email page print pageAll Topic Reviews
A Theory of Feelings Anger and Forgiveness"My Madness Saved Me"10 Good Questions about Life and Death12 Modern Philosophers50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a GodA Cabinet of Philosophical CuriositiesA Case for IronyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to Buddhist PhilosophyA Companion to FoucaultA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to HumeA Companion to KantA Companion to Phenomenology and ExistentialismA Companion to PragmatismA Companion to the Philosophy of ActionA Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyA Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Critical Overview of Biological FunctionsA Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of MindA Cursing Brain?A Delicate BalanceA Farewell to AlmsA Frightening LoveA Future for PresentismA Guide to the Good LifeA History of PsychiatryA History of the MindA Life Worth LivingA Manual of Experimental PhilosophyA Map of the MindA Metaphysics of PsychopathologyA Mind So RareA Natural History of Human MoralityA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Natural History of VisionA Parliament of MindsA Philosopher Looks at The Sense of HumorA Philosophical DiseaseA Philosophy of BoredomA Philosophy of Cinematic ArtA Philosophy of CultureA Philosophy of EmptinessA Philosophy of FearA Philosophy of PainA Physicalist ManifestoA Place for ConsciousnessA Question of TrustA Research Agenda for DSM-VA Revolution of the MindA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Stroll With William JamesA Tear is an Intellectual ThingA Theory of FreedomA Thousand MachinesA Universe of ConsciousnessA Very Bad WizardA Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the CurtainA Virtue EpistemologyA World Full of GodsA World Without ValuesAbout FaceAbout the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the SelfAction and ResponsibilityAction in ContextAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionAction, Contemplation, and HappinessAction, Emotion and WillAdam SmithAdaptive DynamicsAddictionAddictionAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction Is a ChoiceAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAftermathAfterwarAgainst AdaptationAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HappinessAgainst HealthAgency and ActionAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and EmbodimentAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAl-JununAlain BadiouAlain BadiouAlasdair MacIntyreAlien Landscapes?Altered EgosAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Ethics for TodayAn Intellectual History of CannibalismAn Interpretation of DesireAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy An Introduction to Philosophy of EducationAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyAn Introductory Philosophy of MedicineAn Odd Kind of FameAnalytic FreudAnalytic Philosophy in AmericaAncient AngerAncient Models of MindAncient Philosophy of the SelfAngerAnimal LessonsAnimal MindsAnimals Like UsAnnihilationAnother PlanetAnswers for AristotleAnti-ExternalismAnti-Individualism and KnowledgeAntigone’s ClaimAntipsychiatryAre We Hardwired?Are Women Human?Arguing about DisabilityArguing About Human NatureAristotle and the Philosophy of FriendshipAristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's ChildrenAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAristotle, Emotions, and EducationArt & MoralityArt After Conceptual ArtArt in Three DimensionsArt, Self and KnowledgeArtificial ConsciousnessArtificial HappinessAspects of PsychologismAsylum to ActionAtonement and ForgivenessAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutobiography as PhilosophyAutonomyAutonomy and Mental DisorderAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismBabies by DesignBackslidingBadiouBadiou's DeleuzeBadiou, Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking EmancipationBare Facts And Naked TruthsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBattlestar Galactica and PhilosophyBe Like the FoxBeautyBecoming a SubjectBecoming HumanBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing AmoralBeing HumanBeing Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory Being No OneBeing Realistic about ReasonsBeing ReducedBeing YourselfBelief's Own EthicsBending Over BackwardsBerlin Childhood around 1900Bernard WilliamsBertrand RussellBetter than BothBetter Than WellBetween Two WorldsBeyond HealthBeyond Hegel and NietzscheBeyond KuhnBeyond LossBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond PostmodernismBeyond ReductionBeyond SchizophreniaBeyond the DSM StoryBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics in the ClinicBiological Complexity and Integrative PluralismBiology Is TechnologyBiosBipolar ExpeditionsBlackwell Companion to the Philosophy of EducationBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlues - Philosophy for EveryoneBlushBob Dylan and PhilosophyBody ConsciousnessBody Image And Body SchemaBody ImagesBody LanguageBody MattersBody WorkBody-Subjects and Disordered MindsBoundBoundaries of the MindBoyleBrain Evolution and CognitionBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-WiseBrainchildrenBrains, Buddhas, and BelievingBrainstormingBrave New WorldsBreakdown of WillBrief Child Therapy Homework PlannerBrief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and FaithBrief Therapy Homework PlannerBritain on the CouchBritish Idealism and the Concept of the SelfBrute RationalityBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyBut Is It Art?Camus and SartreCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCarving Nature at Its JointsCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsCassandra's DaughterCato's TearsCausation and CounterfactualsCauses, Laws, and Free WillChanging Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-ModernityChanging the SubjectChaosophyCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionCharles DarwinCherishmentChildhood and the Philosophy of EducationChildrenChildren, Families, and Health Care Decision MakingChoices and ConflictChoosing Not to ChooseChristmas - Philosophy for EveryoneCinema, Philosophy, BergmanCinematic MythmakingCity and Soul in Plato's RepublicClassifying MadnessClear and Queer ThinkingClinical EthicsClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyCodependent ForevermoreCoffee - Philosophy for EveryoneCognition and the BrainCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, ReflectionCognitive BiologyCognitive FictionsCognitive Neuroscience of EmotionCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Cognitive Theories of Mental IllnessCoherence in Thought and ActionCollected Papers, Volume 1Collected Papers, Volume 2College SexComedy IncarnateCommitmentCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentConcealment And ExposureConceptual Analysis and Philosophical NaturalismConceptual Art and PaintingConceptual Issues in Evolutionary BiologyConfessionsConfucianismConnected, or What It Means to Live in the Network SocietyConquest of AbundanceConscience and ConvenienceConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the SelfConsciousness EmergingConsciousness EvolvingConsciousness ExplainedConsciousness in ActionConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsole and ClassifyConstructing the WorldConstructive AnalysisContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Philosophy of BiologyContemporary Debates in Philosophy of MindContemporary Debates in Political PhilosophyContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Natural LawContested Knowledge: Social Theory TodayContesting PsychiatryContext and the AttitudesContinental Philosophy of ScienceControlControlling Our DestiniesConversations About Psychology and Sexual OrientationCopernicus, Darwin and FreudCrazy for YouCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCreating ConsilienceCreating HysteriaCreating Mental IllnessCreating Scientific ConceptsCreating the American JunkieCreation, Rationality and AutonomyCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCrimes of ReasonCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychiatryCritical PsychologyCritical ResistanceCritical Thinking About PsychologyCritical VisionsCross and KhoraCruel CompassionCTRL [SPACE]Cultural Psychology of the SelfCultural Theory: An IntroductionCulture and Psychiatric DiagnosisCulture and Subjective Well-BeingCulture of DeathCultures of NeurastheniaCurious EmotionsCurrent Controversies in Experimental PhilosophyCustom and Reason in HumeCustomers and Patrons of the Mad-TradeCutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together AgainCylons in AmericaDamaged IdentitiesDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous EmotionsDaniel DennettDaniel DennettDark AgesDarwin and DesignDarwin's Dangerous IdeaDarwin's LegacyDarwin, God and the Meaning of LifeDarwinian PsychiatryDarwinian ReductionismDarwinizing CultureDating: Philosophy for EveryoneDeathDeathDeath and CharacterDeath and CompassionDeath and the AfterlifeDebating DesignDebating HumanismDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecomposing the WillDeconstructing PsychotherapyDeconstruction and DemocracyDeeper Than DarwinDeeper than ReasonDefending Science - within ReasonDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDegrees of BeliefDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDelusions and the Madness of the MassesDementiaDemons, Dreamers, and MadmenDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDennett’s PhilosophyDepression Is a ChoiceDepression, Emotion and the SelfDepthDerrida, Deleuze, PsychoanalysisDescartesDescartes and the Passionate MindDescartes' CogitoDescartes's Changing MindDescartes's Concept of MindDescribing Inner Experience?Descriptions and PrescriptionsDesembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Desire and AffectDesire, Love, and IdentityDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDeveloping the VirtuesDiagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDialectics of the SelfDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital SoulDimensional Models of Personality DisordersDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisjunctivismDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDispatches from the Freud WarsDisrupted LivesDistractionDisturbed ConsciousnessDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Do We Still Need Doctors?