email page print pageAll Topic Reviews
A Theory of Feelings Addictions Memory and the Self"Intimate" Violence against Women1001 Solution-Focused Questions101 Healing Stories101 Things I Wish I'd Known When I Started Using Hypnosis50 Great Myths of Popular Psychology50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a God8 Keys to Body Brain BalanceA Brief History of Modern PsychologyA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Conceptual History of Psychology: Exploring the Tangled Web A Cooperative SpeciesA Guide to Teaching Introductory PsychologyA History of Modern Experimental PsychologyA History of Psychology in AutobiographyA History of Social PsychologyA History of the BrainA History of the MindA Hole in the HeadA Matter of SecurityA Mind of Its OwnA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Place for ConsciousnessA Short Introduction to Promoting Resilience in ChildrenA Social History of PsychologyA Stroll With William JamesA System Architecture Approach to the BrainA Theory of FreedomA Very Bad WizardAbductedAbout FacesAccounts of InnocenceAction, Emotion and WillAdapting MindsADHD & MeADHD in AdultsAdieu to GodAdolescence and Body ImageAdult Bipolar DisordersAdvances in Culture and PsychologyAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAffect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of SelfAffective MappingAgainst EmpathyAgainst HappinessAges and StagesAll Joy and No FunAll Out!All We Have to FearAlterations of ConsciousnessAmerican Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical NeurosciencesAn Argument for MindAncient Bodies, Modern LivesAnd BreatheAnimal MadnessAnimal Tool BehaviorAnimals in TranslationAnomalous CognitionAping MankindArtificial ConsciousnessAspects of PsychologismAsperger Syndrome and Your ChildAsperger Syndrome, Adolescence, and IdentityAssessment and Treatment of Childhood Problems, Second EditionAssisted Suicide and the Right to DieAttachedAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutism and the Myth of the Person AloneAutopsy of a Suicidal MindBecoming an Effective PsychotherapistBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing No OneBelievingBetween Two WorldsBeyond AppearanceBeyond BlueBeyond BullyingBeyond MadnessBeyond MelancholyBeyond the BrainBeyond the DSM StoryBig DreamsBiofeedback for the BrainBipolar ChildrenBipolar DisorderBipolar KidsBlackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive DevelopmentBlind SpotsBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlubberlandBlushBodiesBody ConsciousnessBody Image, Eating Disorders, and Obesity in YouthBody SenseBody WorkBorderline Personality DisorderBorderline Personality Disorder and the Conversational ModelBorn DigitalBorn to Be GoodBorn Together - Reared ApartBounceBoundaries in Human RelationshipsBounded RationalityBozo SapiensBrain and CultureBrain and the GazeBrain Arousal and Information TheoryBrain BugsBrain Change TherapyBrain Circuitry and Signaling in PsychiatryBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-Based Therapy with AdultsBrain-WiseBrainstormBrainstormingBraintrustBrainwashingBrandedBreaking Murphy's LawBright-SidedBuddha's BrainBullying and TeasingBuyologyCan't You Hear Them?CaptureCare of the PsycheCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCerebrum 2007Cerebrum 2010Cerebrum 2015Cerebrum Anthology 2013Changing the SubjectCharacter Strengths and VirtuesCheating LessonsChild and Adolescent Psychological DisordersChildren’s Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness Chomsky NotebookClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyClinical Psychology in Practice ClosureCognition and PerceptionCognition and the BrainCognitive BiologyCognitive DissonanceCognitive FictionsCognitive Mechanisms of Belief ChangeCognitive PragmaticsCognitive ScienceCognitive ScienceCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Therapy of Anxiety DisordersCognitive Unconscious and Human RationalityCold-Blooded KindnessComing of Age in Second LifeCommunication Issues In Autism And Asperger SyndromeCompassion and Healing in Medicine and SocietyComplementary and Alternative Therapies ResearchComprehending ColumbineConfessions of a SociopathConquering Shame and CodependencyConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the Social BrainConsciousness EmergingConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Science of Being HumanConstructing PainContemporary Debates in Cognitive ScienceConversations on ConsciousnessConviction of the InnocentCooperation and Its EvolutionCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCredit and BlameCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychologyCritical Thinking About PsychologyCross-Cultural PsychologyCrowdsourcingCrueltyCultural Assessment in Clinical PsychiatryCuriousDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous and Severe Personality DisorderDaniel DennettDaughters of MadnessDeafness In MindDeath and ConsciousnessDeath of a ParentDecomposing the WillDeep Brain StimulationDeep ChinaDefining DifferenceDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions of GenderDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDeparting from DevianceDescartes' BabyDescartes's Changing MindDescribing Inner Experience?Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Destructive EmotionsDevelopment of Geocentric Spatial Language and CognitionDevelopment of PsychopathologyDialogues on DifferenceDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Digital HemlockDirty MindsDisgust and Its DisordersDisorders of VolitionDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Doing without ConceptsDrunk Tank PinkEducating People to Be Emotionally IntelligentEffective IntentionsEffective Writing in PsychologyEffortless AttentionEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbracing MindEmbracing UncertaintyEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotionally InvolvedEmotionsEmotionsEmotions and LifeEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions RevealedEmotions, Aggression, and Morality in ChildrenEmotions, Stress, and HealthEmpathyEnjoymentErotic MoralityEscape Your Own PrisonEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthically Challenged ProfessionsEveryday Mind ReadingEvidence for PsiEvidence-Based Mental Health PracticeEvil MenEvolution and Human BehaviorEvolution and LearningEvolution, Games, and GodEvolution, Gender, and RapeEvolutionary Psychology and ViolenceEvolutionary Psychology as Maladapted PsychologyExacting BeautyExperiences of DepressionExperimenterExplaining the BrainExplaining the BrainExplorations in Neuroscience, Psychology and ReligionExploring TranssexualismExpression and the InnerExtending Self-Esteem ResearchExtraordinary BeliefsFact and Value in EmotionFaking ItFatigue as a Window to the BrainFavorite Activities for the Teaching of PsychologyFeeling GoodFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFinding Meaning, Facing FearsFitting In Is OverratedFive Constraints on Predicting BehaviorFlourishingFlow: The Psychology of Optimal ExperienceFolk Psychological NarrativesFooling HoudiniForever YoungFormulation in Psychology and PsychotherapyFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Psychological ThoughtFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom EvolvesFrom Axons to IdentityFrom Madness to Mental HealthFrom Neurons to Self-ConsciousnessFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrom Symptom to SynapseFrontiers of ConsciousnessGay, Straight, and the Reason WhyGenerosityGenes, Environment, and PsychopathologyGenetic Nature/CultureGeniusGetting Under the SkinGlued to GamesGoing SaneGot Parts?Group GeniusGrowing Up GirlGuilt, Shame, and AnxietyGut ReactionsHallucinationHandbook New Sexuality StudiesHandbook of Closeness and IntimacyHandbook of Critical PsychologyHandbook of Emotion RegulationHandbook of EmotionsHandbook of Personality DisordersHandbook of PsychopathyHandbook of Self and IdentityHandbook of Self and IdentityHandbook of Spatial CognitionHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness at WorkHappiness Is.Happy at LastHard to GetHardwired BehaviorHatredHealing the SplitHidden ResourcesHope and DespairHot ThoughtHot ThoughtHouse and PsychologyHow Animals Affect UsHow Animals GrieveHow Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Doctors ThinkHow Enlightenment Changes Your BrainHow Families Still MatterHow History Made the MindHow Infants Know MindsHow Many Friends Does One Person Need?How People ChangeHow Professors ThinkHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Change Someone You LoveHow We ReasonHow We RememberHughes' Outline of Modern PsychiatryHumanHuman BondingHuman Reasoning and Cognitive ScienceHypnotismHysteriaiBrainIdentifying Hyperactive ChildrenIdentifying the MindiDisorderImagination and the Meaningful BrainImitation and the Social MindImpulse Control DisordersImpulsivityIn an Unspoken VoiceIn Defense of SentimentalityIn DoubtIn Search of HappinessIn the Wake of 9/11Individual and Collective Memory ConsolidationInner Experience and NeuroscienceInner PresenceInside the American CoupleIntegrated Behavioral Health CareIntegrating Evolution and DevelopmentIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntellectual DisabilityIntelligenceIntelligence, Destiny, and EducationIntentions and IntentionalityInterdependent MindsInterpreting MindsInto the Minds of MadmenIntoxicating MindsIntrospection VindicatedIntuitionInventing PersonalityInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIs There Anything Good About Men?Issues for Families, Schools and CommunitiesJane Sexes It UpJoint AttentionJoint AttentionJudgment and Decision MakingJust a DogJust BabiesJuvenile-Onset SchizophreniaKarl JaspersKey Thinkers in PsychologyKidding OurselvesKids of CharacterKilling MonstersLack of CharacterLanguage OriginsLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw, Mind and BrainLess Than HumanLet Kids Be KidsLet's Talk About DeathLiving NarrativeLiving with Mild Cognitive ImpairmentLonelinessLooking for SpinozaLossLOT 2Love at Goon ParkMachine ConsciousnessMacrocognitionMade for Each OtherMadnessMaking a Good Brain GreatMaking Habits, Breaking HabitsMaking Minds and MadnessMaking Up the MindMale SexualityMan and WomanMan's Search for MeaningMan, Beast, and ZombieManic MindsManlinessMapping the MindMarking the MindMarvelous Learning AnimalMasculinity Studies and Feminist TheoryMeaningMeaning, Mortality, and ChoiceMedical MusesMeditating SelflesslyMeetings with a Remarkable ManMemoryMemory and DreamsMemory and EmotionMemory And UnderstandingMental BiologyMental IllnessMental Time TravelMetacognitionMetacognition and Theory of MindMethods in MindMindMindMind and BrainMind and ConsciousnessMind Games:Mind in LifeMind TimeMind to MindMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMindful AngerMindfulnessMindfulnessMindfulness and AcceptanceMindfulness-Based Treatment Approaches: Clinician's