email page print pageAll Topic Reviews
A New Understanding of Mental Disorders A Theory of Feelings Addictions Memory and the Self"Intimate" Violence against Women1001 Solution-Focused Questions101 Healing Stories101 Things I Wish I'd Known When I Started Using Hypnosis50 Great Myths of Popular Psychology50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a God8 Keys to Body Brain BalanceA Brief History of Modern PsychologyA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Conceptual History of Psychology: Exploring the Tangled Web A Cooperative SpeciesA Guide to Teaching Introductory PsychologyA History of Modern Experimental PsychologyA History of Psychology in AutobiographyA History of Social PsychologyA History of the BrainA History of the MindA Hole in the HeadA Matter of SecurityA Mind of Its OwnA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Place for ConsciousnessA Short Introduction to Promoting Resilience in ChildrenA Social History of PsychologyA Stroll With William JamesA System Architecture Approach to the BrainA Theory of FreedomA Very Bad WizardAbductedAbout FacesAccounts of InnocenceAction, Emotion and WillAdapting MindsAddiction and Self-ControlADHD & MeADHD in AdultsAdieu to GodAdolescence and Body ImageAdult Bipolar DisordersAdvances in Culture and PsychologyAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAffect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of SelfAffective MappingAgainst EmpathyAgainst HappinessAges and StagesAll Joy and No FunAll Out!All We Have to FearAlterations of ConsciousnessAmerican Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical NeurosciencesAn Argument for MindAncient Bodies, Modern LivesAnd BreatheAnimal MadnessAnimal Tool BehaviorAnimals in TranslationAnomalous CognitionAping MankindArtificial ConsciousnessAspects of PsychologismAsperger Syndrome and Your ChildAsperger Syndrome, Adolescence, and IdentityAssessment and Treatment of Childhood Problems, Second EditionAssisted Suicide and the Right to DieAttachedAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutism and the Myth of the Person AloneAutopsy of a Suicidal MindBecoming an Effective PsychotherapistBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing No OneBelievingBetween Two WorldsBeyond AppearanceBeyond BlueBeyond BullyingBeyond MadnessBeyond MelancholyBeyond the BrainBeyond the DSM StoryBig DreamsBiofeedback for the BrainBipolar ChildrenBipolar DisorderBipolar KidsBlackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive DevelopmentBlind SpotsBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlubberlandBlushBodiesBody ConsciousnessBody Image, Eating Disorders, and Obesity in YouthBody SenseBody WorkBorderline Personality DisorderBorderline Personality Disorder and the Conversational ModelBorn DigitalBorn to Be GoodBorn Together - Reared ApartBounceBoundaries in Human RelationshipsBounded RationalityBozo SapiensBrain and CultureBrain and the GazeBrain Arousal and Information TheoryBrain BugsBrain Change TherapyBrain Circuitry and Signaling in PsychiatryBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-Based Therapy with AdultsBrain-WiseBrainstormBrainstormingBraintrustBrainwashingBrandedBreaking Murphy's LawBright-SidedBuddha's BrainBullying and TeasingBuyologyCan't You Hear Them?CaptureCare of the PsycheCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCerebrum 2007Cerebrum 2010Cerebrum 2015Cerebrum Anthology 2013Changing the SubjectCharacter Strengths and VirtuesCheating LessonsChild and Adolescent Psychological DisordersChildren’s Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness Chomsky NotebookClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyClinical Psychology in Practice ClosureCognition and PerceptionCognition and the BrainCognitive BiologyCognitive DissonanceCognitive FictionsCognitive Mechanisms of Belief ChangeCognitive PragmaticsCognitive ScienceCognitive ScienceCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Therapy of Anxiety DisordersCognitive Unconscious and Human RationalityCold-Blooded KindnessComing of Age in Second LifeCommunication Issues In Autism And Asperger SyndromeCompassion and Healing in Medicine and SocietyComplementary and Alternative Therapies ResearchComprehending ColumbineConfessions of a SociopathConquering Shame and CodependencyConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the Social BrainConsciousness EmergingConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Science of Being HumanConstructing PainConsumer NeuroscienceContemporary Debates in Cognitive ScienceConversations on ConsciousnessConviction of the InnocentCooperation and Its EvolutionCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCredit and BlameCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychologyCritical Thinking About PsychologyCross-Cultural PsychologyCrowdsourcingCrueltyCultural Assessment in Clinical PsychiatryCuriousDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous and Severe Personality DisorderDaniel DennettDaughters of MadnessDeafness In MindDeath and ConsciousnessDeath of a ParentDecomposing the WillDeep Brain StimulationDeep ChinaDefining DifferenceDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions of GenderDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDeparting from DevianceDescartes' BabyDescartes's Changing MindDescribing Inner Experience?Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Destructive EmotionsDevelopment of Geocentric Spatial Language and CognitionDevelopment of PsychopathologyDialogues on DifferenceDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Digital HemlockDirty MindsDisgust and Its DisordersDisorders of VolitionDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Doing without ConceptsDrunk Tank PinkEducating People to Be Emotionally IntelligentEffective IntentionsEffective Writing in PsychologyEffortless AttentionEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbracing MindEmbracing UncertaintyEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotionally InvolvedEmotionsEmotionsEmotions and LifeEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions RevealedEmotions, Aggression, and Morality in ChildrenEmotions, Stress, and HealthEmpathyEnjoymentErotic MoralityEscape Your Own PrisonEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthically Challenged ProfessionsEveryday Mind ReadingEvidence for PsiEvidence-Based Mental Health PracticeEvil MenEvolution and Human BehaviorEvolution and LearningEvolution, Games, and GodEvolution, Gender, and RapeEvolutionary Psychology and ViolenceEvolutionary Psychology as Maladapted PsychologyExacting BeautyExperiences of DepressionExperimenterExplaining the BrainExplaining the BrainExplorations in Neuroscience, Psychology and ReligionExploring TranssexualismExpression and the InnerExtending Self-Esteem ResearchExtraordinary BeliefsFact and Value in EmotionFaking ItFatigue as a Window to the BrainFavorite Activities for the Teaching of PsychologyFeeling GoodFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFinding Meaning, Facing FearsFitting In Is OverratedFive Constraints on Predicting BehaviorFlourishingFlow: The Psychology of Optimal ExperienceFolk Psychological NarrativesFooling HoudiniForever YoungFormulation in Psychology and PsychotherapyFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Psychological ThoughtFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom EvolvesFrom Axons to IdentityFrom Madness to Mental HealthFrom Neurons to Self-ConsciousnessFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrom Symptom to SynapseFrontiers of ConsciousnessGay, Straight, and the Reason WhyGenerosityGenes, Environment, and PsychopathologyGenetic Nature/CultureGeniusGetting Under the SkinGlued to GamesGoing SaneGot Parts?Group GeniusGrowing Up GirlGuilt, Shame, and AnxietyGut ReactionsHallucinationHandbook New Sexuality StudiesHandbook of Closeness and IntimacyHandbook of Critical PsychologyHandbook of Emotion RegulationHandbook of EmotionsHandbook of Personality DisordersHandbook of PsychopathyHandbook of Self and IdentityHandbook of Self and IdentityHandbook of Spatial CognitionHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness at WorkHappiness Is.Happy at LastHard to GetHardwired BehaviorHatredHealing the SplitHidden ResourcesHope and DespairHot ThoughtHot ThoughtHouse and PsychologyHow Animals Affect UsHow Animals GrieveHow Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Doctors ThinkHow Enlightenment Changes Your BrainHow Families Still MatterHow History Made the MindHow Infants Know MindsHow Many Friends Does One Person Need?How People ChangeHow Professors ThinkHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Change Someone You LoveHow We ReasonHow We RememberHughes' Outline of Modern PsychiatryHumanHuman BondingHuman Reasoning and Cognitive ScienceHypnotismHysteriaiBrainIdentifying Hyperactive ChildrenIdentifying the MindiDisorderImagination and the Meaningful BrainImitation and the Social MindImpulse Control DisordersImpulsivityIn an Unspoken VoiceIn Defense of SentimentalityIn DoubtIn Search of HappinessIn the Wake of 9/11Individual and Collective Memory ConsolidationInner Experience and NeuroscienceInner PresenceInside the American CoupleIntegrated Behavioral Health CareIntegrating Evolution and DevelopmentIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntellectual DisabilityIntelligenceIntelligence, Destiny, and EducationIntentions and IntentionalityInterdependent MindsInterpreting MindsInto the Minds of MadmenIntoxicating MindsIntrospection VindicatedIntuitionInventing PersonalityInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIs There Anything Good About Men?Issues for Families, Schools and CommunitiesJane Sexes It UpJoint AttentionJoint AttentionJudgment and Decision MakingJust a DogJust BabiesJuvenile-Onset SchizophreniaKarl JaspersKey Thinkers in PsychologyKidding OurselvesKids of CharacterKilling MonstersLack of CharacterLanguage OriginsLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw, Mind and BrainLess Than HumanLet Kids Be KidsLet's Talk About DeathLiving NarrativeLiving with Mild Cognitive ImpairmentLonelinessLooking for SpinozaLossLOT 2Love at Goon ParkMachine ConsciousnessMacrocognitionMade for Each OtherMadnessMadness and Modernism: Insanity in the light of modern art, literature, and thought Making a Good Brain GreatMaking Habits, Breaking HabitsMaking Minds and MadnessMaking Up the MindMale SexualityMan and WomanMan's Search for MeaningMan, Beast, and ZombieManic MindsManlinessMapping the MindMarking the MindMarvelous Learning AnimalMasculinity Studies and Feminist TheoryMeaningMeaning, Mortality, and ChoiceMedical MusesMeditating SelflesslyMeetings with a Remarkable ManMemoryMemory and DreamsMemory and EmotionMemory And UnderstandingMental BiologyMental IllnessMental Time TravelMetacognitionMetacognition and Theory of MindMethods in MindMindMindMind and BrainMind and ConsciousnessMind Games:Mind in LifeMind TimeMind to MindMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMindful AngerMindfulnessMindfulnessMindfulness and AcceptanceMindfulness-Based Treatment Approaches: Clinician's Guide to Evidence Base and ApplicationsMinding AnimalsMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds, Brains, and LawMindsightMindworldsMirrors in the BrainMistakes Were Made (But Not by Me)Models of MadnessMoodMoral Development and RealityMoral MindsMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Mothers and OthersMotivation and Cognitive ControlMotivational Interviewing: Preparing People For ChangeMovies and the MindMulticulturalism and the Therapeutic ProcessMultiplicityMuses, Madmen, and ProphetsMy Family AlbumMyths about SuicideNarrative IdentitiesNarrative PsychiatryNarratives in PsychiatryNaturalizing Intention in ActionNature and NarrativeNature Via NurtureNeither Bad nor MadNerveNeurobiology and the Development of Human MoralityNeurochemistry of ConsciousnessNeurodiversityNeuroethicsNeuroLogicNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neuroscience and PhilosophyNo Child Left DifferentNo Two AlikeNot By Genes AloneNot Much Just Chillin'Not So Abnormal PsychologyNurturing the Older Brain and MindOn AnxietyOn Being an Introvert or Highly Sensitive PersonOn Being