Müller-Lyer perceptual illusion). Döring concludes by claiming that the cognitive power of judgment and reason "is not superior to, but on a par with that of emotion" (p. 296). When in conflict, either reason or emotion can win or lose. The practical knowledge comes from judgments and emotions and the thing we should do is "to cultivate our emotions over time" (p. 299).
(13) Bennett W. Helm's paper is about emotions conceived as fundamental to motivation and practical reasoning. Emotions are to be understood as "rational responses to things we care about" (p. 303). However, the notion of care is not to be taken too narrowly, i.e. biologically. Therefore Helm attacks the neo-Jamesian account and especially Prinz's approach because, as he says, it "fails directly to address the central question of motivation, and it does so at its peril" (p. 309). On Helm's view emotions are to be best understood by means of import: what matters or is cared about is something that presents a value, more particularly what is worth pursuing, worthy of attention and action. The variety of emotions is explained as a variety of ways in which the target is evaluated. But emotions are not only responsive to "values" and to import: "they are [also] a kind of commitment to import" (p. 310). And here again, if commitment is genuine, it must involve an action on its behalf. To anyone setting forward an objection of vicious circularity, Helm replies that biology is not sufficient to explain all kinds of human care and that "import and the emotions emerge together as a holistic package all of which must be in place for any of it to be intelligible" (p. 313). In this view, "[t]he circularity of the account is therefore a normal part of such holism and is not at all vicious" (p. 313). Helm claims that emotions are not isolated from one another: "it is not possible to have capacity for one emotion type without also having the capacity for many other emotion types and for desire" (p. 314). In subsequent sections Helm deals with the relation between emotions and evaluative judgments to conclude that "the rational interconnections between emotions and judgments are bi-directional" (p. 316).
(14) Christine Tappolet investigates into the relation between emotion, motivation and action. For doing this she bases her argument on a selected case: fear. First she distinguishes several components (up to 6) in an event and asks which of them are essential and cannot be removed regardless of the kind of emotion. According to her, since emotion is intimately related to motivation and action, the question about the motivational component of emotions relates to the rationality of emotions. Tappolet observes that only some emotions are centred on self-interest and that not all emotions are bound up with motivation to the same extent (e.g. joy, hope and awe are in looser relationship to motivation than, say, fear). Tappolet accords with the view that emotions are perceptions of values, thus fear is a perception of the fearsome. She discusses modularity of emotion in the light of modular systems as described by Fodor. Modularity of fear explains a number of reactions which animal fear is tied up with, as well as flexibility in the behaviour of the same species. But if we add to this that different fears are related to different kinds of motivation, we should be distinguishing between different kinds of fear rather than speaking about its modularity. Next, Tappolet presents the desire model, that is a model in which fear does not necessitate action directly but involves a desire, which, in turn, can result in action, provided that the agent makes a deliberation about the goal of the desire and the way to achieve it. Since Tappolet distinguishes two kinds of fear - fear for oneself and fear for others - a natural reply to the question whether the motivations of fear are necessarily self-interested is no. The thesis of motivational egoism is wrong, "at least in the case of human fear" (p. 343). Relations of emotion (human fear) to action and motivation are complex and cannot all be explained by virtue of modularity or egoism, "of one's own well-being and flourishing" (p. 343).
(15) Matthew Ratcliffe considers the relations of emotions and the meaning of life. He starts with Solomon's view, who, however, fails to appreciate the phenomenology of moods. Radcliffe attacks Solomon's thesis that moods are generalized emotions. According to Radcliffe moods are prior to emotions. They are what he calls pre-intentional (in contrast to non-intentional) and they contribute to the structure of intentionally directed emotion. Then he turns to Heidegger's analysis of boredom. For Heidgger the difference between mood and emotion is that moods are phenomenologically deeper than emotions (this is Ratcliffe's interpretation since "Heidegger does not actually draw a distinction between moods and emotions", p. 354). They are "the various different ways in which we are able to experience things as mattering" (p. 355). A variety of moods is a corollary of "a range of different ways in which things matter to us" (p. 356). Insisting on not confusing the intensity of emotion with its depth, Ratcliffe discusses three kinds of boredom, the deepest one being in which "there is nothing left to refuse and no alternative on offer" (p. 358). Another distinction Ratcliffe makes is between emotions and bodily feelings and between the two kinds of what is called bodily feelings (first, when body is involved as "phenomenologically conspicuous", another one when "body feels something", pp. 363-364). If, therefore, existential feelings are "a space of possibilities within which we experience, think, and act", it is better to call them "pre-conceptual" rather than "non-conceptual". If, on the other hand, some emotional states are responsible for meaning of life, they need to be understood not as judgments and generalized emotions (as Solomon claims) but as moods and existential feelings.