Guide to Evidence Base and ApplicationsMinding AnimalsMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds, Brains, and LawMindsightMindworldsMirrors in the BrainMistakes Were Made (But Not by Me)Models of MadnessMoodMoral Development and RealityMoral MindsMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Mothers and OthersMotivation and Cognitive ControlMotivational Interviewing: Preparing People For ChangeMovies and the MindMulticulturalism and the Therapeutic ProcessMultiplicityMuses, Madmen, and ProphetsMy Family AlbumMyths about SuicideNarrative IdentitiesNarrative PsychiatryNarratives in PsychiatryNaturalizing Intention in ActionNature and NarrativeNature Via NurtureNeither Bad nor MadNerveNeurobiology and the Development of Human MoralityNeurochemistry of ConsciousnessNeurodiversityNeuroethicsNeuroLogicNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neuroscience and PhilosophyNo Child Left DifferentNo Two AlikeNot By Genes AloneNot Much Just Chillin'Not So Abnormal PsychologyNurturing the Older Brain and MindOn AnxietyOn Being an Introvert or Highly Sensitive PersonOn Being HumanOn Being MovedOn Deep History and the BrainOn DesireOn KillingOn Nature and LanguageOn PaedophiliaOn PersonalityOn the Frontier of AdulthoodOn the Origins of Cognitive ScienceOn The Stigma Of Mental IllnessOnflowOpen MindsOpening Skinner's BoxOrigin of MindOrigins of PsychopathologyOther MindsOut of Our HeadsOut of the WoodsOvercoming Depersonalization DisorderPanpsychism and the Religious AttitudePanpsychism in the WestParenting and the Child's WorldPassionate EnginesPathologies of the WestPatient-Based Approaches to Cognitive NeurosciencePediatric PsychopharmacologyPeople Types and Tiger StripesPerception & CognitionPerception beyond InferencePerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPersonal Development and Clinical PsychologyPerspectives on ImitationPhantoms in the BrainPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhrenologyPhysical RealizationPhysics in MindPieces of LightPlaying with FirePositive PsychologyPositive PsychologyPostcards from the Brain MuseumPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPoverty and Brain Development During ChildhoodPractical Ethics for PsychologistsPractical Management of Personality DisorderPractical Management of Personality DisorderPredicative MindsPredictably IrrationalPreference, Belief, and SimilarityPrenatal Testosterone in MindPrivileged AccessProcrastinationProust Was a NeuroscientistPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsychological AgencyPsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychological Dimensions of the SelfPsychologists Defying the CrowdPsychologyPsychologyPsychology and Consumer CulturePsychology and LawPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology for ScreenwritersPsychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and TheoriesPsychology's GhostsPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology's TerritoriesPsychopathologyPsychopathyPsychosis and EmotionPsychotherapy, American Culture, and Social PolicyPutnam CampPutting a Name to ItQuantum Memory PowerQuietRadical DistortionRadical Embodied Cognitive ScienceRadical ExternalismRadical GraceRapeRe-Visioning PsychiatryReal MaterialismReality CheckReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecovery in Mental IllnessRecreative MindsRedirectReducing Adolescent RiskRegulating EmotionsRelational BeingRelational Mental HealthRelational Suicide AssessmentReliability in Cognitive NeuroscienceRemembering HomeRemembering Our ChildhoodResearch Advances in Genetics and GenomicsResearching Children's ExperienceResilience in ChildrenRestoring ResilienceRethinking ADHDRethinking Learning DisabilitiesRethinking Middle YearsRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfRevolution in PsychologyRoadmap to ResilienceRomance and Sex in Adolescence and Emerging AdulthoodSchizophrenia RevealedSchizophrenia, Culture, and SubjectivityScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologyScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologySecond NatureSecond NatureSecond That EmotionSecond-order Change in PsychotherapySecrets of the MindSee What I'm SayingSee What I'm SayingSeeing and VisualizingSeeing RedSelf and SocietySelf Comes to MindSelf Control in Society, Mind, and BrainSelf-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric PatientsSelf-CompassionSelf-RegulationSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessSelfless InsightSelvesSerial KillersSex at DawnSex on the BrainSex, Time and PowerSexual Coercion in Primates and HumansSexual DisordersSexual FluiditySexual ReckoningsSexualized BrainsShame and GuiltShatteredSimulating MindsSisyphus's BoulderSNAPSocial NeuroscienceSocial NeuroscienceSocial NeuroscienceSocial Psychology and DiscourseSome We Love, Some We Hate, Some We EatSoul DustSparkSpiral of EntrapmentSplendors and Miseries of the BrainSports Hypnosis in PracticeStanding at Water's EdgeStich and His CriticsStillpowerStop OverreactingStructure and Agency in Everyday LifeStructures of AgencyStuffStumbling on HappinessSubjectivity and SelfhoodSubstance Abuse and EmotionSupersizing the MindSweet DreamsSynaptic SelfTales from Both Sides of the BrainTalking Oneself SoberTalking to BabiesTaming the Troublesome ChildTargeting AutismTeaching Problems and the Problems of TeachingTeleological RealismTen Years of Viewing from WithinTestosterone RexThat's DisgustingThe 5 Elements of Effective ThinkingThe