HumanOn Being MovedOn Deep History and the BrainOn DesireOn KillingOn Nature and LanguageOn PaedophiliaOn PersonalityOn the Frontier of AdulthoodOn the Origins of Cognitive ScienceOn The Stigma Of Mental IllnessOnflowOpen MindsOpening Skinner's BoxOrigin of MindOrigins of PsychopathologyOther MindsOut of Our HeadsOut of the WoodsOvercoming Depersonalization DisorderPanpsychism and the Religious AttitudePanpsychism in the WestParenting and the Child's WorldPassionate EnginesPathologies of the WestPatient-Based Approaches to Cognitive NeurosciencePediatric PsychopharmacologyPeople Types and Tiger StripesPerception & CognitionPerception beyond InferencePerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPersonal Development and Clinical PsychologyPerspectives on ImitationPhantoms in the BrainPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhrenologyPhysical RealizationPhysics in MindPieces of LightPlaying with FirePositive PsychologyPositive PsychologyPostcards from the Brain MuseumPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPoverty and Brain Development During ChildhoodPractical Ethics for PsychologistsPractical Management of Personality DisorderPractical Management of Personality DisorderPredicative MindsPredictably IrrationalPreference, Belief, and SimilarityPrenatal Testosterone in MindPrivileged AccessProcess-Based CBTProcrastinationProust Was a NeuroscientistPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsychological AgencyPsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychological Dimensions of the SelfPsychologists Defying the CrowdPsychologyPsychologyPsychology and Consumer CulturePsychology and LawPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology for ScreenwritersPsychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and TheoriesPsychology's GhostsPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology's TerritoriesPsychopathologyPsychopathyPsychosis and EmotionPsychotherapy, American Culture, and Social PolicyPutnam CampPutting a Name to ItQuantum Memory PowerQuietRadical DistortionRadical Embodied Cognitive ScienceRadical ExternalismRadical GraceRapeRe-Visioning PsychiatryReal MaterialismReality CheckReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecovery in Mental IllnessRecreative MindsRedirectReducing Adolescent RiskRegulating EmotionsRelational BeingRelational Mental HealthRelational Suicide AssessmentReliability in Cognitive NeuroscienceRemembering HomeRemembering Our ChildhoodResearch Advances in Genetics and GenomicsResearching Children's ExperienceResilience in ChildrenRestoring ResilienceRethinking ADHDRethinking Learning DisabilitiesRethinking Middle YearsRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfRevolution in PsychologyRoadmap to ResilienceRomance and Sex in Adolescence and Emerging AdulthoodSchizophrenia RevealedSchizophrenia, Culture, and SubjectivityScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologyScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologySecond NatureSecond NatureSecond That EmotionSecond-order Change in PsychotherapySecrets of the MindSee What I'm SayingSee What I'm SayingSeeing and VisualizingSeeing RedSelf and SocietySelf Comes to MindSelf Control in Society, Mind, and BrainSelf-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric PatientsSelf-CompassionSelf-RegulationSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessSelfless InsightSelvesSerial KillersSex at DawnSex on the BrainSex, Time and PowerSexual Coercion in Primates and HumansSexual DisordersSexual FluiditySexual ReckoningsSexualized BrainsShame and GuiltShatteredSimulating MindsSisyphus's BoulderSNAPSocial NeuroscienceSocial NeuroscienceSocial NeuroscienceSocial Psychology and DiscourseSome We Love, Some We Hate, Some We EatSoul DustSparkSpiral of EntrapmentSplendors and Miseries of the BrainSports Hypnosis in PracticeStanding at Water's EdgeStich and His CriticsStillpowerStop OverreactingStructure and Agency in Everyday LifeStructures of AgencyStuffStumbling on HappinessSubjectivity and SelfhoodSubstance Abuse and EmotionSupersizing the MindSweet DreamsSynaptic SelfTales from Both Sides of the BrainTalking Oneself SoberTalking to BabiesTaming the Troublesome ChildTargeting AutismTeaching Problems and the Problems of TeachingTeleological RealismTen Years of Viewing from WithinTestosterone RexThat's DisgustingThe 5 Elements of Effective ThinkingThe Accidental MindThe Age of EmpathyThe Altruism EquationThe Altruistic BrainThe American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Clinical PsychiatryThe Anatomy of BiasThe Anxious BrainThe Archaeology of MindThe Art and Science of MindfulnessThe Art InstinctThe Art of HypnosisThe Asymmetrical BrainThe Bifurcation of the SelfThe Big Book of ConceptsThe Big DisconnectThe Birth of IntersubjectivityThe Birth of the MindThe Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge ManagementThe Blank SlateThe Body Has a Mind of Its OwnThe Bounds of CognitionThe Boy Who Was Raised as a DogThe BrainThe BrainThe Brain and the Meaning of LifeThe Brain SupremacyThe Brain That Changes ItselfThe Brain's Way of HealingThe Brain: Big Bangs, Behaviors, and BeliefsThe Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive ScienceThe Cambridge Handbook of Situated CognitionThe Character of ConsciousnessThe Chemistry Between UsThe Choice EffectThe Clinical Science of Suicide PreventionThe Cognitive Approach to Conscious MachinesThe Cognitive Behavioral Workbook for Anxiety: A Step-By-Step ProgramThe Cognitive NeurosciencesThe Cognitive-Emotional BrainThe College Fear FactorThe Commercialization of Intimate LifeThe Compass of PleasureThe Compassionate ConnectionThe Concepts of ConsciousnessThe Conscious BrainThe Conscious SelfThe Consuming InstinctThe Creating BrainThe Creative BrainThe Crucible of ConsciousnessThe Crucible of ExperienceThe Cure WithinThe Dao of NeuroscienceThe Developing MindThe Developing MindThe Development of PsychopathologyThe Disappearance of the Social in American Social PsychologyThe Dissolution of MindThe Duty to ProtectThe Educated ParentThe Ego TunnelThe Elephant in the RoomThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human ExperienceThe Emotional Journey of the Alzheimer's FamilyThe Encultured BrainThe Encyclopedia of StupidityThe Enduring Self in People with Alzheimer'sThe Epidemiology of SchizophreniaThe Essential DifferenceThe Ethical BrainThe Evolution of BeautyThe Evolution of ChildhoodThe Evolution of CooperationThe Evolution of LanguageThe Evolution of MindThe Evolving BrainThe Executive BrainThe Faces of TerrorismThe Feeling BrainThe Feeling of What HappensThe First IdeaThe Folly of FoolsThe Folly of FoolsThe Folly of FoolsThe Foundations of Cognitive ArchaeologyThe Fundamentalist MindsetThe GapThe Gender TrapThe Geography of BlissThe Gift of ShynessThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Happiness HypothesisThe Happiness of PursuitThe Health Psychology HandbookThe Healthy Aging BrainThe High Price of MaterialismThe History of PsychologyThe Human FaceThe Human SparkThe Hypomanic EdgeThe Imagery DebateThe Immeasurable MindThe Imprinted BrainThe Incredible Shrinking MindThe Innate MindThe Innate MindThe Integrated SelfThe Intentional BrainThe Language of ThoughtThe Languages of the BrainThe Lexicon of Adlerian PsychologyThe Lie DetectorsThe Lives of the BrainThe Lonely AmericanThe Lust for BloodThe Madness of WomenThe Male BrainThe Man Who Lost His LanguageThe Man Who Shocked the WorldThe Man Who Tasted ShapesThe Man Who Wasn't ThereThe Matter of the MindThe Mature MindThe Mean Girl MotiveThe Meaning of EvilThe Meaning of OthersThe Meaning of the BodyThe Measure of MadnessThe Measure of MindThe Medicalization of Everyday LifeThe Mind and the BrainThe Mind in ContextThe Mind of the ChildThe Mind of the HorseThe Mind's EyeThe Mind, the Body and the WorldThe Mind-Gut ConnectionThe Mindful BrainThe Misleading MindThe Moral MindThe Most Dangerous AnimalThe Most Human HumanThe Mother FactorThe Myth of ChoiceThe Myth of Depression as DiseaseThe Myth of Mirror NeuronsThe Myth of Self HelpThe Myth of Self-EsteemThe Myth of the Spoiled ChildThe Nature of the SelfThe Necessity Of MadnessThe Neuro RevolutionThe Neuron and the MindThe Neuropsychology of the UnconsciousThe Neuroscience of Human RelationshipsThe Neuroscience of PsychotherapyThe Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social BrainThe New BrainThe New Science of DreamingThe New Science of the MindThe New UnconsciousThe Normal PersonalityThe Origins of FairnessThe Overflowing BrainThe Oxford Companion to the MindThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of MindThe Paradoxical PrimateThe Perfectionist's HandbookThe Peripheral MindThe Phenomenology ReaderThe Philosopher's Secret FireThe Philosophical BabyThe Political MindThe Politics of HappinessThe Positive Side of Negative EmotionsThe Postnational SelfThe Postpartum EffectThe Power of PlayThe Praeger Handbook of TranssexualityThe Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday LifeThe Primate MindThe Prism of GrammarThe Psychobiology of Trauma and Resilience Across the LifespanThe Psychological Construction of EmotionThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of HappinessThe Psychology of LifestyleThe Psychology of Religious FundamentalismThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe Psychology of SpiritualityThe Psychology of StereotypingThe Psychology of SuperheroesThe Psychophysiology of Self-AwarenessThe Pursuit of PerfectThe Quest for Mental HealthThe Rational ImaginationThe Ravenous BrainThe Reasons of LoveThe Righteous MindThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Science of EvilThe Science of Intimate RelationshipsThe Science of Shame and its Treatment The Second SelfThe Secret History of EmotionThe Secret Lives of BoysThe Self and Its EmotionsThe Self-Sabotage CycleThe Sense of SelfThe Sensitive SelfThe Shape of ThoughtThe Social AnimalThe Social Nature of Mental IllnessThe Social Neuroscience of EmpathyThe Social Psychology of Good and EvilThe Social Psychology of MoralityThe Social Psychology of MoralityThe Story of Intellectual DisabilityThe Structure of ThinkingThe Survivors ClubThe Talking ApeThe Teenage BrainThe Tell-Tale BrainThe Temperamental ThreadThe Tender CutThe Tending InstinctThe Time ParadoxThe Trauma MythThe Trauma of Psychological TortureThe Trauma of Psychological TortureThe Trouble with IllnessThe True PathThe Truth About GriefThe Turing TestThe Uncertain SciencesThe Undoing ProjectThe Unhappy ChildThe Upside of IrrationalityThe War for Children's MindsThe Well-Tuned BrainThe Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the MonsterThe Winner's BrainThe Wisdom in FeelingThe Woman RacketThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the WorldThe Wow ClimaxThe Yipping TigerThemes, Issues and Debates in PsychologyTheoretical Issues in Psychology: An IntroductionTheory of AddictionTheory of MindThings and PlacesThink CatThink Confident, Be ConfidentThinking about AddictionThinking and SeeingThis Emotional Life: In Search of Ourselves...and HappinessThought and LanguageThought in a Hostile WorldTo Have and To Hurt:Toward an Evolutionary Biology of LanguageToward Replacement Parts for the BrainTrauma and Human ExistenceTrauma, Tragedy, TherapyTreating Attachment DisordersTreating Self-InjuryTreating Self-Injury: A Practical GuideTrue to Our FeelingsTrusting the Subject?Understanding and Treating Borderline Personality DisorderUnderstanding ConsciousnessUnderstanding ParanoiaUnderstanding PeopleUnderstanding TerrorismUndoing Perpetual StressUnlock the Genius WithinUnsettled MindsUnstrange MindsUnthinkingUnthoughtUs and ThemViolent PartnersVirtue, Vice, and PersonalityVision and MindVisual AgnosiaWarrior's DishonourWe Who Are DarkWednesday Is Indigo BlueWelcome to Your BrainWhat Do Women Want?What Dying People WantWhat Have We DoneWhat Intelligence Tests MissWhat Is an Emotion: Classic and Contemporary ReadingsWhat Is Emotion?What is Intelligence?What Is Mental Illness?What Is Thought?What Makes Your Brain Happy and Why You Should Do the Opposite What the Best College Students DoWhat the Dog SawWhat We Know about Emotional IntelligenceWhat We Say MattersWhat's Wrong With Morality?When Boys Become BoysWhen Perfect Isn't Good EnoughWhen the Impossible HappensWhen Walls Become DoorwaysWho's Been Sleeping in Your HeadWho's in Charge?Why Humans Like to CryWhy Love MattersWhy Lyrics LastWhy People CooperateWhy People Die by SuicideWhy Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human BehaviorWhy Smart People Can Be So StupidWhy the Mind is Not a ComputerWhy Us?Why We LieWhy We LoveWhy We SleepWider than the SkyWilliam James at the BoundariesWilling, Wanting, WaitingWittgenstein And PsychologyWomen and Child Sexual AbuseWorking MindsYoga and PsychologyYou Are What You RememberYoung Minds in Social WorldsYour Brain on CubsYour Brain on FoodYour Brain on Food: How Chemicals Control Your Thoughts and Feelings,Your Brain on YogaYour Child in the BalanceZombies and Consciousness