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Does the Woman Exist?Doing without ConceptsDon't Believe Everything You ThinkDonald DavidsonDonald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the MentalDoubting Darwin?Dreaming and Other Involuntary MentationDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV-TR CasebookDworkin and His CriticsDying to KnowDynamics in ActionDysthymia and the Spectrum of Chronic DepressionsEccentricsEducational MetamorphosesEffective IntentionsElbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth WantingEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbodied RhetoricsEmbodied Selves and Divided MindsEmbryos under the MicroscopeEmergencies in Mental Health PracticeEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotionEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion and PsycheEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotional ReasonEmotional ReasonEmotional TruthEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions, Value, and AgencyEmpathyEmpathy and AgencyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpathy in the Context of PhilosophyEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEnchanted LoomsEngaging BuddhismEngineering the Human GermlineEnjoymentEnvyEpicureanismEpistemic LuckEpistemologyEpistemology and EmotionsEpistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentEros and the GoodErotic MoralityEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssays in the Metaphysics of Mind Essays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEssays on Nonconceptual ContentEssays on Philosophical CounselingEssays on Reference, Language, and MindEssays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern PhilosophyEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEsssential Philosophy of PsychiatryEternal Sunshine of the Spotless MindEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in Human CloningEthical TheoryEthicsEthicsEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics and Values in PsychotherapyEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics in Plain EnglishEthics in PracticeEthics in Psychiatric ResearchEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEuropean Review of Philosophy. Vol. 5Everyday IrrationalityEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolutionEvolution and the Human MindEvolution's RainbowEvolutionary Origins of MoralityEvolutionary PsychologyExamined LifeExamined LivesExistential AmericaExistentialismExistentialism and Romantic LoveExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and NaturalismExperiments in EthicsExplaining ConsciousnessExplaining the BrainExplaining the Computational MindExplanatory PluralismExploding the Gene MythExploring HappinessExploring the SelfExpression and the InnerExpressions of JudgmentFaces of IntentionFact and ValueFact and Value in EmotionFacts, Values, and NormsFads and Fallacies in the Social SciencesFaith and Wisdom in ScienceFatherhoodFear of KnowledgeFearless SpeechFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFeelings of BeingFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminism and Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Interpretations of Rene DescartesFeminist TheoryField Notes from ElsewhereFinding Consciousness in the BrainFingerprints of GodFlesh in the Age of ReasonFolk Psychological NarrativesFolk Psychology Re-AssessedForces of HabitForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and RetributionFoucault 2.0Foucault and PhilosophyFoucault NowFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Ethical Practice, Research, and Teaching in PsychologyFour Views on Free WillFrank Ramsey (1903-1930)Free WillFree WillFree WillFree WillFree Will and Action ExplanationFree Will and LuckFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free WillFreedomFreedom and DeterminismFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom and ResponsibiltyFreedom and ValueFreedom EvolvesFreedom RegainedFreedom vs. InterventionFreedom, Fame, Lying, and BetrayalFreudFreud and the Question of PseudoscienceFreud As PhilosopherFreud's AnswerFreud, the Reluctant PhilosopherFriedrich NietzscheFrom Chance to ChoiceFrom Clinic to ClassroomFrom Complexity to LifeFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the HumanitiesFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrontiers of ConsciousnessFrontiers of JusticeFurnishing the MindGalileo in PittsburghGenderGender and Mental HealthGender in the MirrorGender TroubleGenesGenes, Women, EqualityGenetic Nature/CultureGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetic SecretsGenocide's AftermathGenomes and What to Make of ThemGerman Idealism and the JewGerman PhilosophyGetting HookedGilles DeleuzeGlobal PhilosophyGluttonyGod and Phenomenal ConsciousnessGoffman's LegacyGoing Amiss in Experimental ResearchGoodness & AdviceGrassroots SpiritualityGrave MattersGrave MattersGreedGreek Models of Mind and SelfGut ReactionsHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHabits of MindHallucinationHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of EmotionsHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness and EducationHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHappiness, Death, and the Remainder of LifeHard LuckHarmful ThoughtsHaving the World in ViewHealing PsychiatryHealing the Soul in the Age of the BrainHealth, Illness and DiseaseHealth, Science, and Ordinary LanguageHegelHeidegger and a Metaphysics of FeelingHeidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of BeingHermann von Helmholtz's MechanismHermeneutics As PoliticsHeterophobiaHeterosyncraciesHeuristics and BiasesHeuristics and the LawHidden ResourcesHidden SelvesHiding from HumanityHigh Art LiteHistorical OntologyHistory of Psychiatry and Medical PsychologyHistory, Historicity And ScienceHobbesHomosexualitiesHope and Dread in PsychoanalysisHot ThoughtHow Can I Be Trusted?How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Children Learn the Meanings of WordsHow Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?How Do We Know Who We Are?How Emotions WorkHow Emotions WorkHow History Made the MindHow Images ThinkHow is Nature Possible?How Propaganda WorksHow Science WorksHow Scientific Practices MatterHow Scientists Explain DiseaseHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Make Opportunity EqualHow to Solve the Mind-Body Problemhow to stop timeHow to Think More About SexHow We HopeHow We ReasonHuman CloningHuman Development, Language and the Future of MankindHuman EnhancementHuman Evolution, Reproduction, and MoralityHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman NatureHuman NatureHuman Nature and the Limits of ScienceHuman-Built WorldHumanismHumanism, What's That?HumanityHumans, Animals, MachinesHumeHumeHume on Motivation and VirtueHusserlHystoriesI of the VortexI Was WrongIdeas that MatterIdentifying the MindIdentity and Agency in Cultural WorldsIgnorance and ImaginationIllnessImagination and Its PathologiesImagination and the Meaningful BrainImagining NumbersImmortal RemainsImproving Nature?In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of HealthIn Defense of SentimentalityIn Love With LifeIn Praise of Athletic BeautyIn Praise of the WhipIn Pursuit of HappinessIn Search of HappinessIn the Name of GodIn the Name of IdentityIn the Space of ReasonsIn Two MindsIncompatibilism's AllureIndividual Differences in Conscious ExperienceInfinity and PerspectiveInformation ArtsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchIngmar Bergman, Cinematic PhilosopherInhuman ThoughtsInner PresenceInsanityIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntelligent VirtueIntentionIntentionality, Deliberation and AutonomyIntentions and IntentionalityIntentions and IntentionalityInterpreting MindsInterpreting NietzscheIntroducing Greek PhilosophyIntrospection and ConsciousnessIntrospection VindicatedIntuition, Imagination, and Philosophical MethodologyIntuitionismInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIrrationalityIs Academic Feminism Dead?Is It Me or My Meds?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is Oedipus Online?Is Science Neurotic?Is Science Value Free?Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Is There a Duty to Die?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJacques LacanJacques RancièreJacques RanciereJean-Paul SartreJohn McDowellJohn SearleJohn Searle's Ideas About Social RealityJohn Stuart MillJohn Stuart Mill and the Writing of CharacterJoint AttentionJokesJonathan EdwardsJudging and UnderstandingJustice for ChildrenJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeKantKant and MiltonKant and the Fate of AutonomyKant and the Limits of AutonomyKant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral ActionKant on Freedom, Law, and HappinessKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Anatomy of EvilKant's Anatomy of the Intelligent MindKant's Theory of VirtueKarl JaspersKarl PopperKey Concepts in PhilosophyKierkegaardKierkegaard as PhenomenologistKierkegaard's Concept of DespairKierkegaard's MuseKinds of MindsKinds, Things, and StuffKnowing, Knowledge and BeliefsKnowledge MonopoliesKnowledge, Belief, and CharacterKnowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessLacanLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLanguageLanguage in ContextLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Culture, and MindLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw and the BrainLaw, Liberty, and PsychiatryLaws, Mind, and Free WillLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberatory PsychiatryLife and ActionLife at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum, 1857-1997Life Is Not a Game of PerfectLife of the MindLife's FormLife, Death, & MeaningLife, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of UtilityLife, Sex, and IdeasLight in the Dark RoomLike a Splinter in Your MindLiving and Dying WellLiving NarrativeLiving Outside Mental IllnessLiving with DarwinLiving With One’s PastLockeLocke LockeLogic and the Art of Memory Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and LiteratureLooking for SpinozaLooking for The StrangerLost SoulsLOT 2LoveLoveLove's ConfusionsLove's VisionLove, Friendship, and the SelfLove, Sex & TragedyLuckyLudwig WittgensteinLustLyingMachine ConsciousnessMad for FoucaultMad TravelersMade with WordsMadness And Death In PhilosophyMadness and DemocracyMadness