(16) David Pugmire deals with a question whether emotions can be adequately described at all and what happens to them when they are expressed. Unlike material objects, they are inner states and are affected by the fact that they are expressed. On the other hand, they are supposed to externalize if they are expected to be an object of research. This optimism is, according to Pugmire, misguided, since "there can be aspects of experience that finally can evade our best efforts at formulating them" (p. 375). Reasons for reticence are structural and depend on the kind of experiential content. Such is the case of affects, sensations and aesthetic properties of things. It is so because all three kinds, when verbalized, are concerned by risks of inadequacy (individual experience vs conventional language), distortion of description (ineffable expressed by way of figurative description), and disengagement of description (passing from first- to third-person perspective). On the other hand there are reasons for expression. This is first of all a kind of affirmation. By articulating an experience it becomes augmented or completed, confirmed or publicly recognized. Pugmire distinguishes five possibilities of how formulation achieves affirmation (identification, consolidation, reorientation, initiation, transfiguration). There follows, as a result, that isolation by not expressing experience and integration of experience by saying they are two sides of the same coin: on the one hand they are non-conceptualizable and hence ineffable experiences, and on the other - non-conceptualized temporarily but that could be affirmed by their expression. In any case, suspension or affirmation of an experience relies on our choice, which, in turn, is made spontaneously.
(17) Adam Morton's contribution on epistemic emotions is another praise of emotions which, as he states, "serve vital functions in human psychology" (p. 385). Without emotions people would be different and much worse: we could not make plans or create deep, long-lasting social bonds. More particularly Morton is interested in knowing whether "there are emotions that play an important role in our attempts to acquire beliefs correctly" (p. 386). A position he takes is that there is a subclass of epistemic emotions which has hard-to-replace role. Epistemic emotions constitute a minor group within a class of emotions. Examples are: curiosity, (intellectual) courage, love (of truth), and wonder. As Morton observes, they are essential and positive and it often occurs that they are given the same names as virtues. A case which Morton analyzes is the one of a scientist, brilliant but failing to care much about his subject. Without claiming that curiosity or any other epistemic emotions is indispensable for a good research and even being aware that an excessive engagement can be disturbing, Morton argues that "the absence of epistemic emotion seems to make things harder rather than impossible" (p. 391). In one of subsequent sections Morton refers to Deigh's and Roberts' chapters of the handbook and underscores that "[e]motions are complex states combining cognitive and affective elements" (p. 396), and slightly nuances it by "[a]n emotion nearly always has an associated cognitive aspect" (p. 396). The reverse side of the coin is that "deficits in the capacity to feel emotions are often linked to cognitive deficits" (p. 397), a point that seems to be dedicated to those "whose lives are dominated by enquiry" (p. 398).
(18) Michael Stocker looks into a subclass of nonstandard emotions, intellectual emotions, that is emotions about intellectual matters, phenomena which are particularly familiar to philosophers. The presentation is chronological and confined to five authors whose texts testify "that intellectual and other nonstandard emotions are well known in our tradition", then "to show some of the variety they come in" and finally "to begin to answer some questions and issues they cause" (p. 402). So for Aristotle happiness is an intellectual activity. William James is discussed more broadly, since there are some confusions to be spelled out, notably as James devoted much less attention to nonstandard emotions than to feelings of bodily changes, they are much less taken into consideration by theoreticians. The trouble is that while in some passages James observed that in intellectual emotions there need be no feelings of bodily changes, later on he changed radically and claimed that the moral, intellectual and aesthetic feelings are not emotions but cognitive acts, unless they include bodily feelings. Next, Stocker considers briefly Ribot who accepts intellectual emotions as everyday and ordinary emotions, and finally comes to Frijda and Sundararajan. With this we get a new division of emotions (into coarse and refined emotions, e.g. coarse love and anger as well as refined ones) and come to the examination of relation between intellectual emotions and intellectual activity. Given that intellectual emotions are often useful, Stocker turns to asking about when, if ever, they are harmful (what seems be the case of fixation). From an analysis of the motives of medieval scribes copying documents Stocker infers that an intellectual emotion is not indispensable for good intellectual work. He concludes that intellectual emotions are useful but not essential to intellectual work. They are "instrumentally valuable" and "intrinsically valuable - as constituents of good societies or good aspects of societies" and "as constituent values of good lives and good aspects of lives" (p. 423).