There are planters and there are weeders in the garden of science. In Moral Minds, Marc Hauser bends his back in the former capacity and it remains to be seen just how green his thumb proves to be. Hauser is interested in how humans generate moral intuitions, why we have evolved the capacity to do so, and what predictions and precautions can be drawn from research on these topics. He argues that we are all born with a "moral faculty", a set of principles enabling us to automatically evaluate actions as permissible, obligatory or forbidden. Culture sets the parameters of these inborn principles in much the same way as, according to Noam Chomsky, language acquisition operates. The moral faculty thus enables individuals to learn their local moral system and constrains the diversity of possible moral systems. Hauser favors a cultural group selectionist explanation for the evolution of the moral faculty. By generating "universal and unconscious judgments concerning justice and harm", the moral faculty plays a crucial role in sustaining in-group cooperation and stabilizing reciprocity across a range of circumstances and currencies. Hauser believes his work in Moral Minds has practical implications and that "there is an urgency to putting this material together". Our moral faculty evolved, he notes, under significantly different circumstances to those in which we currently find ourselves. He warns us to expect some mismatch between the reasoned and explicit rules codified in culture and the intuitive deliverances of the moral faculty. Understanding our moral intuitions is important, then, because "we are more likely to construct long-lasting and effective policies if we take into account the intuitive biases that guide our initial responses to the imposition of social norms". Hauser optimistically suggests we may be verging on "a renaissance in our understanding of the moral domain". Whether a renaissance is imminent is questionable but, returning to the opening metaphor, we might at least look forward to a good growing season.
Much of Moral Minds is devoted to empirical work on the relationship between reason, emotion and morality. Hauser usefully distinguishes between how we behave morally and how we make moral judgments (between "moral performance" and "moral competence") and chooses to focus on the latter. In Chapter 1, we are introduced to three "creatures" -- Kantian, Humean and Rawlsian -- representing three ways in which reason, emotion and moral judgment may inter-relate. Hauser aims to discover which breed of creature we are, or, should we turn out to be hybrids, which mix and in what proportions.
Kantian creatures "deliver moral judgments based on conscious reasoning from relevant principles". Emotions, for this creature, are obstacles to be avoided in moral decision-making, a feature reminiscent of Kant's distinction between acting 'from' duty versus merely 'in accord with' duty. Hauser does not make particularly clear which principles are relevant for the Kantian creature. He quotes Kant's "universalizability" and "humanity" formulations of the categorical imperative, but quite deliberately does not go into the nuances of Kantian moral theory. This lack of clarity is no great impediment to Hauser's project, however, for which the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology is of greater relevance. Developmental psychologists in the tradition of Piaget and Kohlberg have worked with a reason-based view of morality, which has lead, Hauser claims, to the current dominance in moral psychology of a "conscious moral reasoning" perspective. Hauser explicitly opposes that perspective.
Some philosophers may well wish to take issue with Hauser over his characterization of the Kantian moral creature. It is worth bearing in mind, though, that the crucial feature of the Kantian creature is that it reasons from principles to moral judgments and not that it reasons from specifically Kantian principles. Non-Kantian principles could be plugged into the 'Kantian' creature. Hauser intends only to provide a convenient label for one model of how we might be as moral judgers.
Hauser thinks it clear that we are not pure-bred Kantian creatures. Conscious moral reasoning from explicit principles is only sometimes the cause of our moral judgments. Hauser describes the phenomenon of moral "dumbfounding", in which subjects are unable to adequately justify their initial moral judgment of a given situation but staunchly maintain that judgment nonetheless, often appealing to "hunches". Dumbfounding effects have been uncovered by Jonathan Haidt and others, including Hauser himself with his online Moral Sense Test. For several years now, Hauser's research lab has maintained an online survey site that allows him to extensively sample folk moral judgments, examine the justifications subjects offer for their judgments, and determine the coherence of subjects' response patterns. The MST reveals that, when it comes to justifying moral judgments, the majority of subjects are "clueless". The phenomenon of moral dumbfounding shows, Hauser says, that our impression that we reason from principles to judgments can be "illusory". Conscious moral reasoning, he stresses, may merely provide post hoc justification for our moral judgments and have nothing to do with their genesis.