at HomeMadness Is CivilizationMaking Natural KnowledgeMaking Sense of EvolutionMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMaking the DSM-5Making the Social WorldMaking TruthMale Female EmailMan, Beast, and ZombieMandated Reporting of Suspected Child AbuseManiaManic Depression and CreativityMapping the Edges and the In-betweenMapping the Future of BiologyMarcus AureliusMaster PassionsMatters of the MindMe++Meaning and Moral OrderMeaning and Value in a Secular AgeMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMeaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and MindMeasuring HappinessMeasuring PsychopathologyMedia MadnessMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedicine and Philosophy in Classical AntiquityMedicine of the PersonMedicine, Mental Health, Religion, Science and Well-BeingMelancholy And the Care of the SoulMelancholy and the Otherness of GodMementoMemory and NarrativeMental ActionsMental CausationMental Causation and OntologyMental HealthMental Health At The CrossroadsMental Health Policy in BritainMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMerleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of PhilosophyMetacognition and Theory of MindMetacreationMetaethical SubjectivismMetaethicsMetal and FleshMetaphors of MemoryMetapoliticsMethods in MindMichel FoucaultMill's UtilitarianismMindMindMind and ConsciousnessMind and CosmosMind and MechanismMind GamesMind in a Physical WorldMind in Everyday Life and Cognitive ScienceMind in LifeMind TimeMind's LandscapeMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMind, Brain, and Free WillMind, Reason and ImaginationMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds and PersonsMinds, Brains, and LawMinds, Ethics, and ConditionalsMindshapingMindsightMindworldsMirror, MirrorMixed FeelingsMockingbird YearsModels of the SelfModern Social ImaginariesModern Theories of JusticeModernity and SubjectivityModernity and TechnologyMoody Minds DistemperedMoral BrainsMoral DimensionsMoral FailureMoral ImaginationMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral ParticularismMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology and Human AgencyMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Moral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMotherhoodMotive and RightnessMoving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New PsychiatryMultiple Analogies in Science and PhilosophyMultiple Identities & False MemoriesMusic, Madness, and the Unworking of LanguageMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Double UnveiledMy WayNarrativeNarrative and IdentityNarrative MedicineNarrative PsychiatryNarrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesNatural Ethical FactsNatural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeNatural MindsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveNaturalism and the Human ConditionNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalized BioethicsNaturalizing the MindNatureNature and NarrativeNear Death ExperienceNeither Bad nor MadNeither Victim nor SurvivorNeuro-Philosophy and the Healthy MindNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neurophilosophy at WorkNeurophilosophy of Free WillNeuropoliticsNeuropsychoanalysis in PracticeNeuroscience and PhilosophyNew Essays on the Explanation of ActionNew Philosophy for a New MediaNew Versions of VictimsNew Waves in Philosophy of ActionNietzscheNietzsche and Buddhist PhilosophyNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNietzsche's TherapyNietzsche, Culture and EducationNietzsche: The Man and His PhilosophyNihil UnboundNoir AnxietyNormative EthicsNormativityNorms of NatureNotebooks 1951-1959Notes Toward a Performative Theory of AssemblyNothing So AbsurdOblivionOn AnxietyOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn Being AuthenticOn BeliefOn BetrayalOn BullshitOn DelusionOn DesireOn EmotionsOn HashishOn Human RightsOn Loving Our EnemiesOn Nature and LanguageOn PersonalityOn ReflectionOn Romantic LoveOn the EmotionsOn the Freud WatchOn the Government of the LivingOn the Human ConditionOn the InternetOn the Meaning of LifeOn the Philosophy of LawOn the Pragmatics of CommunicationOn the Punitive SocietyOn TruthOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne Hundred DaysOnflowOnly a Promise of HappinessOntology of ConsciousnessOpen MindedOpen Your EyesOrgans without BodiesOther MindsOur Last Great IllusionOur Own MindsOur Posthuman FutureOur StoriesOut of Its MindOut of Our HeadsOxford Guide to the MindOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPanic DisorderPanpsychismPanpsychism in the WestPartialityPassionate EnginesPassionate EnginesPathologies of BeliefPathologies of ReasonPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perceiving the WorldPerception & CognitionPerception and Basic BeliefsPerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPerceptual ExperiencePerfecting VirtuePerplexities of ConsciousnessPersistencePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal IdentityPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonal Identity and Fractured SelvesPersonhood and Health CarePersonsPersons and BodiesPersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPersons, Souls and DeathPerspectives on ImitationPerspectives on PragmatismPessimismPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenal ConsciousnessPhenomenal IntentionalityPhenomenology and ExistentialismPhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhilosophersPhilosophers on MusicPhilosophers without GodsPhilosophical CounselingPhilosophical Counselling and the UnconsciousPhilosophical DevicesPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical History and the Problem of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in Psychiatry IIPhilosophical MethodologyPhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophical Myths of the FallPhilosophical Perspectives on DepictionPhilosophical Perspectives on Technology and PsychiatryPhilosophical PracticePhilosophical Reflections on DisabilityPhilosophizing About Sex Philosophizing the EverydayPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy and LivingPhilosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy and PsychotherapyPhilosophy and Science FictionPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CulturePhilosophy and the Moving ImagePhilosophy and the NeurosciencesPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy As FictionPhilosophy BitesPhilosophy Bites BackPhilosophy for Counselling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy for LifePhilosophy in a New CenturyPhilosophy in an Age of SciencePhilosophy in Children's LiteraturePhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BodyPhilosophy of Film and Motion PicturesPhilosophy of LovePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and MarriagePhilosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionPhilosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple PersonalityPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Public HealthPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhilosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophy on TapPhilosophy PracticePhilosophy the Day after TomorrowPhilosophy's Role in Counseling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhilosophy, Politics, DemocracyPhotography and PhilosophyPhysical RealizationPhysicalism and Its DiscontentsPhysicalism and Mental CausationPhysicalism, or Something Near EnoughPhysician-Assisted DyingPillar of SaltPin-up GrrrlsPlatoPlatoPlato, Not Prozac!Platonic Ethics, Old and NewPluralistic CasuistryPolarities of ExperiencesPolitical EmotionsPopper, Objectivity and the Growth of KnowledgePornPorn StudiesPornography, Sex, and FeminismPortrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young ManPostcolonial DisordersPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPower and the SelfPower SplitPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical ConflictsPractical Identity and Narrative AgencyPractical PhilosophyPractical RulesPractical Tortoise RaisingPractically ProfoundPracticing Feminist Ethics in PsychologyPragmatic BioethicsPragmatismPragmatism, Old And NewPraise and BlamePredicative MindsPreferences and Well-BeingPrescriptions for the MindPresocraticsPrimary and Secondary QualitiesPrimates and PhilosophersPrivacyPrivileged AccessProblems in MindProblems of RationalityProzac As a Way of LifeProzac BacklashProzac on the CouchPsyche and SomaPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric Cultures ComparedPsychiatric Diagnosis and ClassificationPsychiatric EthicsPsychiatric HegemonyPsychiatric PowerPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry and Philosophy of SciencePsychiatry and ReligionPsychiatry as a Human SciencePsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry in SocietyPsychiatry in the New MilleniumPsychiatry in the Scientific ImagePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsycho-Physical Dualism TodayPsychoanalysis and Narrative MedicinePsychoanalysis and the Philosophy of SciencePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and PhilosophyPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology, Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of Human RelationshipsPsychotherapy and ConfidentialityPsychotherapy As PraxisPublic PhilosophyPunishmentPure ImmanencePurple HazePursuing MeaningQuality of Life and Human DifferenceQueer PhilosophyQuestions for FreudQuestions for FreudQuine and Davidson on Language, Thought and RealityRaceRace in Contemporary MedicineRadiant CoolRadical AlterityRadical ExternalismRadical HopeRational and Social AgencyRational CausationRational Choice in an Uncertain WorldRationality + Consciousness = Free WillRationality and FreedomRationality and the Reflective MindRationality in ActionRawls, Dewey, and ConstructivismRe-creating MedicineRe-EmergenceRe-Engineering Philosophy for Limited BeingsReading AutobiographyReading Bernard WilliamsReading SartreReadings in the Philosophy of TechnologyReal MaterialismReal Natures and Familiar ObjectsReal ScienceRealism in ActionReason & EmancipationReason in ActionReason in PhilosophyReason's GriefReasonably ViciousReasoning About Rational AgentsReasoning in Biological DiscoveriesReasons from WithinReasons without RationalismReclaiming CognitionReclaiming the SoulReconceiving SchizophreniaReconstructing Reason and RepresentationReconstructing the Cognitive