Accidental MindThe Age of EmpathyThe Altruism EquationThe Altruistic BrainThe American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Clinical PsychiatryThe Anatomy of BiasThe Anxious BrainThe Archaeology of MindThe Art and Science of MindfulnessThe Art InstinctThe Art of HypnosisThe Asymmetrical BrainThe Bifurcation of the SelfThe Big Book of ConceptsThe Big DisconnectThe Birth of IntersubjectivityThe Birth of the MindThe Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge ManagementThe Blank SlateThe Body Has a Mind of Its OwnThe Bounds of CognitionThe Boy Who Was Raised as a DogThe BrainThe BrainThe Brain and the Meaning of LifeThe Brain SupremacyThe Brain That Changes ItselfThe Brain's Way of HealingThe Brain: Big Bangs, Behaviors, and BeliefsThe Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive ScienceThe Cambridge Handbook of Situated CognitionThe Character of ConsciousnessThe Chemistry Between UsThe Choice EffectThe Clinical Science of Suicide PreventionThe Cognitive Approach to Conscious MachinesThe Cognitive Behavioral Workbook for Anxiety: A Step-By-Step ProgramThe Cognitive NeurosciencesThe Cognitive-Emotional BrainThe College Fear FactorThe Commercialization of Intimate LifeThe Compass of PleasureThe Concepts of ConsciousnessThe Conscious BrainThe Conscious SelfThe Consuming InstinctThe Creating BrainThe Creative BrainThe Crucible of ConsciousnessThe Crucible of ExperienceThe Cure WithinThe Dao of NeuroscienceThe Developing MindThe Developing MindThe Development of PsychopathologyThe Disappearance of the Social in American Social PsychologyThe Dissolution of MindThe Duty to ProtectThe Educated ParentThe Ego TunnelThe Elephant in the RoomThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human ExperienceThe Emotional Journey of the Alzheimer's FamilyThe Encultured BrainThe Encyclopedia of StupidityThe Enduring Self in People with Alzheimer'sThe Epidemiology of SchizophreniaThe Essential DifferenceThe Ethical BrainThe Evolution of ChildhoodThe Evolution of CooperationThe Evolution of LanguageThe Evolution of MindThe Evolving BrainThe Executive BrainThe Faces of TerrorismThe Feeling BrainThe Feeling of What HappensThe First IdeaThe Folly of FoolsThe Folly of FoolsThe Folly of FoolsThe Foundations of Cognitive ArchaeologyThe Fundamentalist MindsetThe GapThe Gender TrapThe Geography of BlissThe Gift of ShynessThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Happiness HypothesisThe Happiness of PursuitThe Health Psychology HandbookThe Healthy Aging BrainThe High Price of MaterialismThe History of PsychologyThe Human FaceThe Human SparkThe Hypomanic EdgeThe Imagery DebateThe Immeasurable MindThe Imprinted BrainThe Incredible Shrinking MindThe Innate MindThe Innate MindThe Integrated SelfThe Intentional BrainThe Language of ThoughtThe Languages of the BrainThe Lexicon of Adlerian PsychologyThe Lie DetectorsThe Lives of the BrainThe Lonely AmericanThe Lust for BloodThe Madness of WomenThe Male BrainThe Man Who Lost His LanguageThe Man Who Shocked the WorldThe Man Who Tasted ShapesThe Man Who Wasn't ThereThe Matter of the MindThe Mature MindThe Mean Girl MotiveThe Meaning of EvilThe Meaning of OthersThe Meaning of the BodyThe Measure of MadnessThe Measure of MindThe Medicalization of Everyday LifeThe Mind and the BrainThe Mind in ContextThe Mind of the ChildThe Mind of the HorseThe Mind's EyeThe Mind, the Body and the WorldThe Mind-Gut ConnectionThe Mindful BrainThe Misleading MindThe Moral MindThe Most Dangerous AnimalThe Most Human HumanThe Mother FactorThe Myth of ChoiceThe Myth of Depression as DiseaseThe Myth of Mirror NeuronsThe Myth of Self HelpThe Myth of Self-EsteemThe Myth of the Spoiled ChildThe Nature of the SelfThe Necessity Of MadnessThe Neuro RevolutionThe Neuron and the MindThe Neuropsychology of the UnconsciousThe Neuroscience of Human RelationshipsThe Neuroscience of PsychotherapyThe Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social BrainThe New BrainThe New Science of DreamingThe New Science of the MindThe New UnconsciousThe Normal PersonalityThe Origins of FairnessThe Overflowing BrainThe Oxford Companion to the MindThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of MindThe Paradoxical PrimateThe Perfectionist's HandbookThe Peripheral MindThe Phenomenology ReaderThe Philosopher's Secret FireThe Philosophical BabyThe Political MindThe Politics of HappinessThe Positive Side of Negative EmotionsThe Postnational SelfThe Postpartum EffectThe Power of PlayThe Praeger Handbook of TranssexualityThe Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday LifeThe Primate MindThe Prism of GrammarThe Psychobiology of Trauma and Resilience Across the LifespanThe Psychological Construction of EmotionThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of HappinessThe Psychology of LifestyleThe Psychology of Religious FundamentalismThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe Psychology of SpiritualityThe Psychology of StereotypingThe Psychology of SuperheroesThe Psychophysiology of Self-AwarenessThe Pursuit of PerfectThe Quest for Mental HealthThe Rational ImaginationThe Ravenous BrainThe Reasons of LoveThe Righteous MindThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Science of EvilThe Science of Intimate RelationshipsThe Science of Shame and its Treatment The Second SelfThe Secret History of EmotionThe Secret Lives of BoysThe Self and Its EmotionsThe Self-Sabotage CycleThe Sense of SelfThe Sensitive SelfThe Shape of ThoughtThe Social