Reason, for the "Humean creature", causes neither moral judgments nor moral behaviour. It serves only to compare various means to the creature's ends, recalling Hume's famous dictum that reason is and ought only be slave to the passions. For the Humean creature, "emotions ignite moral judgments [and] reason follows in the wake of this dynamic". Humean creatures develop, in the course of normal growth, a suite of emotions which, when triggered, cause moral judgments.
How much of himself Hume would see in Hauser's Humean creature is questionable but not the important issue. As with the Kantian creature, Hauser intends only to provide a convenient label for one way in which reason, emotion and moral judgment may be related.
Hauser points out a shortcoming in the Humean model, namely the lack of an account of "the evaluative process that triggers emotion", but he recognises that we do sometimes act like Humean creatures. Especially when confronted with harmful or disgusting actions, "we have the feeling that we [make moral judgments] quickly, unconsciously and without any apparent reflection upon explicit laws". This observation is not, however, strong support for the Humean creature, since Hauser here misses the possibility that making a moral judgment might feel like entering an emotional state without the moral judgment being caused by an emotional state. Automaticity does not imply emotional causation. In any case, Hauser thinks the predictions of the Humean model are not borne out by psychological research. If we were pure-bred Humean creatures, then damage to emotion-processing regions of the brain would knock out our capacity to make moral judgments; "a Humean creature needs his emotions to make moral decisions". Hauser interprets studies by Antonio Damasio and Shaun Nichols as strongly suggesting that emotionally-impaired subjects may have "normal moral competence but abnormal moral performance". If emotional impairments affect moral behaviour while leaving intact the capacity to make moral judgments then, Hauser argues, we cannot be twin to the Humean creature.
Hauser believes neither reason, nor emotion, nor both in concert, can fully explain the genesis of our moral judgments. Enter the Rawlsian creature, so named in homage to Rawls' suggestion in A Theory of Justice that "a correct account of moral capacities will certainly involve principles and theoretical constructions which go beyond the norms and standards cited in every day life". Rawls also suggested that "there may be deep similarities between language and morality, including especially our innate competences for these two domains". The Rawlsian creature is equipped with what Hauser calls a "grammar of action", a set of principles for morally assessing actions in terms of their causes and consequences. The Rawlsian creature takes actions as inputs and gives moral judgments as outputs: permissible, obligatory, or forbidden. Actions are distinguished according to whether they are intentional or accidental, acts proper or omissions, and whether their consequences are harmful or beneficial, intended or merely foreseen. Emotions are downstream of this unconsciously-operative action-evaluation machinery. The Rawlsian creature's emotions are caused by its moral judgments and motivate its moral behaviour. Finally, this creature might engage in conscious reasoning to justify or somehow modify the judgments output by its moral faculty.
Although Kant or Hume scholars amongst Hauser's readership are best advised to look past the characterization of their respective creatures and let Hauser get on with his project, the same advice does not apply to those interested in Rawls, or at least not as strongly. Hauser believes both the Rawlsian creature and the real Rawls have been neglected; "many current discussions of the evolution of morality, and fairness in particular, either ignore Rawls or misinterpret him" and in moral psychology "there has been no serious engagement with the Rawlsian creature". Moral Minds is an attempt to redress this neglect by developing Rawls' analogy between language and morality and giving the Rawlsian creature some long-overdue attention.
Hauser has gathered evidence suggesting unconscious principles do in fact guide some of our moral intuitions. He devotes Part I of Moral Minds ("Universal Declarations") to presenting this evidence. Hauser's above-mentioned Moral Sense Test features prominently in Chapter 3 ("Grammars of Violence"), where he investigates the principles underlying intuitive judgments of permissible harm. The test introduces us to a cast of characters each caught up in a variant of the classic trolley problem. Hauser's cleverly constructed "moral dilemmas" prompt a pattern of intuitions consistent with the unconscious operation of a "double effect" principle guiding our judgments of permissible harm; "it is impermissible to cause an intended harm if that harm is used as a means to a greater good [but] it is permissible to cause harm if that harm is only a foreseen consequence of intending to cause a greater good". What matters to our intuitive judgments is not whether harms are "personal" or "impersonal" and thus differentially engage our emotions but instead whether harms are caused intentionally or merely foreseen. This double-effect principle operates unconsciously, Hauser says, because most subjects mention no such thing in their reasoning. Thus, Hauser garners significant support for the Rawlsian creature over its Kantian and Humean competitors.
Hauser also searches, in Chapter 2 ("Justice for All"), for principles underlying intuitive judgments of fairness. Appealing to experimental economics, he argues that "fairness is a universal principle with the potential for parametric variation". Cultures set fairness parameters differently due to differences in social organization and local ecology. For example, take the ultimatum game. In this game, one player (the proposer) begins with a sum of money and offers the other player (the respondent) either some proportion of that sum or nothing at all. If the proposer offers something, then the respondent either accepts the proposed proportion and the proposer keeps the remainder, or the respondent rejects the proposal and both players end empty-handed. When members of slash-and-burn horticulturalist cultures play this game, proposers offer low and respondents reject rarely, reflecting, Hauser suggests, the relatively minimal role cooperation plays in their subsistence style. Individuals from cultures in which competitive gift-giving is prevalent, by contrast, propose fairly high offers and as repondents routinely reject. The principle of fairness, Hauser thinks, "has parameters concerning the responsible agent, the original source of the resources, the dependency on others for acquiring the resources, and the option of rejecting an offer". It would be interesting to see if future work could uncover a "dumbfounding" effect in ultimatum game players like that shown by Moral Sense Test respondents. The principles guiding moral intuitions are, after all, supposed to operate unconsciously on the Rawlsian model of moral judgment.
The empirical studies of moral intuitions about violence and justice that Hauser surveys are certainly intriguing and provide ample motivation to further pursue the hypothesis that humans are most closely akin to the Rawlsian creature.
