Review - Rethinking the Western Understanding of the Self
by Ulrich Steinvorth
Cambridge University Press, 2009
Review by Gustav Jahoda, Ph.D.
Nov 17th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 47)

In this book the author, a philosopher, develops a thesis concerning the nature of the self in relation to historical and socio-political changes. As he explains, it consists of series of interlinked essays, overlapping in content, and therefore does not lend itself to straightforward account. However, one can discern two major themes: the first deals with the nature of the Cartesian self, treated as a 'philosophical psychology', and its relation to history; the second seeks to demonstrate the relevance of the Cartesian self to our troubled times, and how it might provide pointers towards our salvation.

The first theme begins by describing the Cartesian self, cavalierly shorn of the dualism that was central for Descartes. It is said to be 'the power of deliberate judgment' and presupposes the existence of free will, which can go against reason to show it is not determined. It is also a feature of the Cartesian self that we 'necessarily aim at extraordinariness', which is a form of self-assertion, a desire for achievement. The free rational self is not present at birth and gradually develops through a first stage into a second stage, a process which the author finds epitomized by Freudian theory. With maturity the second stage of a fully rational self is reached . Then comes a critical jump, also taken by Freud: the concept of the Cartesian self can also be applied to collectivities. 

Here of course only the barest of bones of rich and complex argumentation can be presented. It includes critical discussions of concepts of the self put forward by other philosophers such as Kant and Locke. The author is particularly critical of the Lockean version that later took a utilitarian form.

Next the spotlight is turned on the question what the Cartesian self can teach us about history, and astonishingly the stage notion is applied to the unfolding of historical phases. Broadly speaking closed societies (in Popperian terms) are at the first stage, open ones at the second. Examining various causes put forward by scholars such as Weber, the author seeks to show their inadequacy and puts forward his own Cartesian explanation, namely the triumph of extraordinariness. The old-fashioned picture of tribalism which supports the argument is worth quoting: ''Tribal societies solve their problems by enmeshing individuals in a close web of blood relations that subordinates them to the tribe and suppresses individual aims.' What was needed, so it is argued, were people who had become 'sick of tribalism' and broken through their chains.

In spite of the admirable erudition displayed, the attempt to portray the Cartesian self as the underlying element responsible for the broad sweep of historical change seems hardly convincing. Moreover, the author takes no account of more recent work that is at variance with the ideas of the self propounded in the 17^th century. For instance, the unlimited freedom of the will has been called into question: recent studies indicate that, at least as far as simple choices are concerned, the decisions appear to be taken by the brain several seconds before they emerge into consciousness. Or again, the self is dependent on memories; and when remembering ceases to function, as in Alzheimer's disease, the normal self can no longer be said to exist.

The second general theme might well be called, after Mannheim, a 'diagnosis of our time'. The Cartesian self, while still occasionally paraded, has moved into the background of a clear and incisive survey of our social ills. Various social institutions and 'value-spheres' are critically examined, and sensible if somewhat utopian solutions proposed. An important one (Cartesian, but also mooted by others) is to provide more adequate channels for the morally ambiguous striving for 'extraordinariness'.

The book is said to be aimed at the general public as well as the academy, but the former would find it hard going. Yet it is perhaps worth making the effort: even if the central claim of the thesis appears unsustainable, one can still appreciate the wide and adventurous sweep of the author's ideas, and his debates with his fellow-philosophers.

© 2009 Gustav Jahoda

Gustav Jahoda, Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. His main fields of interest are cross-cultural and social psychology, especially the development of social cognition. He is the author of A History of Social Psychology (Cambridge University Press).