AnimalThe Social Nature of Mental IllnessThe Social Neuroscience of EmpathyThe Social Psychology of Good and EvilThe Social Psychology of MoralityThe Social Psychology of MoralityThe Story of Intellectual DisabilityThe Structure of ThinkingThe Survivors ClubThe Talking ApeThe Teenage BrainThe Tell-Tale BrainThe Temperamental ThreadThe Tender CutThe Tending InstinctThe Time ParadoxThe Trauma MythThe Trauma of Psychological TortureThe Trauma of Psychological TortureThe Trouble with IllnessThe True PathThe Truth About GriefThe Turing TestThe Uncertain SciencesThe Undoing ProjectThe Unhappy ChildThe Upside of IrrationalityThe War for Children's MindsThe Well-Tuned BrainThe Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the MonsterThe Winner's BrainThe Wisdom in FeelingThe Woman RacketThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the WorldThe Wow ClimaxThe Yipping TigerThemes, Issues and Debates in PsychologyTheoretical Issues in Psychology: An IntroductionTheory of AddictionTheory of MindThings and PlacesThink CatThink Confident, Be ConfidentThinking about AddictionThinking and SeeingThis Emotional Life: In Search of Ourselves...and HappinessThought and LanguageThought in a Hostile WorldTo Have and To Hurt:Toward an Evolutionary Biology of LanguageToward Replacement Parts for the BrainTrauma and Human ExistenceTrauma, Tragedy, TherapyTreating Attachment DisordersTreating Self-InjuryTreating Self-Injury: A Practical GuideTrue to Our FeelingsTrusting the Subject?Understanding and Treating Borderline Personality DisorderUnderstanding ConsciousnessUnderstanding ParanoiaUnderstanding PeopleUnderstanding TerrorismUndoing Perpetual StressUnlock the Genius WithinUnsettled MindsUnstrange MindsUnthinkingUnthoughtUs and ThemViolent PartnersVirtue, Vice, and PersonalityVision and MindVisual AgnosiaWarrior's DishonourWe Who Are DarkWednesday Is Indigo BlueWelcome to Your BrainWhat Do Women Want?What Dying People WantWhat Have We DoneWhat Intelligence Tests MissWhat Is an Emotion: Classic and Contemporary ReadingsWhat Is Emotion?What is Intelligence?What Is Mental Illness?What Is Thought?What Makes Your Brain Happy and Why You Should Do the Opposite What the Best College Students DoWhat the Dog SawWhat We Know about Emotional IntelligenceWhat We Say MattersWhat's Wrong With Morality?When Boys Become BoysWhen Perfect Isn't Good EnoughWhen the Impossible HappensWhen Walls Become DoorwaysWho's Been Sleeping in Your HeadWho's in Charge?Why Humans Like to CryWhy Love MattersWhy Lyrics LastWhy People CooperateWhy People Die by SuicideWhy Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human BehaviorWhy Smart People Can Be So StupidWhy the Mind is Not a ComputerWhy Us?Why We LieWhy We LoveWhy We SleepWider than the SkyWilliam James at the BoundariesWilling, Wanting, WaitingWittgenstein And PsychologyWomen and Child Sexual AbuseWorking MindsYoga and PsychologyYou Are What You RememberYoung Minds in Social WorldsYour Brain on CubsYour Brain on FoodYour Brain on Food: How Chemicals Control Your Thoughts and Feelings,Your Brain on YogaYour Child in the BalanceZombies and Consciousness
Overview of Neuroscience and Philosophy
Neuroscience and Philosophy is a collection of essays based on a three-hour "Author and Critics" session at the 2005 American Philosophical Association (APA) meeting in New York. The volume is organized as follows: "The Argument" includes various excerpts from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003); "The Rebuttals" include new critical essays by both Daniel Dennett and John Searle; and finally "Reply to the Rebuttals" includes a detailed response by Bennett and Hacker to both Dennett and Searle. The volume also includes an Introduction and Conclusion by Daniel Robinson.
As a whole, the volume is immensely readable and accessible to non-specialists (at least most of it; parts get rather technical, but the average intelligent reader will most certainly find this a rewarding read). A comprehensive set of end notes are included which elaborate on points made in the text, provide specific citations to support claims and objections, and also point the reader to a very useful list of additional resources to investigate.
The volume is also a good introduction to some of the main debates in cognitive neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, including the notions of consciousness, qualia, intentionality, and ordinary language philosophy. Finally, I believe that this volume exhibits some of the strengths of interdisciplinary interaction. Philosophical inquiry is enhanced when combined with empirical neuroscience; and empirical neuroscience is enhanced when combined with philosophy. Of course, with interdisciplinary work there is the risk of misunderstanding or "talking past" each other. The organization of the volume as a dialectal exchange allows for such misunderstandings to be minimized, but not entirely removed.
The Argument (Bennett and Hacker)
Following the "ordinary language philosophy" of Oxford in the early 1960s, Bennett and Hacker understand that philosophical inquiry is limited to figuring out what makes sense and what is non-sense. Scientific inquiry, on the other hand, is about figuring out what is true and what is not. Thus, it is the work of philosophy to engage in keen reflection about how we use our terms. What this means is that we must strive for conceptual clarity (what the authors call "logic-chopping") before we can hope to pursue meaningful empirical research.
Bennett and Hacker believe that much of cognitive neuroscience is afflicted with linguistic nonsense. For example, they believe that much of Descartes's misguided dualism appears in modern discussions of neuroscience (replacing the immaterial soul as the seat of thinking with the brain). Bennett and Hacker believe that this is the key bit of non-sense currently plaguing cognitive neuroscience: the misapplication of intentionality to the brain or parts of the brain, or what they call the mereological fallacy. Typical examples of such a fallacy is to say that the brain reasons, decides, or wants. But, according to Bennett and Hacker's ordinary language approach (based on Wittgenstein and Ryle) only whole persons can reason, decide, or want. In short, Bennett and Hacker object that the ascription of "intentional states" (believing that, deciding that, wanting that...) are misplaced when applied to brains or parts of brains. Only whole persons (or sufficiently complex systems -- such as animals) can be the proper recipients of such psychological attributions. Thus, it is not that the sentence, "his brain wants to sort through all the incoming visual information" is false; rather, such a sentence is nonsensical (it is neither true nor false, since the attribution of intentional attitudes to the brain is a misapplication). In this sense, cognitive neuroscience must rid itself of this misleading, nonsensical way of speaking in favor of an ordinary language approach where only whole persons are the subjects of such psychological verbs.
Bennett and Hacker trace this fallacious tendency to several key players in the current debate. As such, they include in their discussion cognitive scientists, philosophers, and psychologists. After documenting how these scholars repeatedly use intentional language in this erroneous, nonsensical way, they survey the possible response routes. After consider each possible route, Bennett and Hacker conclude that in fact the majority of scholars discussing cognitive neuroscience fail to use language (especially language about intentional states) in sensible ways.
Bennett and Hacker draw several conclusions from their study. First, they claim that we cannot hope to study human cognition successfully unless we first get our language right (that is, making sure our linguistic usage avoids nonsensical fallacies. This means, among other things, avoiding the attribution of wants, desires, or thoughts (i.e., any intentional state) to the brain or parts of the brain. Bennett and Hacker insist that such intentional terms are only applicable to whole humans (or organisms suitably like human beings).
They also conclude that "getting our language in good order" will assist us in interpreting our experimental results. Without clarity of language (say, avoiding the mereological fallacy), our interpretation of scientific findings will be skewed. Furthermore, when neuroscientists are formulating new research questions, new experimental designs, and pushing the limits of our knowledge about human cognition, Bennett and Hacker insist that our philosophical and conceptual work must not lead to nonsensical presuppositions. In other words, the future success of cognitive neuroscience depends on clarifying our psychological concepts and avoiding the pitfalls of nonsense.
The Rebuttals (Dennett and Searle)
In his essay, Daniel Dennett agrees that in order to have a successful cognitive neuroscience we must diagnose and reformulate our linguistic presuppositions. For example, Dennett agrees with Bennett and Hacker that much of Cartesian dualism still infects neuroscience (shifting the emphasis from an immaterial soul that thinks to the brain that thinks, or what Dennett calls "Cartesian materialism). Dennett also agrees with the idea that we should appeal to ordinary language to resolve such dilemmas. In fact, Dennett points out that this is the very methodological suggestion that lead him to promote the term "folk psychology" (he also points out that Bennett and Hacker seem to overlook the fact that many of their points were made by Dennett some 30 years prior!). Finally, Dennett also agrees with Bennett and Hacker's rejection of "qualia" as ontologically free-floating bits of consciousness.
But Dennett's agreeable nature stops there. Most of his essay is ruthlessly critical of Bennett and Hacker (focusing his attack of Hacker). For example, one of the key arguments forwarded by Bennett and Hacker is that philosophers and neuroscientists are committing the mereological fallacy (ascribing attributes of wholes to their parts), and they think that Dennett commits this fallacy too. Dennett points out that he helped to develop this very criticism against his philosophical opponents, and does not much appreciate the sloppy research Bennett and Hacker produced that misconstrued three decades of his work.
Dennett goes on to tackle just a few key objections to Bennett and Hacker. First, Dennett questions their assertion that conceptual (philosophical, linguistic) questions are distinct from empirical questions. Dennett believes that there is a clear sense in which answers to philosophical questions are more than just "makes sense" or "doesn't make sense". Dennett believes that answers to such conceptual questions can also be "right" or "wrong". As such, the distinction maintained by Bennett and Hacker does not stand up, especially when we are engaged in what Dennett calls "naïve anthropology" (the empirical study of language). So, for example, what happens when we have a disagreement about what "makes sense"? Apparently Bennett and Hacker assume that their own native linguistic capacity is all that they need to cite in order to resolve such conflicts (appealing, as it were, to some set of "grammatical rules" that will decide which usage is sensical and which is nonsensical).
However, Dennett points out that there is no set rules for proper usage, and that when we are engaged in linguistic research, we are engaged in empirical research (not mere "logic chopping"). In short, we have no reason to privilege our own usage of language as THE correct usage. After all, we may be perverse and peculiar in what we take to be sensical, or else those with whom we disagree might be speaking a different language (i.e., a case of indeterminacy of translation). In this way, following Quine's naturalism, Dennett objects to Bennett and Hacker, insisting that there is a keen interplay between philosophy and science.
Dennett also includes a number of additional objections, including the value of empirical discoveries about the brain and the nervous system. He points out that it is an empirical discovery that our brains are engaged in processes that allow us to be conscious, to think, to feel, and to act. Moreover, it is an empirical discovery that brains, or parts of our brains, engage in processes very similar to intentional states, such as guessing, tracking, sorting, and deciding. In fact, Dennett points out that this very discovery is what lead him to develop his account of the "intentional stance". For Dennett, the intentional stance is a kind of ordinary (folk psychological) language applied to complex systems. The brain is a complex system, whose operations can be captured in meaningful ways by speaking as if intentional states applied. What Bennett and Hacker take to be "conceptual blunders" are widespread among philosophers and neuroscientists, and such "blunders" have been responsible for offering sophisticated new explanation for how human cognition occurs. In short, Dennett finds it laughable that they suggest neuroscientists give up this way of speaking, even though it has been so fruitful! (Dennett points out that the intentional stance is much more widespread than Bennett and Hacker realize: computer programmers, electrical engineers, and physicists all speak in intentional terms when discussing computers looking for the printer, thermostats realizing that it is too cold, or falling objects trying to reach a resting point.) While such widespread use of intentional language has been largely metaphorical, Dennett denies that such metaphors are devastating to empirical research. To the contrary, such metaphors are responsible for developing new (and better) explanations of complex phenomena, for promoting innovating research, and for developing comprehensive revolutions in empirical science.
Dennett concludes that Bennett and Hacker's book misses the mark. They offer a single line of attack (the mereological fallacy) that completely fails under close scrutiny. The so-called conceptual confusion Bennett and Hacker discuss is productive and helpful. While Bennett and Hacker offer no positive theories or models, if taken seriously their proposal also undermines our ability to offer rich and meaningful explanations of cognitive neuroscience.
John Searle's rebuttal is delightfully written, witty, and very pointed. His remarks are well organized and document several key objections that are devastating to Bennett and Hacker. Like Dennett, Searle begins with a few (brief) remarks regarding points of agreement. Very quickly, however, we see Searle launch his attack and make short work of Bennett and Hacker.
First, on a technical note, Searle points out that what Bennett and Hacker call the "mereological fallacy" is really what Ryle called a "category mistake". But then Searle goes on to remark that the category mistake they accuse most of the neuroscience community of making is disastrous. In fact, Searle develops a very nice line of argument against Bennett and Hacker, accusing them of committing the following fallacy: in their attempt to rid cognitive neuroscience of misguided and confusion linguistic usage, Bennett and Hacker fail to distinguish criteria for ascribing mental states from criteria for actually having mental states. Arguing that brains are the inappropriate subjects of mental states does not lead to the view that brains are in now way the locus on such psychological processes. In this sense, Bennett and Hacker are unable to distinguish the idea that while brains are not themselves literally deciding things (like deciding what to have for lunch, or which rose is white and which rose is red), the brain most certainly plays a role in such decisions. While the brain may not be the appropriate subject for such psychological verbs, it is misleading to think that the brain plays no role at all in psychology. Searle writes: "The fallacy, in short, is one of confusing the rules for using the words with the ontology. Just as old-time behaviorism confused the evidence for mental states with the ontology of the mental states, so this [strategy used by Bennett and Hacker] construes the grounds for making the attribution with the fact that is attributed. It is a fallacy to say that the conditions for success operation of the language game are conditions for the existence of the phenomena in question [i.e., consciousness]" p. 105).
Searle wraps up his critical essay with a few remarks about the appropriate relationship between philosophy and science. For example, he notes that while most philosophical problems are not solved by empirical research, there are at least some that are. Bennett and Hacker assume that such a distinction is possible, and valuable. However, Searle admits that he is unable to make a "really sharp, precise distinction... between empirical questions and conceptual questions" (p. 123). In this way, Searle aligns himself with Dennett and Quine and other naturalists who find there to be a continuity between science and philosophy.
Reply to the Rebuttals (Bennett and Hacker)
In their reply to Dennett and Searle, Bennett and Hacker maintain their position that conceptual (philosophical) questions and issues are completely distinct from empirical questions and issues. They offer a few examples, but do not offer a convincing reply to Dennett or Searle. They simply re-state their original assertion with new examples.
Bennett and Hacker also maintain their original use of the term "mereological" and insist that their original charge stands (that most of the philosophical and neuroscientific community is engaged in nonsensical, fallacious ascriptions of psychological states to brains and/or brain processes). Bennett and Hacker maintain that it is an error -- a conceptual error, not a factual error -- to ascribe psychological states (intentional states, consciousness, etc.) to the brain or parts of the brain. Despite Dennett's objections, Bennett and Hacker maintain that it just doesn't make any sense to ascribe psychological states to anything other than whole human persons.
Earlier in the volume, Searle objects to this suggestion by pointing out that Bennett and Hacker do not provide a positive account of personhood. What, exactly, do they mean by a person? Despite providing no such account in their original work, Bennett and Hacker suggest that talking of persons and attributing psychological states to persons makes perfect sense. While they appeal to Locke's notion of "person" as a forensic term (p. 134), they do not elaborate with many more details. Instead, what they provide is a re-hashing of Searle's extremely clear summary of Bennett and Hacker's reliance on Wittgenstein (oddly enough, Searle's explanation of what they are doing is far more coherent than the explanation provided by Bennett and Hacker!). What Bennett and Hacker's approach amounts to is that a "person" is, roughly speaking, a human being whose bodily actions are observable. Thus, we can say that a person is thinking X when they display various behaviors. Because the brain does not display behaviors that allow us to ascribe "believes that X" we cannot ascribe beliefs to the brain. This, of course, is roundly criticized by Searle (the difference between evidence for ascribing psychological states vs. actually having such psychological states), but Bennett and Hacker fail to address the main thrust of Searle's objection.
However, Bennett and Hacker agree with Searle that there is a distinction between (a) what criteria we should use to ascribe psychological states (and that these criteria are behavioral), and (b) what neurological processes or pathways or regions are involved in various psychological states (i.e., the "locus" of activity within the brain when a person is thinking). While they acknowledge this distinction, they insist that (a) points to whole persons and their observable behaviors as the proper subjects of conscious states, but (b) points to the idea that brains are merely implicated in a person's thinking (that brains are not thinking; and it's not that brains fail to think; they just aren't the right kinds of things to which thinking or not thinking apply).
At this point, the reader might begin to doubt that these scholars are really talking to each other, as opposed to talking past each other. There seems to be a lot of repeating (especially on the part of Bennett and Hacker) which fails to engage the other scholars. More on this below.
Next, Bennett and Hacker turn to Dennett's intentional stance, attempting to turn the tables on Dennett. In this criticism, Dennett suggested that his intentional stance enabled neuroscientific researchers to push their understanding further, and to provide meaningful and testable explanations. He also claimed that Bennett and Hacker's proposal would cripple neuroscientific research. They write, "No well-confirmed empirical theory in neuroscience has emerged from Dennett's explanations, for ascribing 'sort of psychological properties' to parts of the brain does not explain anything... Not only does it not explain, it generates further incoherence" (pp. 140-141). Who is right? Again, we shall return to that below.
Finally, Bennett and Hacker round out their reply by re-articulating their behavioral orientation, for it seems that they want to affirm the existence of "persons" as subjects of psychological properties, and rely on (whole) bodily behavior as the "data" for ascribing such properties, while eliminating everything else (qualia, private (non-public) mental states, etc.) except plainly-described neurological events (stripped, of course, of any talk of intentionality). How do the propose to support this view? Well, their support is rather laughable. Earlier, Searle draws a parallel with cognition by considering digestion (another physiological process studied by science). Bennett and Hacker take Searle's idea and maintain that "his stomach is digesting food" makes perfect sense (attributing the verb "is digesting" to a person's stomach is appropriate), but that it is inappropriate to say "his brain is thinking". Why? Because we can open up a person's stomach see the food being digested. Presumably, if we open up a person's skull, we won't see thinking happening. Rather, we see thinking happening, on Bennett and Hacker's account, by observing whole persons (specifically, we observe their bodily actions).
Now, this seems a little odd to use the "let's cut it open and look with our naked eye" methodology as a way of solving a conceptual debate. As a line of support for the conceptual clarity of ascribing digestion to the stomach and denying the conceptual coherence of ascribing thinking to the brain, this is not an impressive move.
It is true that when a person is thinking, we would not be able to open her skull and view her brain engaged in "thinking". But this misses the whole point: the aim of empirical cognitive neuroscience is to give us answers to exactly this sort of question (what happens in one's body when one is engaged in thinking?). Before it was discovered that the heart pumps blood, the very idea would have been dismissed by Bennett and Hacker as a bit of conceptual incoherence. The heart, after all, is not involved with circulating blood (only the whole human body does that). And besides, everyone already knows that the heart is the seat of emotions, love, sympathy, and sadness. In ordinary language, when we are suffering an emotional trauma, we call it "heart ache".
Just as it would have seemed preposterous to suggest that the heart pumps blood, it now seems preposterous to Bennett and Hacker that the brain could be conscious or could be engaged in thinking. But empirical research sometimes reveals that our linguistic presuppositions are limiting our understanding. The whole point of empirical cognitive neuroscience is to help us to understand processes that may be hard to see with the naked eye. Some complex processes are distributed across space (that is, across the span of the brain or across the span of the nervous system). In much the same way as the operation of the immune system is distributed across space, cognition is not easily viewed with the naked eye. It is up to science to help reveal parts of the world to us, and for us to respond by developing new and innovative ways of discussing the phenomena discovered.
I take it that this is precisely Dennett's view: sometimes empirical research enables us to use new linguistic conventions to capture our new understanding of the world. Bennett and Hacker seem to think that science must rely on conceptual analysis to sort out all the details in advance. Dennett's naturalism maintains that there is a reciprocity between the empirical and the conceptual. Sometimes that involves adopting the intentional stance with respect to neurological processes. Yet, Bennett and Hacker would insist that such a move undermines our ability to engage in meaningful cognitive neuroscientific research.
Thus, on one side, we have Bennett and Hacker accusing many (most?) philosophers and neuroscientists of committing what they call the mereological fallacy. They maintain that most people are engaged a fallacious ascription of psychological properties to parts of human persons (and that this undermines neuroscientific research). They believe that metaphorical usage corrupts and confuses our understanding. Their aim is to "peel away conceptual confusion" and to clarify conceptual presuppositions (p. 162).
On the other hand, we have philosophers like Searle and Dennett arguing that Bennett and Hacker's proposal would actually restrict us from speaking in otherwise very ordinary ways (including the ascription of psychological properties to parts of human persons, such as their brains). Searle and Dennett (while fierce critics of each other's work) agree that Bennett and Hacker's view would undermine neuroscientific research by placing unnecessary restrictions on the use of the intentional stance.
While this volume of essays does not provide a final answer to this riddle, important aspects of the disagreement are elucidated clearly. That is perhaps all a single volume could hope for: to better frame the debate, to clarify points of agreement and disagreement, and to lay the groundwork for further discussion. This volume does all of this in a very readable and accessible way.
© 2007 James Sage
James Sage, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point