(19) Amelie Rorty focuses on the ambivalence which "seems our natural condition" (p. 425). She characterizes ambivalence as a case which occurs if and only if two minds in same context and under the same description are simultaneous (changing one's mind over time is a different matter). Therefore a case which Rorty analyzes at length of two apparently equal candidates for a position, is rejected since, in fact, the strength of each of them is perceived in a different way. (This proves that we often deal with disguised ambivalence which is the effect of our laziness or self-deception). Rorty develops her characterization of ambivalence which should comprehend four conditions: 1. the same object is described under two different set of conditions differently and both descriptions lead to different mutually exclusive attitudes, 2. both attitudes are considered as incompatible, 3. a priority must be given to one of the attitudes, 4. there is an impossibility to ascribe priority to either attitude. As in some cases ambivalence is appropriate, while in others not, Rorty lists the conditions for appropriate ambivalence: 1. belief about incompatibility of both descriptions is well grounded, 2. both descriptions are well grounded, 3. there is ambivalence about which description should be given priority, 4. belief about impossibility of discarding perceptions of options. After discussing the appropriateness of ambivalence Rorty sketches what she calls 'epistemically responsible ambivalence' which occurs when: 1. both sides of ambivalence are well grounded, 2. there is an awareness of implications of descriptions, 3. there are ways by means of imagination to preserve the terms of ambivalence, 4. "the range of alternative descriptions […] consider[ed as] acceptable would not require massive further revisions in the space of […] reasons and values" (p. 441). Finally, Rorty comes to a constructive ambivalence, which is a narrower class, since it occurs when: 1. ambivalence is appropriate, 2. both descriptions of incompatible perceptions are preserved and descriptions of alternatives taken in isolation are recognized as incompatible, 3. ambivalence is epistemically responsible, 4. there is "energy and resourcefulness to engage in the work of preserving the terms of […] ambivalence" (p. 442). In the last section Rorty considers some objections and questions concerning ambivalence, even if a notion of constructive ambivalence is accepted.
(20) Peter R. Hobson examines "whether developmental disorders might change our view of how thinking, feeling, and willing, and with these, self-awarness, are structured" (p. 446). His approach is via genetic epistemology (Piaget) on the one hand and developmental psychology (L. Vygotsky) on the other. The problem of separation between thinking, feeling and willing becomes more salient when it comes to infants and toddlers. In infant mental life there seems to be no such separation at all and it comes up only through a development achievement (Hobson relates observations of infants at three stages of life: two months, the end of the first year, the middle of the second year). Moreover, infants' affectivity is determinant for their cognitive abilities. After distinguishing a primary intersubjectivity and a secondary intersubjectivity, Hobson claims that "movements in affective stance through responsiveness to the attitudes of others establish a framework within which a child can, between about nine and 18 months of age, come to conceptualize [...] how different persons have different takes on the same shared world." (p. 454). A case upon which Hobson touches more particularly is autism. Here we can see better how impairments in recognizing mental state terms go together with impairments in responding to (e.g. sharing) other people's emotional states. Hobbes underlines that "to think about other human beings' states of mind and to adjust communication in relation to those states implicates feelings in relation to those others [...]" (p. 461). He concludes that developmental psychology lets us see that "the separation of thought from feeling is never complete" (p. 468). We can grasp better "how emotions are structured, and to appreciate how interpersonally situated emotions lift the child out of an egocentric, one-track take on the environment" (p. 469).
(21) Kevin Mulligan focuses on mutual relations between the philosophy of value and the psychology of emotions - relations which at the moment are not sufficiently strong in his opinion. The three issues he attacks are: "what role do values and value-properties play in triggering emotions? [...] is it possible to understand value in terms of emotions? [...] do emotions themselves exemplify value-properties?" (p. 475). First Mulligan expounds a particular account of emotions and a particular account of value. Emotions are intentional but not to be understood in terms of beliefs or desires. They are transient affective episodes, contain a presupposition (e.g. perception, memory etc.), and an affective colouring. As to values they are different from value-properties and constitute an order of ranks. In what concerns value-properties there are aesthetic, cognitive, ethical, religious, vital value-properties. Then Mulligan turns to value as the objet of the intentionality of emotions. Emotions have the material object (the object proper) and the formal object (the object improper). Next he discusses emotional awareness of value. Mulligan refers to Meinong, Husserl, von Hildebrandt and Scheler (in footnotes) who maintained that emotions disclose or may disclose values. In following section Mulligan reports Brentano's view because of his combining an epistemological and ontological claims: "certain intentional affective phenomena [...] enjoy a species of self-evident correctness and present themselves to us as having this feature" (p. 489). Finally Mulligan points to the fact that emotions themselves are assessed: there are positive as well as negative emotions what should not be confused with the valence of an emotion, which, Mulligan observes, is a "different things to different psychologists" (p. 494), e.g. the intrinsic values of pleasantness or unpleasantness, the desire to sustain it or to get rid of it.