Hauser is especially keen in Moral Minds to specify the design of the moral faculty and the course of its development. He attempts this in Part II ("Native Sense"), and most directly in a chapter entitled "The Moral Organ". That title is somewhat misleading, the chapter being largely taken up with enumerating members of that faculty's "support team". Many capacities that are not exclusive to the moral faculty are nevertheless required for its operation. In particular, action perception and mindreading are vital if the Rawlsian creature is to assess actions in terms of causes and consequences. Hauser surveys work in infant and child psychology on "the ABCs of Action", describing how we unconsciously analyse events into discrete actions and interpret those actions by attributing beliefs and intentions to agents and objects. The support team roll call continues: self-awareness, the ability to share attention and engage in pretence and play, to delay gratification and to inhibit impulses more generally, to experience empathy and sympathy. Even innate numeracy skills get a mention. Keeping in mind Hauser's own distinction between moral competence and performance, one could wish for greater clarity here regarding which team members are supposedly necessary for moral judgment and which 'merely' support moral behavior. More importantly, one might wonder where, amidst all this, the moral organ itself lies.
Hauser posits "a circuit specialized for recognizing certain problems as morally relevant and others as irrelevant" but admits that no current studies "pinpoint a uniquely dedicated moral organ". He cites advances in brain imaging technology as just one of the things necessary before such pinpointing is even a possibility. A case of premature publication? Not necessarily. Moral malfunctions may indirectly illuminate the design of the moral organ. For this reason, Hauser takes a walk over the well-trodden testing ground that psychopaths provide for theories of morality.
Hauser holds that psychopaths are "perfectly lucid about their actions". Hence, he thinks, the Kantian model cannot account for the moral malfunction evident in psychopathy. If humans were Kantian creatures, then psychopaths, their reason being intact, would not display moral malfunctioning. One might well think Hauser moves too quickly here. He assumes that engaging in justificatory behaviour is sufficient to qualify psychopaths as rational in the important Kantian-creature sense of "reasoning from relevant principles". This assumption is questionable. Indeed, whether psychopaths suffer rational defects is an ongoing debate amongst pyschologists and philosophers. Hauser himself even reports that psychopaths are often glib and superficial and their reasoned justifications betray "an unparalleled egocentrism". At the very least, it seems, some relevant principles would need to be specified before psychopaths' lucidity could rule out the Kantian model of moral judgment as Hauser himself described that model.
Hauser takes the prevailing view of psychopathy to be that an emotional impairment prevents psychopaths properly distinguishing moral from conventional transgressions thus making them more likely to morally transgress. Given the prominence of emotions in the prevailing view, the Humean model looks in good shape. Hauser criticises the prevailing view, however. He thinks (along with Nichols) that the idea that what distinguishes moral from conventional transgressions is heavier affective loading cannot account for actions being heavily negative-affect-laden but not forbidden or even morally evaluable at all; explosive diarrhea, say, or projectile vomiting. Emotions, Hauser tells us, "cannot do all the heavy lifting when it comes to deciding between conventional and moral events". The Humean model thus also has trouble accounting for the psychopaths' moral malfunction; it cannot be just an emotional impairment that leads psychopaths to misjudge and misbehave. In the course of this discussion, though, Hauser allows that "at least some of our moral judgments -- perhaps only those handling norms against harm and disgust -- may emerge from our emotions". He thus assigns the emotional Humean creature a quite significant role in generating moral judgments, which he set out to argue was done by an unconscious Rawlsian grammar of action.
Psychopathy, Hauser thinks, is problematic for the Kantian and Humean models but provides a good test case for the Rawlsian creature. He says psychopaths "appear to deliver normal moral judgments" and suggests that their action-evaluation machinery (their "genetically endowed moral competence") may be intact even though their moral performance is impaired by an emotional deficit that leaves them unmotivated to act. Hauser's position here is somewhat confusing. Throughout Moral Minds, he takes moral judgments as the measure of moral competence. He accepts the prevailing view of psychopathy insofar as he agrees that psychopaths fail to properly distinguish moral from conventional transgressions. He thus seems committed to denying that psychopaths make normal moral judgments; they do not employ a distinction even small children understand. It is unclear in what sense Hauser supposes the psychopath's moral competence to be intact and unclear, as a result, that the Rawlsian creature fares better than its competitors.
Hauser supports one of the key claims in Moral Minds, that we have a dedicated moral organ, with an argument that contains some contentious premises, some dubious moves, and doesn't convincingly eliminate the Rawlsian's competitors. Hauser's case is likely to be especially unsatisfying to any who doubt his three-way moral bestiary was complete to begin with. The charge of premature publication may, again, seem appealing. Hauser can be excused, though, on grounds of understandable excitement. The findings in support of the Rawlsian creature reported in Part I are certainly enough to motivate his, and future, work on pinpointing dedicated action-evaluation machinery.
Hauser's extensive roll call of moral faculty support team members might disappoint those hoping to see the moral faculty spotlighted. It does, however, allow him to give some specificity and substance to the idea that the building blocks of human morality are evolutionarily ancient. In Moral Minds Part III ("Evolving Code"), he asks which parts of the moral faculty (broadly construed to include its support team) evolved prior to the emergence of our own species. He surveys an impressive range of research, reporting studies on birds, primates, elephants, dolphins, rats and bats and more. Hauser contends that many members of our moral faculty's support team are shared with non-human animals. He presents evidence that some animals also know our "ABCs of action", along with the case for mindreading and self-awareness in nonhumans. Key building blocks of morality are, in this sense, evolutionarily ancient.