WorldRecreative MindsRediscovering EmotionRediscovering EmpathyReference and ExistenceReference and the Rational MindReflections On How We LiveReframing Disease ContextuallyRefusing CareRegulating SexReinventing the SoulRelativism and Human RightsRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyReliable ReasoningReligion without GodRelying on OthersRemembering HomeResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility and PunishmentResponsibility from the MarginsRestraining RageRethinking ExpertiseRethinking IntrospectionRethinking Mental Health and DisorderRethinking RapeRethinking the DSMRethinking the Sociology of Mental HealthRethinking the Western Understanding of the SelfReturn to ReasonRevolt, She SaidRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard RortyRichard Rorty's New PragmatismRightsRights, Democracy, and Fulfillment in the Era of Identity PoliticsRise And Fall of Soul And SelfRitalin NationRobert NozickRousseauRousseau and the Dilemmas of Modernity Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on DeconstructionRules, Reason, and Self-KnowledgeSaints, Scholars, and Schizophrenics: Mental Illness in Rural IrelandSartreSartreSartreSartre in Search of an EthicsSatisficing and MaximizingSaving GodScandalous KnowledgeSchizophreniaSchizophrenia and the Fate of the SelfSchizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion?SchopenhauerSchopenhauer's TelescopeScienceScience and EthicsScience and Pseudoscience in Clinical PsychologyScience and SpiritualityScience and the Pursuit of WisdomScience Fiction and PhilosophyScience Fiction and PhilosophyScience in Civil SocietyScience in DemocracyScience RulesScience WarsScience, Consciousness and Ultimate RealityScience, Policy, and the Value-Free IdealSciences from BelowScientific EvidenceScientific IrrationalismScientific PerspectivismScientific PluralismScientific Realism and the Rationality of ScienceScratching the Surface of BioethicsSecond NatureSecond OpinionsSecond PhilosophySecrets of the MindSecular Philosophy and the Religious TemperamentSecurity, Territory, PopulationSeeing and VisualizingSeeing DoubleSeeing Fictions in FilmSeeing RedSeeing Wittgenstein AnewSeeing, Doing, And KnowingSelfSelf and OtherSelf and SubjectivitySelf, No Self?Self-ConsciousnessSelf-ConstitutionSelf-ExpressionSelf-FulfillmentSelf-Knowledge and ResentmentSelf-Knowledge and Self-DeceptionSelf-Made MadnessSelf-Reference and Self-AwarenessSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessSelvesSentimental RulesSexing the BodySexualized BrainsShades of LonelinessShame and GuiltShame and NecessityShame and PhilosophyShop Class as SoulcraftShynessSigns, Mind, And RealitySimone de BeauvoirSimple MindednessSimulating MindsSimulation and SimilaritySinging in the FireSisyphus's BoulderSituating SemanticsSix Questions of SocratesSkeptical FeminismSkepticismSketch for a Theory of the EmotionsSleeping With Extra-TerrestrialsSlothSocial EpistemologySocial PhenomenologySocializing MetaphysicsSociological Perspectives on the New GeneticsSocratesSocrates CafeSocrates in LoveSocratic Moral PsychologySoft SubversionsSoren KierkegaardSorting Things OutSoul Made FleshSound SentimentsSovereign VirtueSpeaking My MindSpinozaSpinoza and Deep EcologySpinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good LifeSpinoza on MonismSpirits and ClocksSplit DecisionsStich and His CriticsSticks and StonesStiffedStoicismStoicismStoicismStoicism and EmotionStories MatterStranger from AbroadStrong FeelingsStructures of AgencySubjectivity and Being SomebodySubjectivity and OthernessSubjectivity and SelfhoodSubjectivity and SelfhoodSuffering, Death, and IdentitySupersizing the MindSurprise, Uncertainty, and Mental StructuresSurrealist Painters and PoetsSurviving DeathSurviving HitlerSweet DreamsSynaptic SelfSynesthesia : A Union of the SensesSzasz Under FireTaking ActionTaking the Red PillTaking Wittgenstein at His WordTalking Back to PsychiatryTalking Cures and Placebo EffectsTalking to Our SelvesTalking with SartreTaming AngerTeach Yourself PostmodernismTechnology and the Good Life?Teleological RealismTen Years of Viewing from WithinTerrence MalickThe Act of ThinkingThe Activity of BeingThe Aesthetic MindThe Aesthetics of DisappearanceThe Age of GeniusThe Age of InsanityThe Altruism EquationThe Altruistic BrainThe American ParadoxThe Anti-Oedipus PapersThe Antidepressant EraThe Anxieties of AffluenceThe Art of Adolf WolfliThe Art of LivingThe Art of LivingThe Asymmetrical BrainThe Autonomy of MoralityThe Bakhtin CircleThe Beginning of PhilosophyThe Beginnings of Western ScienceThe Belief InstinctThe Beloved SelfThe Bifurcation of the SelfThe Big Book of ConceptsThe Biology and Psychology of Moral AgencyThe Birth of BiopoliticsThe Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of ScienceThe Blank SlateThe Bodhisattva's BrainThe Body ReaderThe Body/Body ProblemThe Bounds of AgencyThe Bounds of CognitionThe Brain and the Meaning of LifeThe Caldron of ConsciousnessThe Cambridge Companion to AdornoThe Cambridge Companion to AtheismThe Cambridge Companion to BerkeleyThe Cambridge Companion to DeweyThe Cambridge Companion to Feminism in PhilosophyThe Cambridge Companion to LacanThe Cambridge Companion to Life and DeathThe Cambridge Companion to Plato's RepublicThe Cambridge Companion to QuineThe Cambridge Companion to Science and ReligionThe Cambridge Companion to Simone de BeauvoirThe Cambridge Companion to SocratesThe Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyThe Cambridge Companion to the StoicsThe Cambridge Introduction to Michel FoucaultThe Cambridge Medical Ethics WorkbookThe Cambridge Textbook of BioethicsThe Case against Assisted SuicideThe Case for HumanismThe Case for Pragmatic PsychologyThe Case of the Female OrgasmThe Certainty of UncertaintyThe Challenge of ThingsThe Character of ConsciousnessThe Clinical and Forensic Assessment of PsychopathyThe Cognitive Basis of ScienceThe Cognitive Neuroscience of ConsciousnessThe Cognitive Science of ScienceThe Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual InvestigationsThe Concept of the Gene in Development and EvolutionThe Concepts of PsychiatryThe Conceptual Evolution of DSM-5The Condition of MadnessThe Conscious BrainThe Conscious MindThe Conscious SelfThe Consolation of PhilosophyThe Consolations of PhilosophyThe Constitution of AgencyThe Constitution of SelvesThe Construction of Human KindsThe Construction of Power and Authority in PsychiatryThe Continuum Companion to Kant The Courage of TruthThe Creation of PsychopharmacologyThe Creation of the Modern WorldThe Crucible of ConsciousnessThe Crucible of ExperienceThe Cultural Context of Health, Illness, and MedicineThe Cultural Origins of Human CognitionThe Culture of Our DiscontentThe Death of PsychotherapyThe Delay of the HeartThe Deleuze ConnectionsThe Disappearance of the Social in American Social PsychologyThe Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New RepublicThe Disordered MindThe Dissolution of MindThe Domain of ReasonsThe Domestication of LanguageThe Dream DrugstoreThe Early Modern SubjectThe Ecstasy of CommunicationThe Ego TunnelThe Emergence of SexualityThe Emotional BrainThe Emotional Construction of MoralsThe EmotionsThe EmotionsThe Empathy GapThe Empire of TraumaThe Empirical StanceThe Engaged IntellectThe Enigma of HealthThe Erotic PhenomenonThe Essential William JamesThe Ethical BrainThe Ethical Dimensions of the Biological and Health SciencesThe Ethical WayThe Ethics of Human CloningThe Ethics of IdentityThe Ethics of PsychoanalysisThe Ethics of SufferingThe Ethics of the Family in SenecaThe Ethics of the LieThe Evolution of Agency and Other EssaysThe Evolution of LanguageThe Evolution of MoralityThe Evolution of the Private Language ArgumentThe Evolved ApprenticeThe ExistentialistsThe Explanation of Social ActionThe Extended MindThe Extinction of DesireThe Fate of KnowledgeThe Feeling BodyThe Feeling of What HappensThe Form of Practical KnowledgeThe Fountain of YouthThe Freud WarsThe Future for PhilosophyThe Future of Human NatureThe God DebatesThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Good LifeThe Greeks and the IrrationalThe Healing VirtuesThe Heart & Soul of ChangeThe Heart of William JamesThe History of Human RightsThe Human AnimalThe Hungry SoulThe Hypomanic EdgeThe Idea of the SelfThe Illusion of Conscious WillThe Illusion of Freedom and EqualityThe Imagery DebateThe Importance of Being UnderstoodThe Imprinted BrainThe Improbability of GodThe Inessential IndexicalThe Innate MindThe Innate Mind: Volume 3The Intentional BrainThe Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of FreedomThe Knotted SubjectThe Language of GodThe Language of ThoughtThe Last PhysicianThe Legacy of John RawlsThe Limits and Lies of Human Genetic ResearchThe Limits of Autobiography The Limits of MedicineThe Logic of AffectThe Loss of SadnessThe Lost Art of HappinessThe Madness of Adam and EveThe Madonna of the FutureThe Making of a PhilosopherThe Making of Friedrich NietzscheThe Making of the Modern SelfThe Man Who Wasn't ThereThe Mark of the BeastThe Matrix and PhilosophyThe Matter of the MindThe Matter of the MindThe Meaning of AddictionThe Meaning of DisgustThe Meaning of FriendshipThe Meaning of MindThe Meaning of the BodyThe Meaning of the BodyThe Measure of MadnessThe Measure of MindThe Medicalization of Everyday LifeThe Medicalization of SocietyThe Meme MachineThe Metaphor of Mental IllnessThe Metaphysical ClubThe Metaphysics of CapitalThe Metaphysics of ScienceThe Metaphysics of Scientific RealismThe Mind and its DiscontentsThe Mind Doesn't Work That WayThe Mind Has MountainsThe Mind in NatureThe Mind IncarnateThe Mind's ProvisionsThe Mind, the Body and the WorldThe MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive SciencesThe Moral Challenge of Alzheimer DiseaseThe Moral Demands of MemoryThe Moral Psychology HandbookThe Most Human HumanThe Most Solitary of AfflictionsThe Multiple Realization BookThe Mystery of ExistenceThe Myth of an AfterlifeThe Myth of Digital DemocracyThe Myth of PainThe Nature and Future of PhilosophyThe Nature and Structure of ContentThe Nature of ConsciousnessThe Nature of DignityThe Nature of IntelligenceThe Nature of LifeThe Nature of MelancholyThe Nature of NormativityThe Nature of Sexual DesireThe Nature of the MindThe Nature of the SelfThe Necessity Of MadnessThe New AtheismThe New Disability HistoryThe New Idea of a UniversityThe New IntuitionismThe New PhrenologyThe New PragmatismThe New Rational TherapyThe New Science of the MindThe Nietzschean SelfThe Origin of Consciousness in the Social WorldThe Other Bishop BerkeleyThe Overman in the MarketplaceThe Oxford Companion to the MindThe Oxford Handbook of Free WillThe Oxford Handbook of HumeThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and PsychiatryThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of BiologyThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of DeathThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of EmotionThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of MindThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of PerceptionThe Oxford Handbook of RationalityThe Oxford Handbook of the SelfThe Paradox of Self ConsciousnessThe Parallax ViewThe Paranormal and the Politics of TruthThe Phenomenology ReaderThe Philosopher's "I"The Philosopher's Autobiography The Philosopher's Secret FireThe Philosophical BabyThe Philosophical Breakfast ClubThe Philosophical Foundations of Modern MedicineThe Philosophical IThe Philosophical PractitionerThe Philosophy of Andy WarholThe Philosophy of Animal MindsThe Philosophy of Animal MindsThe Philosophy of CreativityThe Philosophy of DeathThe Philosophy of DeceptionThe Philosophy of Elizabeth AnscombeThe Philosophy of ExpertiseThe Philosophy of Food The Philosophy of Free WillThe Philosophy of HeideggerThe Philosophy of InformationThe Philosophy of LawThe Philosophy of LivingThe Philosophy of Merleau-PontyThe Philosophy of Motion PicturesThe Philosophy of NeedThe Philosophy of PhilosophyThe Philosophy of PsychiatryThe Philosophy of PsychologyThe Philosophy of ReligionThe Philosophy of SartreThe Philosophy of Science and Technology StudiesThe Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary ReadingsThe Philosophy of William JamesThe Philosophy of WineThe Physics of ConsciousnessThe Physiology of TruthThe Pleasure CenterThe Pleasure's All MineThe Plural SelfThe Politics of AgencyThe Politics of HappinessThe Politics of PersonsThe Portfolio and the DiagramThe Postnational SelfThe Poverty of Radical OrthodoxyThe Power of FeelingsThe Practice of Everyday LifeThe Practices of the SelfThe Presence of MindThe Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday LifeThe Primacy of the SubjectiveThe Prism of GrammarThe Private Life of the BrainThe Problem of PunishmentThe Problem of the SoulThe Prosthetic ImpulseThe Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the Conscious BrainThe Psychology of Good and EvilThe Psychology of HappinessThe Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific MindThe PsychopathThe Pursuit of PerfectionThe Pursuit of UnhappinessThe Race for ConsciousnessThe Rational AnimalThe Rational ImaginationThe Really Hard ProblemThe Reasons of LoveThe Red and the RealThe Relevance of Philosophy to LifeThe Representational and the PresentationalThe Revolt of the PrimitiveThe Right to Refuse Mental Health TreatmentThe Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial ModelThe Rise of the Conservative Legal MovementThe Robot's RebellionThe Roman StoicsThe Routledge Companion to Free WillThe Routledge Companion to PhenomenologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of PsychologyThe Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-BeingThe RoutledgeFalmer Reader In The Philosophy Of Education The Rules of InsanityThe Schopenhauer CureThe Science MythThe Science of AddictionThe Science of Self-ControlThe Search for MeaningThe Second-Person StandpointThe SecretThe Secret History of EmotionThe SelfThe Self and Its EmotionsThe Self AwakenedThe Self-Organizing Social MindThe Self?The Selfish Gene PhilosophyThe Shattered SelfThe Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of PhilosophyThe Shortest ShadowThe Significance of ConsciousnessThe Silent World of Doctor and PatientThe Simpsons and PhilosophyThe Situated SelfThe Sleep of ReasonThe Social Construction of What?The Social Nature of Mental IllnessThe Solitary SelfThe Soul at WorkThe Soul Knows No BarsThe Spinoza ProblemThe Stoic Art of LivingThe Stoics On Determinism And CompatibilismThe Structure of ThinkingThe Struggle against DogmatismThe Subject's Point of ViewThe Subjective SelfThe Sublime Object of PsychiatryThe Subtlety of EmotionsThe Talking CureThe Tears of ThingsThe Therapy for the SaneThe Therapy of DesireThe Things We Do and Why We Do ThemThe Toothpaste of ImmortalityThe Transformation of PsychologyThe Transhumanist ReaderThe Trolley Problem MysteriesThe Turing TestThe Uncertain SciencesThe Undiscovered WittgensteinThe Unity of ConsciousnessThe Uses of PessimismThe Varieties of Religious ExperienceThe Vehement PassionsThe View from WithinThe Virtues of FreedomThe Virtues of HappinessThe Volitional BrainThe Wages of SinThe Web of LifeThe Whole ChildThe Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the MonsterThe Wing of MadnessThe Wonder of ConsciousnessThe Work of MourningThe Works of AgencyThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the WorldThe World of PerceptionThe World of PerversionTheoretical Issues in Psychology: An IntroductionTheories of Human NatureTheory and RealityTheory of MindTherapeutic ActionThere is No Such Thing as a Social ScienceThere's Something About Mary Things and PlacesThinking About FeelingThinking and SeeingThinking for CliniciansThinking for CliniciansThinking of AnswersThinking through the BodyThinking TwiceThinking with WhiteheadThis is Madness TooThomas KuhnThomas KuhnThomas Kuhn's ""Linguistic Turn"" and the Legacy of Logical EmpiricismThought in a Hostile WorldThought in ActionThought's FootingThreads of LifeThree Faces of DesireThrough the Looking GlassTime and IdentityTo Have Or To Be?TolerationTortured SubjectsTowards a Science of Consciousness IIITowards Non-BeingTraumaTrauma, Truth and ReconciliationTrue to LifeTrue to Our FeelingsTrusting on the EdgeTrusting the Subject?Truth & PredicationTruth and Truth-MakingTruth and TruthfulnessTruth as One and ManyTuringTwo Great Problems of LearningTwo Regimes of MadnessUgly FeelingsUmbr(a)Unconscious knowing and other essays in psycho-philosophical analysisUnderstanding EmotionsUnderstanding EvilUnderstanding Kant's EthicsUnderstanding LoveUnderstanding MarriageUnderstanding Moral ObligationUnderstanding PeopleUnderstanding Phenomenal Consciousness Undoing GenderUnifying HinduismUniversitiesUnlearning or 'How NOT to Be Governed?'Unnatural SelectionUnprincipled VirtueUnsanctifying Human Life: Essays on EthicsUnto OthersUpheavals of ThoughtUsers and Abusers of PsychiatryValue-Free Science?Values and Psychiatric DiagnosisVarieties of Anomalous ExperienceVarieties of MeaningVarieties of Practical ReasoningViolence Against WomenViolence and the BodyVirtue, Rules, and JusticeVirtue, Vice, and PersonalityVirtues and Their VicesVirtues of ThoughtVision and BrainVision and MindVision's InvisiblesVisual CultureVital NourishmentW. K. Clifford and "The Ethics of Belief"Waking LifeWandering SignificanceWays of KnowingWeakness of Will and Practical IrrationalityWeakness of Will from Plato to the PresentWeakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation ThoughtWelfare and Rational CareWhat Are We?What Art IsWhat Emotions Really AreWhat Good Are the Arts?What If Medicine Disappeared?What Is a Human?What Is an Emotion: Classic and Contemporary ReadingsWhat Is Good and WhyWhat Is Medicine?What is Mental Disorder?What Is Posthumanism?What Is Secular Humanism?What Is the Good Life?What is the Self?What Is This Thing Called Happiness?What Is Thought?What Makes Us Think?What Nietzsche Really SaidWhat Should I Believe?What Should I Do?What We Owe to Each OtherWhat Would Aristotle Do?What's Good on TVWhat's Wrong with Children's RightsWhat's Wrong With Science?When Self-Consciousness BreaksWhere Biology Meets PsychologyWhere the Action IsWhere the Roots Reach for WaterWhispers from the EastWho Rules in ScienceWho Was Jacques Derrida?Who's in Charge?Whose Freud?Why Everyone (Else) Is a HypocriteWhy God Won't Go AwayWhy Read Mill Today?Why the Mind is Not a ComputerWhy Things Matter to PeopleWhy Think?Why Think? Why Truth MattersWhy We DanceWider than the SkyWilliam Blake on Self and SoulWilliam James at the BoundariesWilliam James on Ethics and FaithWilling, Wanting, WaitingWisdom, Intuition and EthicsWise TherapyWitchcrazeWithin ReasonWithout ConscienceWittgensteinWittgenstein and Approaches To ClarityWittgenstein And PsychologyWittgenstein and PsychotherapyWittgenstein on Freud and FrazerWittgenstein Reads FreudWittgenstein Reads WeiningerWomen, Body, IllnessWomen, Madness and MedicineWords and ImagesWorld, Affectivity, TraumaWritten in the FleshYoga - Philosophy for EveryoneYour Drug May Be Your ProblemZizekZombies and Consciousness
What Kind of Philosophy is Philosophy Enough?
Writing in the early 50's, Morton
White had observed that "although there were many mansions in philosophy,
the more splendid ones housed metaphysics, logic, epistemology, and ethics,
which lived on a commanding hilltop, while somewhere downtown were the
two-family dwellings for political philosophy and jurisprudence, the small
apartments for aesthetics, and the boardinghouses for philosophers of the
special sciences" (xi). Disturbed however by this 'invidious ordering of
the philosophical disciplines," he came to think that "a more
democratic division of housing should be devised, one that provided better
quarters for the deprived disciplines" (xi).
In the present book (2002), and a half century later, White
articulates within the context of the Anglo-American Analytic tradition, in the
language and within the preoccupations proper to that tradition (and of which
he has been a prominent and eloquent proponent) the reasons why he has come to
disagree with some of its main tenets or articles of belief. In particular, he
explains why he has come to disagree with, and reject Quine's view that
"philosophy of science is philosophy enough" (x-xi, 5, 59-60, 108).
And so, this work relates in part White's own relatively early 'conversion' or
change of mind. But its central philosophical aim is to demonstrate why
philosophers, who wish to "avoid the blind alleys of full-fledged
classical rationalism and half-fledged neo-rationalism" (4. 187) should
accept instead that "philosophy of culture is philosophy enough" (5,
187). His main argument is that any philosopher who adopts and applies the
doctrine of 'holistic pragmatism' (properly understood) consistently and
thoroughly must come to this 'salutary' conclusion.
Interestingly though, he adopts
for his purpose the formulation of this doctrine as stated explicitly and
perhaps most perspicuously by Quine himself --in his well-known and influential
1951 paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1, 67). But as he points out,
contrary to what is commonly believed, it was actually laid out most defensibly
by Tarski in a 1944 personal letter to him (67). He then turns it
systematically against Quine, whose 'democratic credentials' vis-à-vis
the philosophical disciplines were arguably not broad or consistent enough
--though they were admittedly broader than those of the logical positivists
against whom he had mounted his own rather successful attack. He also turns
it as well against other early Pragmatic and Analytic philosophers who, he
argues, had not gone far enough in their rejection of rationalism, or been
consistent and thoroughgoing enough in their holism or their pragmatism. Finally,
he argues that his holistic pragmatism can also serve to indict a number of
other philosophers in the history of modern philosophy --from Descartes onward,
and in fact, up until the early part of the 20th century, including
those that he calls "part-time rationalists" or "half-hearted
anti-rationalists" (xii, 4)--providing however judicious qualifications
and exemptions in specific cases, as warranted.
Though he recognizes both William
James and John Dewey as the pragmatists whose holism makes them unquestionably
"the progenitors of more recent efforts to broaden the scope of philosophy
from an examination of logic and physics to an empirical examination of other
elements of civilization or culture" (6), White meticulously endeavors to
pointedly bring out their "occasional lapses into rationalism." He
does so on the basis of some original textual analyses worthy of our attention.
His main strategy in each and all
cases consists in bringing out and undermining tacit or explicit conceptual dualisms,
sharp theoretical distinctions and strict disciplinary
divisions underlying the philosophical views of these thinkers, and that,
he argues quite rightly, are untenable upon closer scrutiny. Some of the most
well-known dualisms and distinctions include: pure reason vs. sensory
experience, rational vs. empirical, a priori vs. a posteriori,
coercions of the ideal order vs. coercions of the sensible order, relations of
ideas vs. matters of fact, analytic vs. synthetic statements, necessary truths
vs. contingent truths, eternal truths vs. sensible truths, truths of logic and
mathematics vs. truths of natural science, observation sentences vs. moral
judgments, cognitive vs. emotional or moral, etc. Needless to say, these
typically served to underwrite and justify the traditional divisions,
boundaries and hierarchies commonly drawn not only between various areas of
philosophy (metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, political
philosophy, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, etc) but between
different disciplines as well (science, mathematics, philosophy, psychology,
art, theology, history, law, politics, etc).
For the sake of terminological
clarification, it should be said that White uses the term "culture"
interchangeably with "civilization" to denote a whole range of human
endeavors and their corresponding institutional practices, and not in the sense
in which some anthropologists or cultural studies theorists use it (xiii, 1).
When, by his own account, White
first realized that metaphysics and epistemology were in fact empirical
disciplines, he subsequently came to see more clearly than he had before that
the so-called privileged parts of philosophy could not defend their conclusions
by a priori methods, as they presumed to do. Hence, he became even more
convinced of the necessity of a more democratic reapportionment of the many
"houses of philosophy," and making an explicit acknowledgement of the
diverse and equally valuable practices housed and carried out therein.
That is why he now believes that
(natural) science is merely one cultural institution among many others,
whose practices and workings philosophers may and of course should study and
examine --preferably from a holistically pragmatic point of view [as Duhem, Tarski
and Quine for example had done (see relevant discussions in chapters IV, V and
VI)]. Similarly however, he believes that philosophers may and in fact should
study and examine the practices and workings of other institutions --as well
from the same point of view as long as it is done consistently. Thus they may
study and examine, for example: psychology and religion [as
William James for example has done in rather ground breaking ways, though not
always consistently with his own holistic pragmatism (see chapter II)], art
[as John Dewey and Goodman have done, each in their own way and more or less
successfully, with occasional lapses into dualism and rationalism (see chapters
III and VIII)], history [as White himself has done, and other
empiricists before and after him had also done (see chapter VII)], law [as
Oliver Wendell Holmes has done, and as his old boyhood-friend James also
suggested we do later on (see chapter IX)], and most importantly, at least for
White's overarching argument, morality and politics as well [as
John Rawls has done in notable and commendable ways (see chapter X)]. The key
point of his overarching argument --also his main point of contention with
Quine over whether a strict and firm distinction can be drawn justifiably
between science and ethics-- is first introduced and
substantiated further in chapters I and X-XI respectively.
Consistently then with his
holistic, empirical and pragmatic stance, White argues that what distinguishes
the different disciplines associated with various elements of culture is their different
vocabularies and substantive statements, and not the fact that we use
fundamentally different methods in supporting these statements.
As already suggested above, White's
book, comprising 11 chapters, weaves together two main threads: one that is
historical and another that is, properly speaking, more argumentative. It is
clearly written, carefully argued, and full of noteworthy details from a
scholarly point of view. In each chapter, White takes great care in sorting out
judiciously and fairly the valid and positive points from the objectionable and
untenable contributions of the philosophers he discusses.
In order to convey more than a
superficial appreciation of the main thrust of his view, I will focus on his
characterization of holistic pragmatism, and examine how he uses it in his
defense against Quine's arguments. My main concern, however, is to take some
critical measure of the way in which White 'cashes in' his central claim,
namely, that "philosophy of culture is philosophy enough," and the
fruitfulness that an analysis such as his can be brought to bear in the context
of contemporary philosophy and discussions of culture.
(I) The Rationalistic Tradition or the "Fruitless
Quest for Certainty"
Since the primary target of his holistic
pragmatism is rationalism in its various forms --overt or covert,
half-hearted or full-fledged, partial or full-blown - it might help motivate
his discussion of the former to take a brief historical perspective.
White believes quite rightly, I think,
that much of the history of philosophy has been, in the words of Dewey, a
fruitless "quest for certainty" (x, 5, 52), and that Dewey himself,
like many other philosophers before and after, and well into the 20th
century, have in fact contributed to that quest deliberately or unwittingly.
White shows that this was certainly
the case in earlier centuries with Descartes (3-4, 7, 24, 66, 70), Locke (22,
156-7), Hume (63-6), Kant (72-3, 174, 182), even Hegel (78, 87-8) and J. S.
Mill (72-3). Although White argues extensively and in an original way which may
in fact qualify as a revisionist reading that the case against Hume (contrary
to what commentators assume) may not be as straightforward as is commonly
assumed (see White, 2000 for details). In some sense, one could say
nevertheless that both Hume and Mill, to single them out, did not go far enough
in their rejection of rationalism. But these philosophers were not the only
ones who succumbed to "the siren song" of rationalism --half or
full-fledged. Others, who are not typically associated with rationalism given
their radically different approaches and avowed interest in various aspects of
culture, followed suit. These include: Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Friedrich Engels,
to mention a few. (88).
In addition to these figures from
earlier centuries, there were a number of empirically- minded philosophers in
the early 20th century who were, as White puts it, "part-time
rationalists." Pierre Duhem, for example, an early advocate of holism in
the philosophy of physics, whose name became subsequently associated with the
so-called "Duhemian conjunction (of hypotheses),."
maintained nevertheless a sharp epistemic distinction between physical and
mathematical truth, and so, his philosophy retained vestiges of rationalism
(54-6). William James, once characterized approvingly by Russell (56-8), as a
proponent of holistic pragmatism, also maintained inconsistently with his
general stance a sharp distinction between truths "coerced by the ideal
order" as opposed to those "coerced by the sensible order"
(153-4). Bertrand Russell himself who was once an advocate of holistic
pragmatism would later on abandon it (57). As for John Dewey, he was arguably
the most anti-dualist philosopher of culture of the 20th century. He
dealt not only with art, but with history, education, religion, law, politics,
and many other subjects. And though much of his thinking on these and other
matters was dominated by his antipathy for the rationalism and mind-body
dualism of Descartes, he did not fully escape from the influence of classical
rationalism, and occasionally lapsed into the mind-body dualism that he
elsewhere deplored (24) --as White shows in another demonstration of his
remarkable scholarship. In the end, Dewey also seemed to uphold a distinction
between two kinds of truth (ideational vs. existential) that smacked of a
rationalist residue (39-40, 53-4).
What is ironic, as White remarks,
is that many of the "half-fledged rationalists" or "half-hearted
anti-rationalists" were also social scientists, psychologists, historians,
economists, or more generally humanists, who should have in fact rejected
rationalism root and branch --or might have been expected to do so. Most of
them were empirically-minded thinkers working under the varied banners of
romanticism, positivism, materialism, and pragmatism, yet they somehow remained
under the grip of a pure, non-empirical reason.
So why then, one may ask, did it
take so long for 20th century philosophers to escape this grip and
stop being seduced by the "siren song" of rationalism? And what
impeded "the emergence of a thoroughgoing holistic pragmatism"?
According to Morton White, one factor was certainly the wide (explicit or
tacit) acceptance of Cartesian rationalism and half-rationalism, and yet
another one was the predominance of views on a priori knowledge held by
analytic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, C.I. Lewis, and
Rudolf Carnap. We should not forget that all of these distinguished and very
influential philosophers accepted some version or other of the
analytic-synthetic distinction -- though admittedly, as White points out, Moore
expressed doubts about its clarity toward the end of his life" (5).
What about Wittgenstein? How should
we assess his impact in this regard? If one could characterize two major errors
from which White had to recover, so to speak, in order to apprehend clearly the
viability of holistic pragmatism and its implications for a broadly construed
philosophy of culture, they are: 'Error #1' Wittgenstein's view in the Tractatus,
according to which "psychology is no more closely related to
philosophy than any other natural science" and that "the statements
of philosophy are (in fact) senseless" (xi, 70). And 'Error #2': Quine's
view that "philosophy of science is philosophy enough." As for the
late Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations, White seems to
have an overall positive assessment despite a critical qualification. According
to his understanding of Wittgenstein's later views, it would seem that he
"encouraged an expansive view of philosophy as the philosophy of culture
as well as holistic pragmatism." But then "he also seemed to hold
that some statements are factual whereas others are accepted merely on the
basis of grammar." Did Wittgenstein actually accept a sharp dichotomy
between analytic and synthetic truth? If he did, then, White would have to
conclude that his philosophy contained a vestige of rationalism. But, in the
final analysis, he prefers to think that "he was more of an ally of
holistic pragmatism than he is often made out to be," especially, he adds,
because "he encouraged philosophers to describe the many uses of
language" in various areas of culture (63).
(II) Holistic Pragmatism --Or, How Quine Got Hoisted with
His Own Petard?
It is befitting at this stage to
engage the discussion of the doctrine of holistic pragmatism --as an attempt to
radically put in question the analytic-synthetic distinction which was so
central to the logical positivists' program (60).
Holistic pragmatism basically
rejects the Cartesian conception of philosophy and objects fundamentally to the
view that no mathematical or logical principles can be abandoned in the face of
"a recalcitrant experience," to use Quine's expression. Furthermore,
it holds that if a statement reporting an experience is rejected, the whole
conjunction that logically implies it may be rejected; if a prediction of
experience turns out to be false, at least one of the components of the whole
conjunction that implies it may be rejected, and that component may even be a
logical statement --unless that logical statement is itself involved in using
the holistic pragmatic method of testing. [More on this in section IV].
Let's consider now Quine's
formulation of the doctrine as it is laid out in his 1951 paper. He writes: "Each
man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory
stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific
heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational,
pragmatic." (1, 1953: 46). According to White, this formulation,
though concise is in fact "pregnant with meaning." It is significant
for the following four reasons: (i) Being about the behavior of human beings
and their heritage, it is about a cultural phenomenon. (ii) Since a scientific
heritage is regarded as a conjunction of many beliefs rather than as one
(singular and non-conjunctive) belief, it is underwritten by a holistic view.
(iii) Its reference to a barrage of sensory stimulation or a flux of
experiences makes it an empiricist statement. And finally, (iv) its reference
to a pragmatic warping of a scientific heritage to fit sensory promptings shows
that it is obviously situated within the tradition of pragmatism (67).
Holistic pragmatism stipulates that
the warpings that scientists or any other inquirers (in any other field) engage
in must be done with great concern for the elegance and simplicity of
the theory they ultimately adopt, and with the intention of warping the
heritage conservatively, or by engaging in minimum modification (James)
or mutilation (Quine) of it (22). It is here useful, I believe, to take
stock of the brand of holism characteristic of James' pragmatism which has
unquestionably influenced Quine's thinking on this subject.
It comes out clearly when he considers the question of how we test our beliefs,
or as Quine would put it, how the configuration and reconfiguration of our
"web of beliefs' take place.
Holistic pragmatism must then be viewed,
as we have already established above, in direct opposition to rationalism, in
that the latter holds that we (can) have knowledge that is not tested by
experience, This opposition is illustrated in the attack that Tarksi, Quine,
Goodman and White himself had mounted in the 50s and 60s on the logical
positivists' distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. The latter,
as we may recall, claimed that all truths of logic are analytic because they
are true by virtue of the meanings of their terms and therefore not tested by
experience. In contrast, holistic philosophers argue that because a scientific
theory is a conjunction of logical statements and statements of natural
science, a scientist's sensory experience may lead her to reject even a logical
component of that conjunction in an effort to make the scientific theory fit
those sensory promptings. For this reason, among others, holistic pragmatists
reject the analytic-synthetic distinction as unclear, obscure and untenable.
Finally, they argue that statements of metaphysics or ontology are also
conjuncts of a holistically conceived scientific theory that is pragmatically
warped to fit sensory experience.
White makes it clear that he agrees
with most of Quine's characterization of the way in which natural scientists
warp their heritage, but he points out that it is his restrictive and selective
focus that he finds problematic and objectionable. In particular, he disagrees
with Quine's arguments to keep science and the philosophy of science on a pedestal
and separate from other human endeavors, and thereby blocking the path toward a
broadly and more democratically construed approach to culture and the
philosophy of culture. He writes: "What separates Quine and me on this
issue is not his behaviorism but his selective behaviorism, which is motivated
by his initial philosophical inclination to regard knowledge more narrowly than
I do and which impels him to build epistemic walls between science and ethics
that I decline to build or buttress" (167). And he adds, quite
significantly and decisively, I believe, that it has sometimes occurred to him
that if Quine were to discover that a proposed criterion for being cognitive did
in fact apply to ethical statements, he might count that as an argument against
the criterion itself. Whereas he would be inclined to say that a criterion for
being cognitive which leads to the conclusion that ethical statements are not
cognitive is defective for that very reason. After all, he points out, most of
us say that we believe, and some of us say that we know, that ethical
statements are true. This is one of the reasons, he claims, why he has argued
that they should be accepted as elements of a Duhemian conjunction (of beliefs)
which is anchored in sensory experience and emotional experience, and
that in ethics, we use a Duhemian conjunction to work out a manageable
structure into the flux of sensations and feelings of moral obligations,
whereas in science, we use a Duhemian conjunction to work out a manageable
structure into the flux of sensory experiences. (6, 76, 168).
In order to make his case, White
often turns Quine's own arguments against him --in an effort, so to speak, to
hoist him with his own petard. Thus, though he adopts Quine's holism, he argues
in contrast for a non-reductive holism (157). While Quine has questioned
against the positivists the epistemic separation between science and ontology,
White takes a similar path, but this time, in order to undermine Quine's
separation of science from ethics. He does not share his inclination to
distinguish between the cognitive and the moral.
He calls into question two of
Quine's claims: (1) We can judge the morality of an act only on the basis of
our moral principles themselves. (2) A coherence theory of truth is the lot of
ethics --while, of course, the correspondence theory of truth is naturally the
lot of natural science. White rejects (1), because, in his mind, it lends
support to the view that our ethical principles are somehow self-evident
guarantors of singular moral judgments with no anchor in our feelings. He
prefers to anchor a conjunction of moral and descriptive beliefs in a
combination of sentences with varying degrees of observationality. He rejects
(2) because, in his view, experience includes feelings of moral obligation as
well as sensory experiences. For White, our heritage contains not only beliefs
of logic and natural science, but moral beliefs as well --since, as he puts it,
"a moral judge tries to organize a flux consisting of feelings of moral
obligation as well as of sensory experiences" (3, 76). In
addition to "observation-sentences" (with varying degrees of observationality),
White wishes to countenance "feeling-sentences" (with varying degrees
of normativity). This in effect serves indirectly to underwrite his
thoroughgoing "radical empiricism," while at the same time avoiding
the "scientism" of Quine's view.
The distinction that Quine wanted
to establish and maintain between science and ethics is in
White's view untenable. The kind of warping of our scientific heritage that a
scientist engages in can also take place in ethics as well as in other areas.
As a "methodological monist," as he occasionally calls himself, and a
consistent proponent of holistic pragmatism, White believes that we test both
our physical and moral beliefs by checking our so-called "Duhemian
conjunctions" against a pool of experiences --to be sure, differently
constituted kinds of experiences, but experiences nevertheless: in the former
case a pool consisting wholly of sensory experiences, and in the latter case a
pool composed of both sensory experiences and feelings of obligations (169).
Though we may treat some beliefs with great respect or conservatively, and we
often do, this is no guarantee that we will always respect them or kindred
beliefs, when trouble arises in a system or web in which they play a part. The
detailed arguments that he articulates and levels rigorously against Quine are,
in my view, correct and rather convincing (155-170). In the final analysis,
White gives us good reasons to reject the restrictive position that Quine
defends, namely, once again, that "philosophy of science is philosophy
enough." This is arguably, as he puts it, a remnant of the logical
positivism against which Quine reacted --but apparently insufficiently (3).
(III) Can Holistic Pragmatism be Justified? --Without
One final set of questions must be
addressed before drawing this discussion to a close. How can holistic
pragmatism be ultimately justified? Is it just an empirical description
(with a certain degree of generality) of what scientists, moralists or any
other inquirers engage in, or is it a rule with a certain prescriptive
and normative power? In either case, is it such that one can be prompted to
revise or reject it on the basis of a required warping of our heritage to fit
with our continuing sensory promptings, to accommodate new facts, new
realizations, new moral or scientific beliefs, or is it such that we must seek
to preserve it at all costs, and should not discard it lightly? And last but
not least, isn't holistic pragmatism ultimately compelled to assume a
questionable distinction of the kind that White sought to undermine throughout
his discussion? E.g. a priori vs. a posteriori, or analytic vs.
synthetic? To his credit, White takes up these questions and attempts in a
final chapter to answer them.
White argues, in reply, that holistic pragmatist can
and should say that "some logical principles are immune to
rejection by experience --namely, those involved in his hypothetico-deductive
method of testing--and that the doctrine of holistic pragmatism is also immune
to quick and easy rejection by experience because he
resolves to hold on to it (179; see section II). What this implies under
White's analysis is this: the Duhemian conjunction or scientific heritage of
each scientist or empirically-minded inquirer contains two kinds of statements,
those that they resolve to immunize against easy refutation by experience and
those that they do not immunize in such a manner. For White, as we have seen
earlier, the heritage of a holistic pragmatist is rather heterogeneous in
composition; it may include logical, epistemological, physical or even moral
statements. A holistic pragmatist may begin (as a descriptive epistemologist) by
making an empirical statement about the behavior of scientists, in which
case he is merely describing the actual practices by which they support and
test their beliefs, but he may later on (as a normative epistemologist) issue a
rule, according to which no experience may constitute sufficient ground for
rejecting holistic pragmatism itself. And in so doing, he would take on a
different role, akin in some sense to that of the legislator who transforms a
customary practice into law. By thus transforming his description of how
scientists do support and test their beliefs into a prescription (a rule
or convention) of how they should do so, White argues, a holistic
pragmatist may protect his doctrine from refutation by a skeptic or critic who
considers it merely as an empirical, descriptive hypothesis.
The advantage gained from regarding
holistic pragmatism as a rule is that it enables us to make sense of
epistemology as a normative discipline, in addition to being a descriptive
endeavor. But to say so however, and White stresses this crucial point, does
not entail that it is immutable. In fact, consistently with the central tenets
of holistic pragmatism, it must now be clear that nothing is in fact considered
to be immutable, and nothing is immune or immunized once and for all and
absolutely from possible revision or rejection. All beliefs are subject to
possible revisions and eventual rejection. However some beliefs may be more
immunized than others, relatively speaking. Some may even be pinned down, while
others are unpinned. And so, to say that holistic pragmatism is a rule suggests
that it is for the time being pinned down for all practical and theoretical
purposes, and that, as such, it is not to be cast off lightly or discarded
easily. As White puts it: "...the principle of holistic pragmatism is one
that a holistic pragmatist does not lightly surrender" (181-2). Elsewhere,
he also states: "In my view, the principle of holistic pragmatism resists
change in the highest degree, and that is why we resolve to hold on to it"
(183; see also section II). White goes on to stress again and again, in so
many different ways, that resolving to accepting and holding on to holistic
pragmatism does not mean that it can never be altered or surrendered. For,
"what is once pinned down does not have to be always pinned down." It
means however that in order to warrant and effectuate either of those changes a
very powerful argument is required.
By thus distinguishing between an
empirical description and a rule, as White does, isn't he in the end committing
in turn the cardinal "sin of epistemic dualism" that he has so
vehemently sought to expiate from the work of other philosophers? Isn't such a
distinction itself as problematic and objectionable as the analytic-synthetic
distinction, or the a priori-a posteriori distinction? In response,
White writes: "Of this sin I believe I am not guilty for a reason that I
repeat: a rule, like a legal statute is not immutable, since changes in the
institution of scientific thinking requires its rules to change as changes in
customs requires the laws of a country to change. Therefore, the rule of
holistic pragmatism differs from the analytic, a priori, necessary, and
self-evident truth that classical rationalists such as Descartes and
half-rationalists such as Hume accept. And so long as this rule is regarded as
mutable, it is not separated from empirical beliefs by the epistemic chasm that
rationalism creates" (186).
(IV) A Few Thoughts in Guise of a Final Evaluation
Philosophers seeking a distinctive
role for philosophy should not feel uneasy for being relieved of a 'first job'
they thought they had (i.e., analyzing attributes, meanings, essences in a
priori manner), and that they have for the most part performed poorly or
even miserably. They have always had all along a 'second job', which they have
performed rather well and at times admirably, though not always consistently
enough (i.e., describing and evaluating the ways in which we form beliefs,
support and test them) and which could well substitute for the first one. They
should not fear that the tasks that they must now perform to fulfill their new
job requirements --those of the descriptive and normative epistemologist--make
them look like (or in any case, not essentially different from) many other
inquirers in various areas who espouse and exemplify holistic pragmatism in
various ways in their respective work. It is only when philosophers are willing
and ready to take up the pair of tasks described above that they will be able
to "avoid the blind alleys of rationalism" and come to accept fully
that "philosophy of culture is philosophy enough" (187).
When we finally take the proper and
full measure of White's project, and when all is added up, it becomes apparent,
as I have mentioned at the outset, that in order to redefine the proper and
only viable kind of philosophy, in accord with the doctrine of holistic
pragmatism, White must do away with a number of dualisms, distinctions and
divisions which have saddled Western philosophy for much of its history --esp.,
modern and up to the better part of the 20th century. It also
becomes apparent that the philosophy of culture that he advocates must be
anti-metaphysical, anti-foundationalist, anti-rationalist, anti-skepticism,
anti-reductionist holism, anti-reductive naturalism, and arguably,
anti-scientism -- not to mention several other oppositions that may well be
applicable. The (descriptive and normative) epistemology that he favors must be
empirical, holistic, pragmatic, but one could also assume, naturalized, yet
socialized and historicized as well.
Perhaps the single, most overriding
merit of White's enterprise is that he seeks to do so from the perspective of a
rehabilitated and more consistently construed pragmatism, that is firmly
anchored in a "radical empiricism" of the kind that James was not
able to carry through consistently, and which may be akin to what has in more
recent years been characterized as 'superior empiricism,"
taking its cue from a statement to that effect by F.W.J. von Schelling.
In some sense, one might very
plausibly say that White has in effect undertaken (to use a term that may well
be anathema in this context) the 'deconstruction' of dualistic or binary
systems of thought along with the traditional assumptions and pretensions which
have characteristically dominated most, if not all, of the history of Western
philosophy. To this extent, he may thus be joining those philosophers, in the
so-called Continental tradition, who have also endeavored to do just that for
the past 40-50 years or so.
But this naturally compels us to ask whether White is therefore merely
"breaking down an already broken and widely open door."
This however may not be fair in view
of the fact that about half a century ago, in his Age of Analysis
(1955), he said that "nothing could be more important than applying the
techniques of analytic philosophy to subjects in the philosophy of
culture." But little did he expect, he goes on to say, that by the end of
the 20th century, his hope would be "realized in the work of
several philosophers trained in analytic, linguistic, and pragmatic
traditions, who managed to free themselves from the vestiges of rationalism
in logical positivism." And he adds: "I think this ironic development
in the history of philosophy bodes well for its future, since it opens up new
avenues for humanistic inquiry. It also shows that study of the many aspects of
culture is not the exclusive preserve of muddle-heads, philosophasters,
and charlatans" (xiii; emphasis added).
One may wonder in this last regard
who exactly does White have in mind when using these words? Could this be in
reference to philosophers more squarely anchored in the so-called "Continental
tradition"? What would White say for example about the well-known comments
made by Moore and Carnap about the work of Santayana and Heidegger
respectively? It is well-known that G.E. Moore dismissed Santayana's study The
Life of Reason (1905-6) --a five-volume work in the philosophy of culture
that dealt with art, religion, morals and science--by saying: "This book
is so wanting in clearness of thought that I doubt whether it can be of much
use to anyone."
Similarly, it is well-known that Carnap also dismissed Heidegger's Being and
Time (1927) as consisting essentially of pseudo-statements and even
If White intended somehow,
wittingly or unwittingly, to revive or perpetuate the divide between
traditions, then one may have to conclude that his book is in the end merely of
historical interest, still caught up in a rear-guard outlook and perspective,
rather than truly advancing the philosophical debate about philosophy or
philosophy of culture, or for that matter, the contemporary debate raging today
in cultural politics. It seems to me that such a debate has already moved in
many ways beyond the traditional concerns of Analytic philosophy or even those
of the Continental philosophy toward what we may more properly characterize as
"post-Analytic and meta-Continental philosophy" --of the kind that
John McCumber, for example, to his credit, has been urging and defending in his
latest book, Reshaping Reason: Toward a New Philosophy (2005),
and in which he argues for a broadly construed philosophy (of culture) in time,
in its time, or rather, a philosophy that enable us to inhabit more fully our
time in its various dimensions, as temporal and relational beings that we are,
by rationally constructing situations, or situating us --in so many different
ways, and in diverse areas of human activities.
Nader N. "Philosophy in Time, or, How to Inhabit Time?--A Critique of
Temporal Reason." A Critical Review of John McCumber. Reshaping Reason:
Toward a New Philosophy. In Philosophy in Review/Comptes Rendus Philosophiques.
Vol. 26, No. 3, June 2006; 222-25.
On the Uses and Abuses of 'Culture' in Contemporary Philosophy. New
York- Amsterdam: Rodopi, forthcoming in 2007.
Gilles. Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995.
M. Being and Time. (1927). Translated. by John Macquarrie
and Edward Robinson. London: SCM Press, 1962.
William. Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
John. Reshaping Reason: Toward a New Philosophy. Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2005.
G.E. "A Review of Santayana's The Life of Reason." International
Journal of Ethics 17 (1906-07): 248.
W.V. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In From a Logical
Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1953, pp. 20-46. Originally published in Philosophical
Review 60 (1951).
G. The Life of Reason. Or, The Phases of Human Progress.
Vol. 1-5. New York: Scribner's; London: Constable. 1905-06.
F. W. J. von. On the History of Modern Philosophy. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Morton. "A Philosophical Letter of Alfred Tarski." Journal
of Philosophy 84 (1987): 28-32.
"The Psychologism of Hume and Quine Compared." In Proceedings of
the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Ed. M.D. Gedney. Philosophy
Documentation Center. (Bowling Green: KY: 2000), 7: 151-59.
The Age of Analysis: Twentieth Century Philosohers. Boston: 1955.
© 2006 Nader N. Chokr
Nader N. Chokr, Professor of Philosophy & Social Sciences,
Shandong University, Jinan, China