(22) Jerome Neu reflects on control over emotions. He observes that if love is beyond control, then Christ's famous commandment is rightly ridiculed by Freud. In this case loving one's enemy is psychologically impossible. Likewise Kant for whom emotions too are not within one's control and Nietzsche, another critic of Christian love who claimed that Christian love is an effect of ressentiment. From this Neu passes on to a more general question about "things that we ought or ought not to feel" (p. 506). According to some philosophers, e.g. Aristotle, Spinoza, an accomplished life includes emotions. But if emotions are beyond our control how can we - Neu asks - choose what to feel? Following Aristotle, we should feel in a appropriate way, but, again, how to feel in a moderate way if we cannot, as it is believed, control how we feel and, particularly, how to avoid feeling inappropriate emotions. After distinguishing different senses of "appropriateness", Neu touches on issues of control which, as he says, are central for "the question of whether there is [...] an "Ethics of Emotions"" (p. 511). Although it is true that emotions are not in our control ("[w]e cannot make ourselves love someone because we think we ought", p. 511) we can try to do so. Technically or practically one could try to feel appropriately and try not to feel inappropriate emotions. Neu's view is that there are degrees of control and of its lack. According to this, what we feel or not depends on who we are, and who we are is, at least to some degree, in our control. As Aristotle observes, "earlier choices determine[...] later outcomes" (p. 513). Therefore it can be said that we can control our emotions indirectly, by becoming persons we should become or becoming persons that should feel what ought to be felt. Shaping our character is the job of therapy and education and, one could add, of our self-therapy and self-education. This, in turn, brings us to the questions of limits of education and a risk of manipulation.
(23) In his paper on the moral emotions Jesse J. Prinz asks three questions. But first he rectifies a cartoon version of Kant's view on emotions: in fact, since for Kant a consciousness of obligation depends on feeling ""pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty"" (p. 520), it is inaccurate to state that Kant tends to exorcize the emotions. Regarding the question about the role played by emotions in morality Prinz notices that they play a role or roles in motivating moral behaviour (we want to be good) as well as in moral epistemology (we assess things good or bad). With respect to the second question ("which emotions play roles in morality") it seems fair to distinguish types of emotions according to kinds of moral evaluation. Thus emotions of blame (anger, disgust, contempt, disappointment, guilt and shame) are different from emotions of praise. It is characteristic that there is much less to say about emotions of praise since we are expected to act decently and are not praised for observing rules. Next Prinz considers pro-social emotions such as blame and praise (which, either by deterrence or reinforcement, contribute to moral education) as well as fellow-feelings (sympathy, empathy, and concern). Although they belong to a class of motivationally moral, they are not epistemically moral emotions. Finally Prinz turns to asking whether there are distinctively moral emotions. His reply is that there are no such emotions. For instance, anger can depend on a moral judgment but can also be independent of such a judgment. This is the case of fellow-feelings as well: sometimes they arise without any moral context. As Prinz concludes: "[m]oral emotions seem either to serve additional functions that are not moral or derive from emotions that are not moral" (p. 536).
(24) Patricia Greenspan investigates how we can "move toward moral emotions, and thence to moral judgment, from a fairly minimal innate basis in emotion" (p. 540) 'Innate' is to be understood in terms of unlearned responses or response tendencies stemming from genetic endowment. Greenspan is especially interested in some general mechanisms by which infants and children pick up reactions from others (e.g. a tendency to follow a caretaker's gaze). By this she intends to support a moderate view on innateness of ethics. Although the theory of basic emotions is rejected by social constructivists, there are some emotions which are recognized cross-culturally and independently of social background (the case of fear, anger and disgust). Cultural modifications concern objects that can be considered differently in different cultures. To this extent a way emotions are felt is modified too (this is the case of love which depends "on how we are taught to conceptualize the love object", p. 543), and accordingly, expression and communication of emotions differ too. Greenspan observes that "[w]hich states we should treat as paradigmatic cases of emotion, the more primitive or the more developed and cognitively complex, will vary with our theoretical purposes, normative or scientific" (p. 543). After providing an account connecting cognitive and affective components of emotion, Greenspan passes on to discussing the possibilities for linking ethics and emotions, especially by proposing an intermediate view: she refers to Rawls' account of how we learn moral emotions. Greenspan's contribution to this is that she "take[s] the viability of a moral code to depend on how well suited it is to being learned at an early stage on the basis of our innate stock of emotions and mechanism of emotional transfer" (p. 552). It should not be neglected that the moral language is taught simultaneously with moral emotions.