Hauser makes a few eyebrow-raising uses of moral language when discussing nonhuman "proto-morality". His casual reference to the "evolved rights" of mink, for one thing, should jar readers. The issue is not the superficial one of incautious expression but rather a deep and genuine uncertainty, in which Hauser is not alone, about how moral language ought to be applied to animals. Hauser adventurously muses on the possibility of full-blown nonhuman morality but, recognizing the formidable difficulty of testing for it as opposed to "merely socially coordinated behaviors", is content to conclude that "such questions exist and are worth addressing". Indeed.
Hauser's cautious "interim report" is that nonhuman animals have only some of the precursors of human morality. They also, Hauser concludes after surveying yet another interesting array of studies, display only a fraction of the cooperativeness observed in humans. Reciprocal interactions in nonhumans are, at best, restricted to "a single commodity, within a single context, and the timespan for exchange is remarkably short". Hauser's review of the animal cooperation literature is at times very entertaining; any under-appreciated IT support workers amongst his readership can look forward to some solace from his story of social hierarchy, dominance, aggression and a popcorn machine amongst macaques. Nonhuman animals do of course cooperate in many ways. However, Hauser says, humans seemingly uniquely engage in large-scale cooperation among unrelated individuals. We are also seemingly unique in maintaining stable reciprocal relationships across a variety of circumstances and currencies. The mismatch between human and nonhuman "building block" sets, along with the mismatch in cooperative capacity, suggests to Hauser that the evolutionary function of our moral faculty is to allow large-scale cooperation and generalized reciprocity.
Hauser apparently wants to dovetail his view with the cultural group-selectionism of Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson. The focus of Moral Minds is predominantly on the development of the moral faculty, though, and Hauser's comments on its evolution go by fairly quickly. It is simply too early to assess whether Hauser plus Boyd and Richerson equals "a solution to the paradox of human cooperation". It is, however, worth pointing out that Hauser's account of the evolution of the moral faculty need not be tied to the theory of cultural group selection. Selection for reciprocity, in particular, can occur at many biological levels. Hauser's clearly thinks, though, that there are interesting links between his work and that of Boyd and Richerson. Developing the ideas in this section of Moral Minds would be a worthwhile future project.
Moral Minds ends with a discussion of issues Hauser thinks likely to arise out of his work so far. He quite sensibly rejects three "classically held beliefs" about the relationship of biology and morality. A biological explanation for moral judgment need not imply, and in Hauser's own case certainly doesn't imply, "predetermined outcomes, thereby eliminating free will". Nor need it claim that moral principles are somehow "encoded in the DNA". Those two classically held beliefs rest on (frustratingly persistent) misunderstandings of the relevant biology. Finally, biological perspectives on morality should not be opposed on the grounds that "only religious faith and legal guidelines can prevent moral decay". Hauser's brisk dismissal of this idea is akin to Richard Dawkins' in The God Delusion (in fact, these two books could be illuminatingly read together). There are, however, more vexing issues that remain live despite Hauser's confident assurances.
Hauser insists throughout Moral Minds that his project is descriptive; he is not making prescriptions for human behavior. He also insists, though, that his work on the moral faculty will help us "navigate between descriptive and prescriptive principles". This would be simple sense, and unsensational, if all he meant was that some reasoned prescriptions will be more at odds with the intuitive deliverances of our moral faculty than others, and that we are better off knowing of such obstacles than not. Hauser has something stronger in mind, though. Most books in this genre make early mention of the Naturalistic Fallacy (in some guise) and Moral Minds is no exception. "We are not entitled to move from the natural to the good", Hauser tells us; "the equation of good with natural [is] fallacious". He nevertheless thinks an understanding of our moral grammar "bears on our approach to the prescriptive principles of what ought to be". Once we uncover the moral faculty's principles, he says, "we may use these principles to guide how we consciously reason about morally permissible actions". It is certainly tempting to read Hauser here as saying that laying out our grammar of action could give us insight into what is 'really' right and wrong, our intuitive biases aside.
It is confusing just what kind of connection Hauser is trying to establish between descriptive and prescriptive moral projects. He is perhaps best understood as recommending that we reason pragmatically when constructing our normative theories, eyes open to the difficulties of implementation our intuitive biases will create. How reason-responsive our moral judgments are, though, is left distressingly unclear at the end of Moral Minds. The Rawlsian, Kantian and Humean creatures all receive some support from Hauser's work. In his view, we are a mix of all three. Our initial moral judgments are generated by unconscious principles, we can reason in favor or against these judgments, and emotions can promote or hinder our acting in line with our moral judgments. Hauser's work could be useful as moral 'navigational aid', however, only if the Kantian creature retains a significant role even after the Rawlsian creature has taken up its share of the psychological stage. How many lines the Kantian is left with (or if it even has a speaking part at all) will likely be a lively debate taken up in the wake of Moral Minds.
Further, there is a difference between reason changing our moral intuitions and reason influencing our moral behavior. It seems that a consequence of Hauser being right is that certain intuitive moral judgments could persist even while we rationally reject them and behave accordingly. In that case, Moral Minds implies that some rationally desirable normative policies may come only at the cost of 'moral dissonance', so to speak. Of course, if Hauser's right, whining about it won't help. Still, we should recognise that the connections between descriptive and prescriptive moral projects are not as clear or constructive as is optimistically suggested.
Finally, Hauser considers the Rawlsian model of moral judgment attractive insofar as it seems amenable to "a pluralistic position...that recognizes different moral systems and sees adherence to a single system as oppressive". It would be unfair to make too much of Hauser's closing remarks, but one may struggle to see how being "as perplexed by another community's moral system as we are by their language" could be a good thing. As repeatedly stressed, however, drawing out the implications of Hauser's work will be an interesting and worthwhile Endeavour.
With Moral Minds, Marc Hauser has sown many seeds. It remains to be seen which are watered, which wither, and which grow wild.
© 2007 Ben Fraser
Ben Fraser, Ph.D candidate, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia