email page print pageAll Topic Reviews
Anger and Forgiveness"Are You There Alone?"10 Good Questions about Life and DeathA Casebook of Ethical Challenges in NeuropsychologyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to Muslim EthicsA Cooperative SpeciesA Critique of the Moral Defense of VegetarianismA Delicate BalanceA Life for a LifeA Life-Centered Approach to BioethicsA Matter of SecurityA Natural History of Human MoralityA Philosophical DiseaseA Practical Guide to Clinical Ethics ConsultingA Question of TrustA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Short Stay in SwitzerlandA Very Bad WizardA World Without ValuesAction and ResponsibilityAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionActs of ConscienceAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction NeuroethicsAdvance Directives in Mental HealthAfter HarmAftermathAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HealthAgainst Moral ResponsibilityAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAging, Biotechnology, and the FutureAlbert Schweitzer's Reverence for LifeAlphavilleAltruismAmerican EugenicsAmerican PsychosisAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Evolutionary EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy And a Time to DieAnimal LessonsAnimal RightsAnimals Like UsApplied Ethics in Mental Health CareAre Women Human?Aristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAssisted Suicide and the Right to DieAutonomyAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismAutonomy, Consent and the LawBabies by DesignBackslidingBad PharmaBad SoulsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBeauty JunkiesBefore ForgivingBeing AmoralBeing YourselfBending Over BackwardsBending ScienceBernard WilliamsBetter Humans?Better Than WellBeyond ChoiceBeyond GeneticsBeyond HatredBeyond Humanity?Beyond LossBeyond LossBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond the DSM StoryBias in Psychiatric DiagnosisBioethicsBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics at the MoviesBioethics Beyond the HeadlinesBioethics Critically ReconsideredBioethics in a Liberal SocietyBioethics in the ClinicBiomedical EthicsBiomedical EthicsBiomedical EthicsBiomedical EthicsBiomedical Research and BeyondBiosBioscience EthicsBipolar ChildrenBluebirdBodies out of BoundsBodies, Commodities, and BiotechnologiesBody BazaarBoundBoundaries and Boundary Violations in PsychoanalysisBraintrustBrandedBreaking the SilenceBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyCapital PunishmentCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsChallenging the Stigma of Mental IllnessCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionChild Well-BeingChildrenChildren's RightsChoosing ChildrenChoosing Not to ChooseClinical Dilemmas in PsychotherapyClinical EthicsCloningClose toYouCoercion as CureCoercive Treatment in PsychiatryCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy Comfortably NumbCommonsense RebellionCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentComprehending CareConducting Insanity EvaluationsConfidential RelationshipsConfidentiality and Mental HealthConflict of Interest in the ProfessionsConsuming KidsContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContentious IssuesContesting PsychiatryCrazy in AmericaCreating CapabilitiesCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCritical Perspectives in Public HealthCritical PsychiatryCrueltyCultural Assessment in Clinical PsychiatryCutting to the CoreCyborg CitizenDamaged IdentitiesDeaf Identities in the MakingDeath Is That Man Taking NamesDebating Same-Sex MarriageDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecoding the Ethics CodeDefining DifferenceDefining Right and Wrong in Brain ScienceDefining the Beginning and End of LifeDelusions of GenderDementiaDemocracy in What State?Demons of the Modern WorldDescriptions and PrescriptionsDesert and VirtueDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDestructive Trends in Mental HealthDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital HemlockDigital SoulDignityDisability BioethicsDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisordered Personalities and CrimeDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDoes Feminism Discriminate against Men?Does Torture Work?Double Standards in Medical Research in Developing CountriesDrugs and JusticeDworkin and His CriticsDying in the Twenty-First CenturyEarly WarningEconomics and Youth ViolenceEmbodied RhetoricsEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotional ReasonEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmpathyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEncountering NatureEncountering the Sacred in PsychotherapyEngendering International HealthEnhancing EvolutionEnhancing Human CapacitiesEnoughEros and the GoodErotic InnocenceErotic MoralityEssays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEthical Choices in Contemporary MedicineEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Dilemmas in PediatricsEthical Issues in Behavioral ResearchEthical Issues in Dementia CareEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in the New GeneticsEthical LifeEthical Reasoning for Mental Health ProfessionalsEthical TheoryEthical WillsEthically Challenged ProfessionsEthicsEthicsEthicsEthics and AnimalsEthics and ScienceEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Discovery of the UnconsciousEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics at the CinemaEthics Case Book of the American Psychoanalytic AssociationEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics for EveryoneEthics for PsychologistsEthics for the New MillenniumEthics in CyberspaceEthics in Health CareEthics In Health Services ManagementEthics in Mental Health ResearchEthics in PracticeEthics in PsychiatryEthics in PsychologyEthics in Psychotherapy and CounselingEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEthics, Culture, and PsychiatryEthics, Sexual Orientation, and Choices about ChildrenEvaluating the Science and Ethics of Research on HumansEvilEvil GenesEvil in Modern ThoughtEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolution, Gender, and RapeEvolutionary Ethics and Contemporary BiologyEvolutionary Psychology and ViolenceEvolved MoralityExperiments in EthicsExploding the Gene MythExploiting ChildhoodFacing Human SufferingFact and ValueFaking ItFalse-Memory Creation in Children and AdultsFat ShameFatal FreedomFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist TheoryFinal ExamFirst Do No HarmFirst, Do No HarmFlashpointFlesh WoundsForced to CareForgivenessForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and ReconciliationForgiveness and RetributionFoucault and the Government of DisabilityFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Forensic Mental Health AssessmentFree WillFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will and Reactive AttitudesFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree?Freedom and ValueFreedom vs. InterventionFriendshipFrom Darwin to HitlerFrom Disgust to HumanityFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Silence to VoiceFrontiers of JusticeGender in the MirrorGenetic PoliticsGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetics of Original SinGenetics of Original SinGenocide's AftermathGetting RealGluttonyGood WorkGoodness & AdviceGreedGroups in ConflictGrowing Up GirlGut FeminismHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHandbook for Health Care Ethics CommitteesHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of PsychopathyHappinessHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHard FeelingsHard LuckHardwired BehaviorHarmful ThoughtsHeal & ForgiveHealing PsychiatryHealth Care Ethics for PsychologistsHeterosyncraciesHistorical and Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical EthicsHoly WarHookedHookedHow Can I Be Trusted?How Propaganda WorksHow to Do Things with Pornography How to Make Opportunity EqualHow Universities Can Help Create a Wiser WorldHow We HopeHow We Think About DementiaHuman BondingHuman EnhancementHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman TrialsHumanism, What's That?Humanitarian ReasonHumanityHumanizing MadnessI am Not Sick I Don't Need Help!I Was WrongIdentifying Hyperactive ChildrenIf That Ever Happens to MeImproving Nature?In Defense of FloggingIn Defense of SinIn Love With LifeIn Our Own ImageIn the FamilyIn the Land of the DeafIn the Name of IdentityIn the Wake of 9/11In Two MindsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchInnovation in Medical TechnologyInside Assisted LivingInside EthicsIntelligence, Race, and GeneticsIntensive CareIs Human Nature Obsolete?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is There a Duty to Die?Is There an Ethicist in the House?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJudging Children As ChildrenJust a DogJust BabiesJust CareJustice for ChildrenJustice for HedgehogsJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeJustifiable ConductKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Theory of VirtueKids of CharacterKilling McVeighLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLaw and the BrainLearning About School ViolenceLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLegal and Ethical Aspects of HealthcareLegal Aspects of Mental CapacityLegal ConceptionsLegalizing ProstitutionLet Them Eat ProzacLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberal EugenicsLife After FaithLife at the BottomLife, Sex, and IdeasListening to the WhispersLiving ProfessionalismLosing Matt ShepardLostLuckyMad in AmericaMad PrideMadhouseMaking Another World PossibleMaking Babies, Making FamiliesMaking Genes, Making WavesMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMalignantMasculinity Studies and Feminist TheoryMeaning and Moral OrderMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedical Research for HireMedicalized MasculinitiesMedically Assisted DeathMeditations for the HumanistMelancholia and MoralismMental Health Professionals, Minorities and the PoorMental Illness, Medicine and LawMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMetaethical SubjectivismMill's UtilitarianismMind FieldsMind WarsMind WarsModern Theories of JusticeModernity and TechnologyMoney ShotMonsterMoral Acquaintances and Moral DecisionsMoral ClarityMoral CultivationMoral Development and RealityMoral Dilemmas in Real LifeMoral DimensionsMoral EntanglementsMoral FailureMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral MindsMoral OriginsMoral Panics, Sex PanicsMoral ParticularismMoral PerceptionMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RealismMoral RelativismMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral Status and Human LifeMoral StealthMoral Theory at the MoviesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMoral, Immoral, AmoralMoralismMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMorals, Rights and Practice in the Human ServicesMorals, Rights and Practice in the Human ServicesMore Than HumanMotive and RightnessMovies and the Moral Adventure of LifeMurder in the InnMy Body PoliticMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Sister's KeeperMy Sister's KeeperMy WayNano-Bio-EthicsNarrative MedicineNarrative ProsthesisNatural Ethical FactsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalized BioethicsNeither Bad nor MadNeoconservatismNeonatal BioethicsNeurobiology and the Development of Human MoralityNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNew Takes in Film-PhilosophyNew Waves in EthicsNew Waves in MetaethicsNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNo Child Left DifferentNo Impact ManNormative EthicsNormativityNothing about us, without us!Oath BetrayedOf War and LawOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn EvilOn Human RightsOn The Stigma Of Mental IllnessOn the TakeOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne ChildOne Nation Under TherapyOne World NowOur Bodies, Whose Property?Our Bodies, Whose Property?Our Daily MedsOur Faithfulness to the PastOur Posthuman FutureOut of EdenOut of Its MindOut of the ShadowsOverdosed AmericaOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPassionate DeliberationPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perfecting VirtuePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonhood and Health CarePersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPerspectives On Health And Human RightsPharmacracyPharmageddonPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhysician-Assisted DyingPicturing DisabilityPilgrim at Tinker CreekPlaying God?Playing God?Political EmotionsPornlandPowerful MedicinesPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical EthicsPractical Ethics for PsychologistsPractical RulesPragmatic BioethicsPragmatic BioethicsPragmatic NeuroethicsPraise and BlamePreferences and Well-BeingPrimates and PhilosophersPro-Life, Pro-ChoiceProcreation and ParenthoodProfits Before People?Progress in BioethicsProperty in the BodyProzac As a Way of LifeProzac on the CouchPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric EthicsPsychiatry and EmpirePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and Consumer CulturePsychology and LawPsychotropic Drug Prescriber's Survival GuidePublic Health LawPublic Health Law and EthicsPublic PhilosophyPunishing the Mentally IllPunishmentPursuits of WisdomPutting Morality Back Into PoliticsPutting on VirtueQuality of Life and Human DifferenceRaceRadical HopeRadical VirtuesRape Is RapeRe-creating MedicineRe-Engineering Philosophy for Limited BeingsReason's GriefReasonably ViciousReckoning With HomelessnessReconceiving Medical EthicsRecovery from SchizophreniaRedefining RapeRedesigning HumansReducing the Stigma of Mental IllnessReflections On How We LiveReframing Disease ContextuallyRefusing CareRefuting Peter Singer's Ethical TheoryRelative JusticeRelativism and Human RightsReligion ExplainedReprogeneticsRescuing JeffreyResponsibilityResponsibility and PsychopathyResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility from the MarginsResponsible GeneticsRethinking CommodificationRethinking Informed Consent in BioethicsRethinking Mental Health and DisorderRethinking RapeReturn to ReasonRevolution in PsychologyRightsRights, Democracy, and Fulfillment in the Era of Identity PoliticsRisk and Luck in Medical EthicsRobert NozickRousseau and the Dilemmas of Modernity Rule of Law, Misrule of MenRunning on RitalinSatisficing and MaximizingSchizophrenia, Culture, and SubjectivityScience and EthicsScience in the Private InterestScience, Policy, and the Value-Free IdealScience, Seeds and CyborgsScratching the Surface of BioethicsSecular Philosophy and the Religious TemperamentSeeing the LightSelf-ConstitutionSelf-Made MadnessSelf-Trust and Reproductive AutonomySentimental RulesSex Fiends, Perverts, and PedophilesSex OffendersSexual DevianceSexual EthicsSexual PredatorsSexualized BrainsShaping Our SelvesShock TherapyShould I Medicate My Child?ShunnedSick to Death and Not Going to Take It AnymoreSickoSide EffectsSidewalk StoriesSister CitizenSkeptical FeminismSocial Inclusion of People with Mental IllnessSocial JusticeSociological Perspectives on the New GeneticsSome We Love, Some We Hate, Some We EatSovereign VirtueSpiral of EntrapmentSplit DecisionsSticks and StonesStories MatterSubjectivity and Being SomebodySuffering, Death, and IdentitySuicide ProhibitionSurgery JunkiesSurgically Shaping ChildrenTaking Morality SeriouslyTaming the Troublesome ChildTechnology and the Good Life?TestimonyText and Materials on International Human RightsThe Aims of Higher EducationThe Almost MoonThe Altruistic BrainThe American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Forensic PsychiatryThe Animal ManifestoThe Art of LivingThe Autonomy of MoralityThe Beloved SelfThe Best Things in LifeThe Big FixThe Bioethics ReaderThe Biology and Psychology of Moral AgencyThe Blackwell Guide to Medical EthicsThe Body SilentThe BondThe Book of LifeThe Burden of SympathyThe Cambridge Companion to Virtue EthicsThe Cambridge Companion to Virtue EthicsThe Cambridge Textbook of BioethicsThe Case against Assisted SuicideThe Case Against PerfectionThe Case Against PunishmentThe Case for PerfectionThe Case of Terri SchiavoThe Challenge of Human RightsThe Code for Global EthicsThe Colonization Of Psychic SpaceThe Commercialization of Intimate LifeThe Common ThreadThe Connected SelfThe Constitution of AgencyThe Creation of PsychopharmacologyThe Criminal BrainThe Decency WarsThe Difficult-to-Treat Psychiatric PatientThe Disability PendulumThe Disability Rights Movement: From Charity to ConfrontationThe Domain of ReasonsThe Double-Edged HelixThe Duty to ProtectThe Emotional Construction of MoralsThe End of Ethics in a Technological SocietyThe End of Stigma?The Essentials of New York Mental Health LawThe Ethical BrainThe Ethical Dimensions of the Biological and Health SciencesThe Ethics of BioethicsThe Ethics of ParenthoodThe Ethics of SightseeingThe Ethics of the FamilyThe Ethics of the LieThe Ethics of TransplantsThe Ethics ToolkitThe Evolution of Mental Health LawThe Evolution of MoralityThe FamilyThe Fat Studies ReaderThe Forgiveness ProjectThe Form of Practical KnowledgeThe Fountain of YouthThe Freedom ParadoxThe Future of Assisted Suicide and EuthanasiaThe Future of Human NatureThe Good BookThe Good LifeThe Great BetrayalThe Handbook of Disability StudiesThe Healing VirtuesThe High Price of MaterialismThe History of Human RightsThe HorizonThe Idea of JusticeThe Ideal of NatureThe Illusion of Freedom and EqualityThe Immortal Life of Henrietta LacksThe Importance of Being UnderstoodThe Insanity OffenseThe Joy of SecularismThe Language PoliceThe Last Normal ChildThe Last UtopiaThe Limits of MedicineThe LobotomistThe Love CureThe Lucifer EffectThe Manual of EpictetusThe Mark of ShameThe Meaning of NiceThe Medicalization of SocietyThe Merck DruggernautThe Mind Has MountainsThe Modern Art of DyingThe Modern SavageThe Moral ArcThe Moral BrainThe Moral Demands of MemoryThe Moral FoolThe Moral MindThe Moral Psychology HandbookThe Moral, Social, and Commercial Imperatives of Genetic Testing and ScreeningThe Most Good You Can DoThe Myth of ChoiceThe Myth of the Moral BrainThe Nature of NormativityThe New Disability HistoryThe New Genetic MedicineThe New Religious IntoleranceThe Offensive InternetThe Origins of FairnessThe Oxford Handbook of Animal EthicsThe Oxford Handbook of Ethics at the End of LifeThe Perfect BabyThe Philosophy of NeedThe Philosophy of PornographyThe Philosophy of PsychiatryThe Politics Of LustThe Portable Ethicist for Mental Health Professionals The Power of Religion in the Public SphereThe Price of PerfectionThe Price of TruthThe Problem of PunishmentThe Prosthetic ImpulseThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe PsychopathThe Purity MythThe Pursuit of PerfectionThe Relevance of Philosophy to LifeThe Right Road to Radical FreedomThe Right to Be ParentsThe Righteous MindThe Root of All EvilThe Rules of InsanityThe Second SexismThe Second-Person StandpointThe Silent World of Doctor and PatientThe Sleep of ReasonThe Social Psychology of Good and EvilThe Social Psychology of MoralityThe Social Psychology of MoralityThe Speed of DarkThe Stem Cell ControversyThe Stem Cell ControversyThe Story of Cruel and UnusualThe Story WithinThe Stubborn System of Moral ResponsibilityThe Suicide TouristThe Terrible GiftThe Theory of OptionsThe Therapy of DesireThe Trauma of Psychological TortureThe Trauma of Psychological TortureThe Triple HelixThe Trolley Problem MysteriesThe Trouble with DiversityThe Truth About the Drug CompaniesThe Ugly LawsThe Varieties of Religious ExperienceThe Virtues of HappinessThe Virtuous Life in Greek EthicsThe Virtuous PsychiatristThe Voice of Breast Cancer in Medicine and BioethicsThe War Against BoysThe War for Children's MindsThe Whole ChildThe Woman RacketThe Worldwide Practice of TortureTherapy with ChildrenThieves of VirtueThree Generations, No ImbecilesTimes of Triumph, Times of DoubtTolerance Among The VirtuesTolerance and the Ethical LifeTolerationToxic PsychiatryTrauma, Truth and ReconciliationTreatment Kind and FairTrusting on the EdgeTry to RememberUltimate JudgementUnborn in the USA: Inside the War on AbortionUndermining ScienceUnderstanding AbortionUnderstanding CloningUnderstanding EmotionsUnderstanding EvilUnderstanding Moral ObligationUnderstanding Physician-Pharmaceutical Industry InteractionsUnderstanding TerrorismUnderstanding the GenomeUnderstanding the Stigma of Mental IllnessUnderstanding Treatment Without ConsentUnhingedUnprincipled VirtueUnsanctifying Human Life: Essays on EthicsUnspeakable Acts, Ordinary PeopleUp in FlamesUpheavals of ThoughtUsers and Abusers of PsychiatryValue-Free Science?Values and Psychiatric DiagnosisValues in ConflictVegetarianismViolence and Mental DisorderVirtue EthicsVirtue, Rules, and JusticeVirtue, Vice, and PersonalityVirtues and Their VicesWar Against the WeakWar, Torture and TerrorismWarrior's DishonourWeaknessWelfare and Rational CareWhat Genes Can't DoWhat Is a Human?What Is Good and WhyWhat Is Good and WhyWhat Is the Good Life?What Price Better Health?What Should I Do?What We Owe to Each OtherWhat Would Aristotle Do?What's Good on TVWhat's Normal?What's Wrong with Children's RightsWhat's Wrong with Homosexuality?What's Wrong With Morality?When Is Discrimination Wrong?Who Holds the Moral High Ground?Who Owns YouWho Qualifies for Rights?Whose America?Whose View of Life?Why Animals MatterWhy Animals MatterWhy I Burned My Book and Other Essays on DisabilityWhy Not Kill Them All?Why Punish? How Much?Why Some Things Should Not Be for SaleWisdom, Intuition and EthicsWithout ConscienceWomen and Borderline Personality DisorderWomen and MadnessWondergenesWould You Kill the Fat Man?Wrestling with Behavioral GeneticsWriting About PatientsYou Must Be DreamingYour Genetic DestinyYour Inner FishYouth Offending and Youth Justice Yuck!
Any anthology on a topic as broad as moral philosophy risks committing sins of omission. In lieu of what Shafer-Landau calls the "point-counterpoint" approach usually taken in ethics readers, in which the audience is presented with positive accounts of particular views and critical responses, Shafer-Landau has chosen, particularly the sections on distinctive moral theories (such as consequentialism and deontological ethics), to focus on various defenses and articulations of the moral theories under consideration. Thus, "Readers will not have criticisms of the theories presented and ready to hand. As a compensation, however, they will have a more nuanced target to aim at when seeking to identify for themselves the vulnerabilities (and the strengths) of the views they are exploring" (xi-xii). As Shafer-Landau promises, Ethical Theory: An Anthology is impressive in its depth, as well as in the breadth of topics in moral philosophy which it contains.
The seventy-six readings of this volume are distributed into twelve parts. Each part begins with an introduction, in which Shafer-Landau lays out the basic issue to be addressed and provides brief summaries of the positions and particular arguments presented in each essay. These introductions are helpful in that they suggest how the readings in each section are related, prepare the reader to identify the key arguments, and suggest points of comparison between various essays, both within individual sections and in other parts of the collection.
Part I, "The Status of Morality," contains important essays and excerpts which address the realism/anti-realism debate concerning whether moral values are objective features of the world and whether there are moral facts which exist independently of the perspectives (or beliefs) of particular individuals or cultures. On the anti-realist side of this debate, David Hume argues that moral values are feelings rather than properties of things. A.J. Ayer extends the Humean analysis of values to its extreme, holding that moral claims are not statements at all, but rather exhortations. J.L. Mackie argues against the existence of moral values, noting that it is "queer" to believe such things exist, and holding that any time we make a value judgment, it is false because it appeals to a property which doesn't exist. Lastly, Gilbert Harman denies that moral properties are needed to explain the moral judgments we make. On the realist side, G.E. Moore argues that good cannot be defined naturalistically and is therefore a "non-natural"--but real--property. Mary Midgley critiques moral relativism (which a second selection by Harman defends), and papers by Michael Smith and Shafer-Landau both defend forms of moral realism.
How and whether moral beliefs are justified gets taken up in Part II, "Moral Knowledge." In particular, the readings in this section address the question of whether the existence of moral disagreement poses an insurmountable problem for our own moral beliefs, as well as the question about what beliefs, if any, serve as the foundation for the rest of our moral views. Renford Bambrough and George Sher both address the problem of disagreement. The selections from Shelley Kagan and Robert Audi defend the idea that the basis of our moral views are grounded in intuitions about particular cases--Kagan's paper defending these intuitions as the basis of moral knowledge and Audi's paper providing a general defense of ethical intuitionism, by trying to show that not all moral beliefs require justification from other moral beliefs. Against this, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues against the idea that any beliefs (including moral beliefs) are self-evident, and defends a coherentist view of moral justification.
The selections in Part III, "Why Be Moral?" address the question of what reason we have to act and live morally. This section contains excerpts from Plato's Republic, in which it is suggested that we have reason to appear moral but no reason to actually be moral. Arguably, this is the first expression of what is now regarded as ethical egoism--that one ought to do whatever serves one's own interests. This idea gets refined in various ways in the selections by Gregory Kavka (who takes a Hobbesian approach to showing that self-interest actually provides grounds for being moral), Philippa Foot (who thinks one can rationally reject morality), and Lester Hunt (who attempts to connect self-interest to the (less selfish-sounding) notion of flourishing, arguing that living morally allows us to flourish, which is itself in our interest). Ethical Egoism is criticized by James Rachels as indefensibly arbitrary (in a way comparable to racism or sexism). Joel Feinberg provides a critique of psychological egoism, which many have thought, if true, would imply that the only psychologically possible sorts of moral systems would have to be rooted in an appeal to our own self-interest. Shafer-Landau defends moral Rationalism, and thus rejects the views offered by both Foot and Kavka. Finally, Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints" suggests that while morality is important, other things matter, too, and we should not feel too compelled to strive for moral sainthood, since we would miss out on other goods and endeavors.
Part IV, "Ethics and Religion," contains discussions of the relationship between God (or religion) and morality. Plato's Euthyphro provides the classic challenge to the idea that things are good (or right) because God issues the relevant commands. If God is not using moral criteria to distinguish good and bad (right and wrong), then these commands seem arbitrary. Robert Adams seeks to diffuse the Euthyphro problem by suggesting that moral commands can be issued (or invented) by a loving God. Moral arguments for the existence of God (or the afterlife)--that there can be no eternal justice or reason to be moral without a God (or afterlife)--are explored in readings from Kant and Stephen Layman. Eric Wielenberg's essay criticizes the idea that there is an essential connection between religion and morality. This section also features excerpts of a debate on this topic between William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.
Questions about the nature of value--particularly, whether there is one or many kinds of value--get taken up in Part V. This section begins with John Stuart Mill's espousal of hedonism--that happiness (or pleasure) is the ultimate, and only value. This is followed by Robert Nozick's well-known "Experience Machine" thought-experiment which seeks to show that there are other values besides that acknowledged by hedonists. Fred Feldman offers a more recent defense of hedonism, and James Griffin argues that the satisfaction of informed desires is the basis of value. Richard Kraut criticizes the desire-satisfaction view and, like Derek Parfit and W.D. Ross (both also featured in this section), opts for value pluralism, which claims that there are many intrinsic values which cannot be reduced to a single factor.
Part VI, "Moral Responsibility," connects the (metaphysical) free will problem to the issue of moral responsibility. Richard Taylor argues that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, and thus that moral responsibility requires some degree of indeterminism in the world. Galen Strawson, however, argues that even if determinism were false, we still could not be responsible for our actions since a lack of determinism would simply imply that our actions are arbitrary. A.J. Ayer rejects the idea that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible, and presents a classic version of compatibilism, which says that we can be held morally responsible for our actions as long as it is possible that we could have done something else (if we had wanted to do something else). Thomas Nagel explores the puzzle of "moral luck," in which he notes that we often hold people morally responsible even when significant aspects of their actions are not in their control, and thus seems to suggest either that moral judgment is irrational (although we can't help doing it) or that we have to live with the fact that luck figures into the moral status of our actions. Susan Wolf tries to work out a view about when we can attribute the quality of being under the will's control to a person's action, and argues that we are responsible for actions that are expressions of our "deeper self." This section concludes with Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," in which Strawson argues that our moral concepts (including those which presuppose responsibility) are autonomous with respect to the issue of determinism, and that the truth of determinism (if it is true) should not make a bit of difference to our moral discourse.
Moral Standing, the topic of Part VII, is concerned with the question of who deserves moral consideration. Kant restricts this quality to humans, arguing that only human lives have intrinsic value, and that animals have only relative value. (That said he does not think it good to mistreat animals.) On this view, moral standing is afforded to those with rationality and autonomy. Peter Singer finds such a view far too restrictive, even prejudicial, and argues that sentience (the ability to have experiences, including those of pleasure and pain) is the ground of moral standing, and thus, that (non-human) animals, too, deserve the same amount of moral consideration as humans. Joel Fienberg agrees with Singer, but attempts to cast moral standing as a matter of having interests rather than of being sentient. Kenneth Goodpaster takes up Feinberg's idea, and argues that the blanket of moral standing needs to be further extended to all living things (including plants and paramecium), since anything with a life has interests. This section also features two papers on the moral standing of fetuses, by Michael Tooley and Don Marquis, who both explore the concept of personhood (and how this notion loads into questions about abortion and infanticide).
Part VIII, "Consequentialism," offers several different defenses of consquentialist theories (generally, utilitarian) of moral rightness: in general, that the moral status of an action is determined by the consequences (or anticipated effect) of performing that action. Defenses of act-utilitarianism (that the rightness of an act is determined by its anticipated consequences) are provided in readings from John Stuart Mill and William Shaw. J.J.C. Smart's essay includes an important criticism of rule-utilitarianism (that right actions are those which are enactments of rules which, if everyone followed them, would have the best consequences): that if rule-utilitarianism is different from act-utilitarianism, this is because rule-utilitarians think that following rules is more important than expected outcome in particular cases. Essentially, this is "rule-worship" rather than true consequentialism, since sometimes following a rule which is generally a good one can have disastrous results. Brad Hooker attempts to defend rule-consequentialism while rejecting utilitarianism (i.e. rejecting that happiness or pleasure is the value towards which our consequentialist calculations must aim). Papers by R.M. Hare, Peter Singer, and John Harris apply consequentialist thinking to particular moral issues, with the results--in some cases, counterintuitive--that slavery might sometimes be moral, that we should contribute much more than we do to famine relief, and that we should all be willing to enlist in a survival lottery which would ensure longer lives for more people, at the occasional sacrifice of a healthy person's transplantable organs.
The main normative rival to consequentialism, deontological ethics, gets taken up in Part IX. The crux of deontology is that some acts are, by their very nature and regardless of the effects such actions have in particular cases, wrong (and others right). This section begins with the classic exposition of a deontological theory by Kant. Selections by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill attempt to clarify particular aspects of Kant's theory, particularly how to understand and apply the two best known formulations of his categorical imperative: that we should only act on maxims we at the same time can will to be universal laws, and that we should always treat all of humanity as an end in itself rather than a means to our own ends. Robert Nozick offers a puzzle for the deontologist: that there may be cases where doing a morally prohibited act (like lying or killing) would prevent the occurrence several instances of this act. If the value of truth or life is the basis for our prohibitions of such acts, then it seems strange that we should condemn an act which seeks to minimize the occurrence of these moral transgressions. Alan Gewirth provides a sophisticated defense of the Golden Rule (which is similar to the second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative) which is meant to show why the duty to respect other persons makes egoism (see Part III) irrational. Selections by Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson explore how and whether the doctrine of double effect may allow the Kantian to avoid Nozick's puzzle (and similar consequentialist criticisms). The doctrine of double effect holds that one is not violating deontological rules as long as one does not directly intend, for example, that the death of an innocent person occurs. (For example, I may permissibly avert a trolley about to kill five people onto a track where it will kill one, as long as I don't intend to kill the one person, even though this is an expected outcome.) However, as the reader will see, the doctrine of double effect is not without its problems, since it would also seem to license killing a person in order to give her organs to other people who need them.
Part X, "Contractarianism," offers four readings on social contract theory which, while generally an issue taken up under the blanket of social and political philosophy, is concerned with basic moral questions about why we should obey rules (or, be moral) and how we should go about living with each other in a way that prevents life from being "nasty, brutish, and short." The section opens with excerpts from Hobbes' Leviathan, in which, in order to avoid a nasty "state of nature," we all agree to give up some of our rights (to take whatever we want), and to transfer these rights to a sovereign, who enforces rules that guarantee that everyone will play fair and get what they deserve, or pay the price for not so doing. David Gautier offers a contemporary articulation and defense of a Hobbesian social contract theory. We then see a different account of the origins of social rules in John Rawls' theory of "justice as fairness," which suggests that just rules are those that would be developed by lawmakers who legislate from behind a "veil of ignorance" (so that they cannot legislate in ways that would be self-serving). Finally, Thomas Scanlon proposes a contractarian system (in which he claims to be preserving what is good in utilitarianism, while rejecting utilitarianism itself), which is rooted in the idea that right actions are those which no one could reasonably reject (or criticize); moral actions are those which reasonable people can agree should be done, since those actions will preserve, protect, or otherwise speak to the interests of all reasonable persons.
Various articulations of a virtue-based approach to moral living are offered in Part XI, "Virtue Ethics." The section begins with excerpts from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, in which we are told that ethics is an "inexact science," that the aim of human life is happiness (by which Aristotle means human flourishing), and that we flourish by living virtuously. Martha Nussbaum's essay tackles the problem that since various cultures have had different ideas about what virtue is, an Aristotelian approach to ethics results in a relativistic conception of morality. Nussbaum challenges this idea, and argues that Aristotle is concerned to identify core values and ideals that are of value for everyone. Rosalind Hursthouse argues in her essay against the claim that a virtue-based ethic fails to offer sufficient moral guidance. This issue is also taken up in the last paper of this section by Julia Annas, who is concerned to work out a view about how moral education should be done. She endorses Aristotle's view that moral virtue requires practice, and argues that becoming moral involves developing a skill, rather than a lot of book-learning. This section also features work by Michael Slote and Christine Swanton, both of whom address the question of how to characterize a virtuous action.
The final section of this anthology, "Prima Facie Duties and Particularism," features several essays concerned with the question of whether there is any tidy way to catalogue our various duties, as well as whether there are any absolute moral rules. W.D. Ross suggests that we have several "prima facie duties"--duties which, if nothing else conflicts with them, we ought to honor--but that when these duties conflict, we simply have to use our intuition to see which duty has more weight; he does not think any sort of consequentialism will solve this problem. David McNaughton offers a contemporary defense of a Rossian view of our duties. Jonathan Dancy, the best-known advocate of moral particularism, argues that there simply are not any general moral rules (and so not even any prima facie duties), because what counts as a reason for doing something in one context can be a reason not to do the same action in a different context. We can only decide what ought to be done, in any given case, by considering the particular features of that case. Margaret Little attempts a less extreme form of particularism, arguing that while there are no moral absolutes, our moral rules are "defeasible generalizations," which capture the general moral rule of thumb; however, there are always going to be cases when the rules should be broken. Finally, Gerald Dworkin defends particularism on the grounds that it captures what we ordinarily do when reasoning about our duties--we typically appeal to details of the particular cases, rather than invoking general principles, and if we can get on in this way, then moral rules or generalizations may not be as necessary as say, Kant or the utilitarians, each in their different ways, thought they were.
All things considered, the readings Shafer-Landau brings together in this collection provide an excellent introduction to ethical theory. The layout of the volume is simple and elegant, and Shafer-Landau's introductions to each section are quite helpful. Anyone in search of a compendium of key readings in ethical theory should consider adding Shafer-Landau's collection to his or her bookshelf. A professor searching for a new book for an ethical theory course could do no better (although he or she, like Shafer-Landau, will struggle in deciding what to include and what to omit in course readings).
© 2007 Matthew Pianalto
Matthew Pianalto is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Arkansas. His personal webpage is: http://comp.uark.edu/~mpianal
Comment on this review