(25) Robert C. Roberts starts by observing that good and bad are objective and emotion has a relevant epistemic power, provided it is appropriate. The opposite view developed much later is that values derive from emotions. However, its corollary is that under particular but quite common conditions it can occur that a good quality provokes repugnance, while a bad one triggers admiration and desire. In order to ban such consequences, Hume added an additional condition that a feature must be considered without reference to our particular interest. But even this restriction is not sufficient because we meet persons with different capacity of objective assessment. In order to avoid relativism, the problem turns to be addressed as "how can we derive morality from human sentiments regarded as purely "natural" phenomena, that is, as having nothing properly moral already "in" them?" (p. 563). Roberts sketches a character of a morally mature person. It turns out to include several treats having something to do with emotions (mainly by means of dispositions: truthfulness, compassionateness, respect and value for other human beings, courage, perseverance, etc.). Roberts makes the point that emotions should not be criticized as such but only so far as they are inaccurate or express imperfections of character (there are some exceptions, e.g. envy, which is false appraisal not only when it admits false instance but which is false appraisal as type). Next Roberts refers to his own propositions of defining various emotion types and stresses that emotions "are a kind of structured perception that [he] call[s] concern-based construals" (p. 571). In other words, "emotions have a propositional structure and so can be individuated by defining propositions" (p. 572). As to whether there are natural (or basic) emotions (and if they are natural they too have to be pan-cultural), Roberts remarks that "[e]motions that have not undergone cognitive sharpening via normative shaping are very hard to find in human life" (p. 582).
(26) Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson's paper starts too by referring to sentimentalist theories. The problem these theories do not take into account is the instability of affect, e.g. a content of a joke which when retold is less funny than when heard for the first time. Here is the difference with colours which are perceived in the same way at any time. D'Arms and Jacobson look for understanding "the contours of different people's senses of humor, honor, purity, and the like, such that these can be understood as constituting relatively stable and coherent perspectives on these values" (p. 589). There are two ways, both unsatisfactory, of solving the instability problem by sentimentalists. On the one hand it is argued that funny is not a stable property of the object and after a few repetitions it disappears. But this means a radical subjectivism. On the other hand, although reponses are unstable, judgment about what is funny is stable. The objection D'Arms and Jacobson raise is that "judgments too tend to instability, when based on unstable response" (p. 592). After discussing the nature of sensibility, D'Arms and Jacobson pass on to listing several obscuring factors which "generate or suppress emotional responses in ways that do not reveal the agent's underlying sensibility" (p. 598). The most obvious one is repetition. Other obscuring factors are: mood effects, social ingratiation, contagion, opposite tendencies, hostility. They are all proofs of the fact that "our actual responses reflect our evaluative perspective less often than might be supposed" (p. 605). In the last section D'Arms and Jacobson develop their claim that "it's an agent's sensibility, rather than his responses or even his judgments, that normally constitutes his perspective on some sentimental value" (p. 606). As they suggest, "alienated judgments are often defective" (p. 606).
(27) Derek Matravers examines the ways in which emotions are present in the arts with a special attention paid to the expression of emotions in music and in paintings. He moves in two steps: first looking for "the properties of a work of art that cause us to experience it as expressive" (p. 618), then an attempt to "clarify the nature of expression in such a way that it illuminates our understanding of art" (p. 618). After outlining "three accounts of the relation between music and the emotions" ("experience of expression is some kind of imagined content" (Levinson), "the content of the expressive experience is a kind of imagined state" (Walton), "expression is a matter of an aroused feeling" (Matravers)) (p. 625), Matravers passes on to Budd's account according to which "music is able to mirror those aspects of feeling available to it" (p. 626). Next he examines painting in its relation to emotions. Painting, more so than music, seems to be rather "the result of an expressive act" (p. 627). On the other hand, in case of music its emotional quality can be more easily confused with expression of emotions. Paintings are product of person in such and such mood or experiencing so and so (in music this element is more complex since a composer and a performer are to be distinguished). Here Matravers accounts Richard Wollheim's approach of which the main axis is the concept of projection. Matravers' solution is to embrace several accounts. In order to grasp the issue we need "a generous pluralism". As he says, "the problem has seemed so difficult to solve that there was no single problem to be solved in the first place" (p. 633).
(28) Susan L. Feagin is concerned with "a particular variety of feelings that occur as part of appreciating literary works of art, paradigmatically novels" (p. 635), for instance about the feeling a reader experiences when reading the same sentence several times but in different contexts. These feelings are, however, disturbing and, as she tells, take "attention away from what one ought to be attending to in the work" (p. 636). Feagin discusses Kivy's complexity argument ("to maximize one's enhanced formalist appreciation [...] one should listen without feelings to absolute music", p. 638) as applied to literature. She observes that unlike music, literature, especially novels, is too long to be read in a single sitting and therefore between readings, during breaks, one may have feelings that are of different order than feelings during a process of reading (or during a listening in case of music). Feagin argues in favour of a usefulness of feelings. For instance "feelings often alert us to what is important in one's current environment [i.e. in literary works] in a way that cannot be accomplished by reason or cognition, 'intellectual' activities, or even by affectless perception" (p. 637). They can help us concentrate on important links between passages "by heightening our awareness of them, making more salient in our consciousness, and our dispositions to notice and be affected by what is important down the line" (p. 642). In the third section Feagin focuses on Vonnegut's novel in order "to explain how these 'deep and important' human feelings are involved in appreciation in ways that they do not take attention away from the work" (p. 643). In the last section Feagin insists on how important and fruitful can be "the ability to read with feeling but without getting 'carried away' [...] from the work" (p. 647). It is probably even more difficult to keep one's feelings and simultaneously remain undistracted from the work than to banish feeling and stick to an intellectualist reading. She concludes that rather than our distraction, many feelings are quite the opposite - means of grasping intricacies and subtleties in literary works.
(29) Jenefer Robinson observes that as to "the question of music, all appraisal theories seem equally at a loss" (p. 653). On the other hand, it is generally accepted that music arouses emotions. Robinson's task is to solve this paradox. Robinson enumerates four ways of arousal of emotions by music: by personal and cultural associations, by responding to attributes of music itself, by appraising the musical structure of a piece, and finally, by responding to what is expressed by music. Then Robinson passes on to cases when music brings expressive features but without anyone or anything being a bearer of these features. Robinson quotes cases of how music affects people's mood, physiological reactions and facial expressions, as well as the impact music has on perception, memory, other cognitive effects (e.g. recognition, decision-making), and altruism. If the states in question are referred to as moods rather than emotions this is because they are not caused by an appraisal of the music and also because although they are provoked by music, they are not about music ("even though it's the sad music that makes me feel sad, I'm not sad about the music", p. 667). In next section Robinson moves to the issue of emotions of appreciation. She distinguishes four ways in which emotions are triggered by appraisals (by identifying the topoi and the emotions they arouse, an appropriate feeling is a mode of structural understanding, by understanding what a piece is expressing, by putting us into a mood, which allows to notice certain expressive qualities). In the last section Robinson claims that different ways in which music arouses affective states can occur simultaneously and that different emotions or moods can be produced at the same time by the same piece of music. Therefore, blends earlier unknown to listener can be produced. Such states are called ineffable because of their being nuanced or ambiguous. These new blends are coloured by the individual character of the listener. Nevertheless, they help him "to appreciate the music more fully" (p. 676).
(30) Matthew Kieran deals with differences that lie in our emotional responses to the same event when experienced in real life and when represented in art work. He argues that the asymmetries cannot be explained by mere distinction between fact and fiction (he first considers literary and then cinematic examples). What matters too is (i) distance at which things in fiction are represented and impossibility of interfering and (ii) the fact that artistic representation is mediated by different devices. Therefore, "as readers we are free to respond in ways that we otherwise would or could not" (p. 686). The point is well expressed by Chaplin's dictum that "'Life is a tragedy when seen in close-up but a comedy in long shot'" (p. 686). In following sections Kieran engages into a discussion about the relationship between moral criteria and artistic value in the light of emotions. He claims that "whether the relevant emotional responses are merited or not in responding to the work depends upon whether they would be (or we would judge them to be) such in real life" (p. 690). He observes that when reading narratives we often allow attitudes and emotional responses that are not merited. This is because we feel or imagine in accordance with the moral code underlying the narrative and take on "moral commitments and values other than our own" (p. 691) and which dovetail the world as represented in what we read. There are also other factors which make us take attitudes different from that we show in real life. For instance in fiction characters' motives are transparent to us which is not the case in real life. We are also open to the "aestheticization of things like violence" (p. 694), can experience intense emotional states "without any moral cost" (p. 696), learn about human behaviour, can experience drives and desires "that normally we would consider to be prohibited" (p. 698).
The index (pp. 705-722) includes names and terms, but its criteria are not clear: some names and references are considered while others not (e.g. Scheler is indexed only once while in fact he is referred to also on p. 216, p. 489, n. 38, p. 493, n. 47). Therefore, although useful, the index is not entirely reliable.
There would be a lot to say about each paper. Given the space I have I will confine myself to some remarks and a general comment. I would like to start with vocabulary. The term emotion is used in the title of the handbook and is a predominant one. However, there is no absolute consistency with this. We read about intellectual (pp. 401 sq.) or moral emotions (pp. 519 sq.), but also about moral and intellectual feelings (p. 409 in a quote from James), bodily (p. 363) and existential feelings (p. 354, p. 367), and moral emotions and moral feelings (p. 504 in a quote from Rawls). Elsewhere there are emotions and feelings used interchangeably in the same paragraph (e.g. p. 9, p. 373, p. 456, p. 464, p. 491, p. 520) or only in the same chapter of the handbook (e.g. p. 446 & p. 451, p. 635 & p. 642). Should it be inferred that the technical language of emotions (or feelings) - at least in English - is far from being settled for ever? I can only agree with the claim about "the absence of a systematically developed vocabulary to identify feelings" (p. 648, see also p. 83: "[i]deally, we would like a system of global condition labels that covered the whole of emotional life") and take it as applicable to the general category of emotion/feeling as well. How the language determines the perspective of seeing the issue is sufficiently visible in the Stoics: the confusion is common and it is still frequent to be told that in their view emotions are negative. Recently this interpretation has been discarded and it has been suggested that in the Stoics one must distinguish pathe (bad emotions) and eupatheiai (good emotions) (see e.g. p. 146). But - one could ask - would it not have been more logical to speak about emotions using a general term pathe and then divide them into two kinds: negative (kakopatheiai) and positive (eupatheiai)?
One could also guess whether some examples are not too naive indeed. What about the claim that "sexual response to a familiar partner is less intense than to a novel partner" (p. 43)? In Dr Faustus Th. Mann makes a quite different observation when he relates a story of a cooper who tested "the thing out on other women, when he had one that he loved, so much apparently that he was left cold and "impotent" with others"). A typical case of fear is supposed to be that of a wolf attacking man (p. 325) - but this is rather untypical, since it is quite uncommon, if at all, to meet a single wolf, unless one refers to the Little Red Riding Hood, and more than one zoologist would be happy to have such an opportunity (the same for a bear, e.g. p. 232). A delicious cake is, I agree, stale after a few days (p. 590), but this is just one side of the story: for an old wine can be even better than a young one.
The reader meets a number of contradicting views throughout the handbook. So far as it concerns the proper views of the contributors, this makes up for the richness of the handbook. For example you will find an appraisal of the role of emotions and a denial of their positive role in life, those who claim emotions are rational and those who deny this. So far, so good. But what about the interpretation of the views of others? What a beginner or a student is supposed to think when he reads e.g. that "Plato posited three parts of the soul, arguing that emotion could not be identified with either reason or desire since it sided sometimes with one and sometime with the other" (p. 100) and, later on, that in Plato "reason itself is subject to passions that prepare it for a fuller rationality" (p. 130, n. 19), or that "Sartre actually denies that emotions are actions" (p. 225) and, in another paper, that "[...] we can choose our emotions. Sartre in particular thinks that passions are actions" (p. 512)?
It is surprising to find in the Oxford Handbook a number of misprints, though some papers are much more affected than others. It can be particularly disturbing when it comes to names (e.g. Knuutila/Knuuttila (not included in the index), p. 131, n. 20, p.142, p. 186/p. 145, n. 4, p. 165, Colombetti/Colometti, p. 494, n. 54/p. 497, Grifths/Griffiths, p. 115, p. 257, p. 300, p. 558/p. 101, p. 239, p. 246, p. 292, n. 15, p. 344).
In a recent review of another Oxford Handbook, Gary Hatfield (in his review of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, John Bickle (ed.) in: Notre Dame Philosophical Review 2010.05.06) settled a couple of well pointed considerations that can refer to a number of currently published handbooks, the handbook under review included. For instance he observed - and this is valid for Goldie's volume as well - that "the volume is more like a collection of the research of a selected set of authors than the construction of a handbook intended to survey a field". In fact, some field seems to be overrepresented (e.g. epistemic function of emotions is discussed not only by Morton in his Epistemic Emotions but also by Stocker and by Greenspan), while others are underrepresented or simply absent. As observed by Gill, the major objectives of the handbook are: "historical interpretation" and "advancing the theory of emotion", though he rightly remarks that the former may provide "larger theoretical implications" for the latter (pp. 143-144).
Regarding the historical side little has been said (a page and a half: pp. 240-241) about Descartes or Brentano, and figures dramatically lacking are Pascal, Spinoza and Scheler, not to mention more authors whose views should be, in my opinion, discussed in a general historical interpretation of emotions. As to advancing the theory of emotion, the major omission concerns a vertical model of affectivity. There is just some hints to this (e.g. p. 41: "[e]motions [...] belong to various ontological levels" - Nicolai Hartmann would be of great use here), and when we read explicitly about "different levels of feeling" (p. 357) this is not spelled out otherwise than by tying it up with the three-leveled model of moods in Heidegger. We meet a "distinction between the intensity or strength of an emotional state and its depth" (p. 350), which it is true, is crucial, but it was already elaborated by Max Scheler as early as in 1913-1916. It is a pity that there is so little about a hierarchical approach in the handbook, since it helps to solve several controversies occurring in the debate about emotions. For instance, when several levels are distinguished, general statements containing a modal verb may (or may not) or an adverb such as often, can be posited in a more concrete way. This is because some (say lower) feelings are concerned by what is claimed in a general statement, while others (say higher feelings) are not; therefore there is no more need to introduce may/may not.
It could be reminded - as Hatfield did - that "a handbook intend[s] to survey a field". The question now is whether The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion is supposed to survey the philosophical issues related to or emerging from an analysis of emotions, or to overview the principal streams in current philosophical research on emotions. In the former case a sort of a list of key problems should first be drawn. Here the method was different. The editor commissioned papers "from top scholars working in th[e] field" (p. 1), so that "each chapter really does make a significant advance in emotion research" (p. 12). Therefore, to quote once again Hatfield, "[t]he volume is to be commended for collecting chapters that address [several] issues [...] Depending on one's specific interests, there is more or less to find." By these remarks I do not mean to undermine the general value of the handbook. Without any doubt it stands for a collection of useful and inspiring materials that I recommend for anyone interested in philosophy of emotions. Personally, I have already made good use of it in papers and seminars and intend to do so in my future research.
© 2010 Robert Zaborowski
Robert Zaborowski, Ph. D.
University of Warmia and Mazury & Polish Academy of Sciences
 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion includes:
Part I What Emotions Are
1. J. Deigh: Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology, pp. 17-40
2. A. Ben-Ze'ev: The Thing Called Emotion, pp. 41-62
3. R. Cowie: Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring that Pervade Everyday Life, pp. 63-94
4. R. de Sousa: The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science, pp. 95-117
Part II The History of Emotion
5. A. W. Price: Emotions in Plato and Aristotle, pp. 121-142
6. C. Gill: Stoicism and Epicureanism, pp. 143-165
7. P. King: Emotions in Medieval Thought, pp. 167-187
8. K. Abramson: A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain, pp. 189-213
9. A. Hatzimoysis: Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre, pp. 215-235
10. L. C. Charland: Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from the History of Psychopathology, pp. 237-259
Part III Emotions and Practical Reason
11. J. Elster: Emotional Choice and Rational Choice, pp. 263-281
12. S. A. Döring: Why Be Emotional?, pp. 283-301
13. B. W. Helm: Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts, pp. 303-323
14. C. Tappolet: Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear, pp. 325-345
Part IV Emotions and the Self
15. M. Ratcliffe: The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life, pp. 349-371
16. D. Pugmire: Saying It, pp. 373-384
17. A. Morton: Epistemic Emotions, pp. 385-399
18. M. Stocker: Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions, pp. 401-423
19. A. Rorty: A Plea for Ambivalence, pp. 425-444
20. P. R. Hobson: Emotion, Self-/Other-Awareness, and Autism: A Developmental Perspective, pp. 445-472
Part V Emotion, Value, and Morality
21. K. Mulligan: Emotions and Values, pp. 475-500
22. J. Neu: An Ethics of Emotion?, pp. 501-517
23. J. J. Prinz: The Moral Emotions, pp. 519-538
24. P. Greenspan: Learning Emotions and Ethics, pp. 539-559
25. R. C. Roberts: Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation, pp. 561-583
26. J. D'Arms & D. Jacobson: Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect, pp. 585-613
Part VI Emotion, Art, and Aesthetics
27. D. Matravers: Expression in the Arts, pp. 617-634
28. S. L. Feagin: Affects in Appreciation, pp. 635-650
29. J. Robinson: Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?, pp. 651-680
30. M. Kieran: Emotions, Art, and Immorality, pp. 681-703